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This thesis explores possibilities that arise from 
regarding theodicy as the activity of descriptive understanding 
of Christian belief and practice as found in the classical 
theistic framework.
First, any theodicy as an activity is analysed in terms 
of the role of philosophy, the place of epistemology, the basis 
of theology, and the taking of an apologetic stance. It is 
then argued that traditional approaches to theodicy suffer from 
methodological weaknesses which derive from formulating theodicy 
in terms of unbelief, and from strictly theoretical analysis. 
The superiority of philosophical description is argued as 
better suited to understanding religious belief as held in the 
community of believers, with especial reference to relationships 
that hold between language and reality. A critical exploration 
follows of the approach to theodicy of a proponent of philoso- 
phical description, D.Z. Phillips, and consideration is given 
to the status of evaluations made by believers.
In the light of this critique, two attempts are made 
to describe the shape of Christian theodicy using the interperson 
model of theological language. The first attempt, based on a 
description of actual interpersonal relationships, is found 
eventually to be open to serious objections. A second attempt 
is then made, based not only on interpersonal language, but 
using a distinction between "surface" and "depth" in religious 
language, and by arguing for the presence of an epistemological 
"direction" in religious belief. On this basis, a Theodicy of 
Dependence is developed as best describing the shape of 
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Introduction and Section One
Introduction
1. It is possible to understand the task of theodicy in 
narrower or broader terms. More narrowly, the interests and 
intentions of the theodicist may be set out by using such 
phrases as "to justify the ways of God", "to vindicate the 
goodness and justice of God", "to make God's omnipotence and 
omnibenevolence compatible with the existence of evil", "to 
defend the belief that this is the best of all possible worlds". 
There is a common strand in narrower theodicy, however it is 
put, in that there is an assumption someone needs to be 
convinced one way or the other about God in the face of evil.
2. Recent discussion in theodicy has led S.T. Davis to 
propose that the word "theodicy" should be used in a broader
way: that theodicy is "any response to the problem of evil
2 from the perspective of Judeo-Christian religious belief".
He suggests this wider use because of the variety of approaches 
now in evidence in theodical writing - such variety being not 
just stylistic, but reflecting deeper methodological and 
substantive differences. But even so, and granting that 
theodicy now takes in writers from the process, existentialist, 
and analytical traditions of philosophy, and from a wide range
of theological commitments, Davis' book Encountering Evil; Live
3Options in Theodicy , which brings such various thinkers
together in debate, still has the background assumption that 
someone needs to be convinced one way or the other about God 
in the face of evil.
This thesis is set within the broader conception of what 
might constitute a valid form of theodical writing, but it sets 
on one side as an interest and intention the assumption that 
theodicy is an argument between believers and unbelievers in
which each is seeking to defend his position or convince the 
other. That is not to say certain of the arguments made in 
this thesis could not be set within that different context, 
but, if they were, that would be because protagonists use what- 
ever is to hand. My interest is in what it means for an 
adoring worshipper to offer his worship to God in a frequently 
hostile world. My intention is to lay out the discussion by 
seeking a descriptive understanding of the shape of such 
practised belief.
But in a different sense this thesis has a narrower 
brief. Attention is focussed on those worshippers whose beliefs 
are set out within the context of classical Christian theism.
3. What would constitute success within broader theodical 
activity? Clearly not, in this thesis, the power of the argu- 
ment to convince people they should move from belief to unbelief, 
or from unbelief to belief. Indeed, in laying out an under- 
standing of the shape of practised belief descriptively, it may 
be that the unbeliever is confirmed in his position and the 
believer in his at the same time. But what that result would 
indicate is that perhaps belief and unbelief are not based on 
the power of argument, but on religious judgement and commitment. 
Philosophical description is not intended to, nor can it, 
operate as that which tells anyone whether they should or should 
not believe. Its task is to set out what the shape of belief/ 
unbelief is, if one believes/does not believe. The descriptive 
philosopher is neither protagonist, nor preacher.
4. It might be objected that what is proposed is an
unacceptable modification of the notion of "theodicy". Theodicy,
4 in that it is a word made up from the words "theos" and "dike" ,
must be an activity concerned with the narrower, as well as the
broader, task. My reply is that if gains in understanding of 
the nature of belief can be attained by the methodological 
procedure of setting on one side the need to vindicate or 
defend, then those gains in themselves are sufficient reasons 
for exploring such an approach. It is not necessary for this 
thesis to go beyond this methodological stance to make the 
exploration worth the attempt. But, in course of argument, a 
rather stronger case is made - that in fact this methodology is 
peculiarly appropriate to understanding what it is believers are 
saying.
5. But, it might be objected immediately, this view of 
philosophy as descriptive understanding is unacceptable in 
principle, for philosophy has to do with the exposure of error, 
not its descriptive understanding - one cannot understand that 
which is an error. One cannot assume, therefore, ahead of 
determining the coherence of the beliefs of the believer, that 
those beliefs can be understood. Indeed, attempting to describe 
those beliefs may itself show they cannot be described, because 
they are incoherent.
The problem here concerns what the tests of coherence are 
this objector has in mind. Perhaps part of the descriptive task 
in relation to a long-standing and persistent practised belief 
system is to seek to understand what the internal criteria of 
rationality are that enable it to be long-standing and persistent? 
That "perhaps" is a possibility worth exploring. Ahead, then, 
of an accurate philosophical description of the shape of 
persisting belief in God held in a world that contains evil, 
perhaps one does not know what the criteria are by which to 
judge it coherent or not? Philosophical imperialism needs to 
be resisted here. What is possible in philosophy does not depend
on legislation on what philosophy must be, but on whether the 
kind of philosophy practised yields insights of a worthwhile kind 
regarding that examined.
6. But is "it being claimed that if a coherent account of 
belief can be given in the terms proposed, that that belief is 
thereby shown to be "true" - and does not such an account come 
after all to the same thing as justifying the belief in question? 
Not at all. All that would be implied is that the belief could 
be "true", that is, there are no reasons internal to the structure 
of that belief which make it "untrue" because incoherent.
s
Whether what is "possible" is "plausible" is not of interest 
in descriptive philosophy.
7.a) Traditional theodicy has, of course, seen itself as 
concerned in varying ways with settling a question of "truth". 
The debate has been at bottom about not just whether it is 
possible that belief in God could be a true belief in the light 
of the fact of evil, but whether it is plausible. This debate 
is based on a confusion. The confusion concerns whose problem 
it is as to whether belief in God is plausible belief. Although 
the question of God's existence might well be the concern of the 
unbeliever, it cannot properly be the concern of the believer, 
for the believer is someone for whom God is the reality whom he 
worships, this worship being within a community and a tradition. 
Internal to this worshipful belief is that, for the believer, 
God is real quite as surely as evil is a reality. The believer's
o
proper problem is, therefore, how God and evil relate together. 
This thesis is interested primarily in this problem. The 
unbeliever, be he atheist or agnostic, however, only has in this 
context the fundamental presupposition that evil is a reality. 
His "problem" is whether or not to accept as a further pre-
supposition the believer's claim concerning the reality of God. 
The unbeliever might well wish to test belief in the reality of 
God. That desire to "test" belief in the reality of God cannot 
be the interest or intention of the believer, for he is 
concerned to express his belief. Now in expressing his belief, 
in the context of worship, the believer will use certain tests 
for what is and what is not appropriate in his form of under- 
standing. But these tests are internal to belief, and are a 
way of achieving coherence. When, therefore, the descriptive 
theodicist seeks to understand the shape of belief he will need 
to set out what the tests are through which the rationality of 
belief is maintained. This descriptive task is not at all the 
same as externally applying tests as to whether those beliefs 
are "plausible".
b) It might be objected that there are many believers 
for whom considerable doubts are raised by evil in relation to 
their belief in God, indeed contrary to what has just been said, 
that this pressure to doubt God's existence is precisely the 
believer's problem. To answer this point an argument is 
developed in section four which seeks to show why believers 
find force in a question that is not rightly theirs.
c) It might also be objected that in any case my argument 
involves a triviality, namely, that believers in God believe in 
God. But trivialities can express important points. The 
important point here is the place God has in the believer's 
structure of thought. My argument is that important, and not 
trivial, insights into theodicy become possible when it is
accepted that "God", as the presiding concept in Christian
q belief, is unshakeable in the Christian form of life.
8. The ways in which traditional writing on theodicy has 
approached the task of vindicating God to the unbeliever have 
been varied. There are those who have argued that such theodicy 
is:
not possible at all, as a matter of fact
not possible at all, as a matter of logic
12 possible in principle, but not possible in fact
possible in principle, and in fact
possible in principle, and in fact, but not
desirable
15 
not possible in principle, but possible in fact.
Where these approaches seek to vindicate God they usually build 
on a common platform, that the way things go in the world is 
causally related directly or indirectly to the will of God, 
and that it is possible to make inferences from the world to God. 
In opposition to these points, it is argued religious belief 
does not proceed from the world to God, but conversely, from 
God to the world - and, even then, not on the basis of 
inference.
9. The thesis is organised as follows:
Section One seeks to understand what factors
constitute theodicy as an activity. This discussion is set out, 
not in terms of tasks or goals, but by considering inputs to 
theodicy from philosophy, theology, epistemology, and apologetic. 
How theodicy proceeds as an activity depends on decisions in 
each of these regards.
Section Two considers what are argued to be false 
moves in theodicy, and lessons are drawn from these false moves 
for the task of engaging in theodicy as the descriptive under- 
standing of the believer's proper problem. An underlying problem
7is identified in philosophical method which treats religious 
belief on the basis of strictly theoretical analysis.
Section Three critically examines a theodical
position - that of D.Z. Phillips - which specifically aims to 
use a methodology designed to open up the structures of religious 
belief in its own terms.
Section Four attempts, in the light of previous 
discussion, to find in what terms a description may be made of 
the structures of thought held by believers when they use the 
interpersonal language of classical theism in worship. How do 
Christian believers, as worshippers, hold together as mutually 
compatible the realities for them of both God and evil?
8Section One; Theodicy as an Activity
1. First, how does philosophy contribute to theodicy?
a) The present century has seen the rise to
dominance in English philosophy of the view that philosophy is 
an analytical activity, not a synthetic one. This view has 
also been associated with the claim that what is to be analysed 
is ordinary-language, and that criteria of meaning applicable 
in ordinary-language have generalised significance. Clarifica- 
tion of concepts, exposure of category errors, dispelling the 
bewitchment of language, and so on, are the proper and only 
concerns of the philosopher. As far as theodicy is concerned, 
much recent writing has been of this type, with particular 
attention to such concepts as "Omnipotence", "Freewill", and 
"Evil". The centre of interest in this approach is the question 
of what it makes sense to say in ordinary-language terms.
A paradigm example of theodicy as a philosophical
activity of this kind is M.B. Ahern's The Problem of Evi1. Its 
sole interest is in the threefold theodical terms "God", "Evil", 
and "Goodness", and whether it makes sense, given the criteria 
of meaning for ordinary-language, to say them, and to say them 
together.
b) Other theodicists are still, however, influenced 
by an older view of the nature of philosophy which sees the 
philosophical task as not merely clarificatory, but also as 
being synthetic. These theodicists would claim the problem of 
evil only arises at the point where the logicians finish. If, 
as Ahern and Plantinga claim, the logical disproof of God's 
existence does not, or cannot, succeed, how, in the context of 
the given world view (Christianity), and on the basis of a
coherent epistemology, can an account be offered of God's 
dealings with men? Such writers see it as a proper philosophical 
task to attempt to construct a comprehensive theodicy. In 
addition to the preliminary need for clarity they look for a 
further coherence, that of a system of thought. To achieve this 
further coherence, such theodicists need a given world view and 
a specific epistemological theory, for the view and the theory
set respectively the limits of what it is that is to be discussed,
1 R 
and the legitimacy of the discussion.
Outstanding examples of such theodicies are those by
19 J. Hick in Evil and the God of Love , and A. Farrer in Love
20 Almighty and Ills Unlimited. Both of these writers have
elsewhere than in these theodicies made clear their philosophical 
commitments and their world-views, and these theodicies are 
their resulting attempts at constructive writing in philosophy 
regarding the problem of evil.
c) Another view of the nature of philosophy is to
be found in the writings of "later Wittgensteinian" philosophers. 
The emphasis is still on clarity, but the clarity thought to be 
possible is that which derives from describing the use of words 
in known contexts. l The interest shifts to philosophical 
understanding, those understandings having to do with all the 
extra-linguistic activities that surround the use of words within 
life-situations. In the case of theodicy, therefore, the 
emphasis would be on describing what words mean as used in the 
given total context; for example, how the word "omnipotence" 
functions in the community of Christian belief. There are, on 
this view, no generally transferrable or normative criteria of 
meaning known apart from the given context of use. No one form 
of language-use can be exalted as the test of meaning for all
10
others.
The predominant application to theodicy of this 
understanding of philosophy is found in the writings of D.Z. 
Phillips, especially in The Concept of Prayer. 22 But generally 
there has been little direct consideration of theodicy using 
this view of philosophy.
This thesis is written from a position not unsympathetic 
to this third approach, but which is nevertheless critical of
some of the uses to which descriptive philosophy has been put 
in the philosophy of religion. The guestion is explored as to 
whether the method of descriptive understanding can be 
successfully detached from the kinds of epistemological theory 
sometimes associated with it.
2. Secondly, what is the contribution theology makes 
to theodicy?
a) The inescapability of the theological element in 
theodicy is commented on by Hick. One of the lessons he draws 
from his historical survey of theodical writing is that there
has been continual interaction between theodicy and theology. 
The alternative "Augustinian" and "Irenaean" ways of thinking 
about God and evil are, Hick argues, connected with alternative 
ways of thinking about several other topics, such as the fall
of man, the nature of sin, providence, redemption, predestination,
23 heaven and hell. I would prefer to phrase this somewhat
differently from Hick, and say theodicy is the result of the 
interaction of philosophy and theology in a given area, rather 
than saying theodicy itself interacts with theology, but the 
main point stands.
b) But in what form does theology enter into theodicy? 
One of my complaints against much writing by analytical theodic-
11
24 ists is that the theology entertained is highly truncated, and
comprises a short set of theodical terms - omnipotence,
omnibenevolence, God, evil, freewill, and a very few more. But
25 theology cannot be truncated in this way without distortion,
for the meanings of such terms do not lie in themselves alone, 
but in the network of surrounding terms such as forgiveness, 
grace, hope, Holy Spirit, and heaven. It is striking that in 
much discussion the very words which link common theodical 
vocabulary to the believer's awareness of the love of God in 
Christ, and which qualify that vocabulary, are given little or 
no place.
c) In the light of the point just made, one is led 
to raise the wider consideration as to the relationship between
A
theology and Christian experience. It seems to be assumed by 
many writers that the Christian faith stands, or falls, with 
the successful defence, or otherwise, of a few given doctrines. 
Now, whilst it must be the case that there is a definite 
relationship between Christian experience and Christian theology, 
and that to some extent this relationship will be dialectical
O C.
in operation, I would argue that the Christian experience 
is what the believer has primary reference to within the 
dialectic, not any particular theological doctrines. In this 
way Hick, for example, speaks of Christian theology as "the 
attempts by Christian thinkers to speak systematically about God 
on the basis of the data provided by Christian experience", and 
instances Christological theories and atonement theories as 
respectively relating to the "faith-experience that 'God was in 
Christ 1 ", and to the "basic fact of faith that in Christ God 
was 'reconciling the world unto Himself". He remarks that "The 
other departments of Christian doctrine stand in a similar
12
27 
relationship to the primary data of Christian experience." The
call by the Christian community, then, to those who would know 
God, is fundamentally the call to experience salvation in Christ, 
not fundamentally to assent to a creed. In the context of 
theodicy it is important, therefore, to resist the intellectuali-
OQ
sation of Christianity into a theoretical system of ideas.
The links between experience and theology are well spelt 
out also by Phillips (though it is not suggested for the same 
reasons as Hick):
systematic theology is a sophistication of that 
theology which is necessarily present in so far 
as religious language is present. The theological 
system is often constructed to answer certain 
questions and problems which may arise. But the 
foundation of a theological system is based on 
the non-formalised theology which is within 
the religious way of life carried on by the 
person who is constructing the theological system. 
In so far as this is true, theology is personal, 
since it is based on one's own experience of God. 
Where the connection between theology and exper- 
ience is missing, there is a danger of theology 
becoming an academic game.29
My interest is, therefore, in what it means in the widest sense for 
the Christian community to experience the all-goodness and all-
powerfulness and all-lovingness of God, and to seek to talk
^ 4-   4. 30 
about it.
d) It might be objected that this project involves 
the theodicist in a hopeless task, for everyone's experience is 
different and, therefore, one would need as many theodicies as 
there are believers. And further, does not this approach to 
theology amount to recognising an inability on the part of the 
believer to express himself and his experience clearly, and in a 
way open to public test? No; for there are indeed very public 
tests as to whether an experience is Christian. What counts 
as Christian experience is determined within an historic and
13
communal tradition. The experiences referred to are those 
recognised by that community of believers as significant and 
authentic. What counts as forgiveness, for example, is well 
known in the tradition, and does not depend on its being
accurately defined in doctrine, or on the individual believer's
31 
ability to give an account of it.
e) Theology is, thus, essential to theodicy, for it 
provides the community's belief in words - but the reservation 
needs to be made that theology is at best the attempt by the 
community to encapsulate an experience. The question is, of 
any theological term, then, what role it plays in the context of 
practised belief.
3. Thirdly, what contribution does epistemological theory 
make to theodicy? It has already been indicated that epistemo- 
logical theory is one of two factors necessary to "constructive" 
theodicy. The extent of this importance is now assessed, but 
only part of the case concerning epistemology is presented here,
for the place of epistemology in relation to Phillips* thought
32 is handled in a different context. Comment at this point is
restricted to illustrating the formative role of epistemology 
in two major theodicists, by way of exemplars. Firstly, Leibniz, 
in the rationalist tradition. Secondly Hick, in the empiricist 
tradition.
a) Leibniz begins Theodicy, Essays on the Goodness
33 
of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil by first
declaring his views on the correct relationship between faith 
and reason. He writes:
I begin with the preliminary question of the 
conformity of faith with reason, and the use of 
philosophy in theology, because it has much 
influence on the main subject of my treatise, 
and because M. Bayle introduces it everywhere.
14
I assume that two truths cannot contradict each 
other . . . 34
And at the beginning of his first essay proper on theodicy, he 
writes :
Having so settled the rights of faith and of 
reason as rather to place reason at the service 
of faith than in opposition to it, we shall see 
how they exercise these rights to support and 
harmonize what the light of nature and the light 
of revelation teach us of God and of man in 
relation to evil . 35 (My underlining)
Leibniz had no doubt at all, then, that both in his own writing 
and in the writing of Bayle what determined the possibilities 
of the shape of their theodicies was the epistemological theory 
that underwrote each of them. To counter Bayle f s theodical 
views there was, Leibniz saw, a need to change the basis of 
argument. But what is the effect of this frank confession? Is 
it not that theodicies prove, as a consequence, to be more 
illuminating as to their author's epistemological options than 
revealing as to whether God, in a simple way, can be "justified"? 
Does the all -goodness and all- power fulness of God turn on the 
adoption of an epistemological theory? My argument is eventually 
that this question is too simplistic, and epistemology has a 
proper place in theodicy if that epistemology is internally 
related to the nature of worship; but this argument must be
oc
made in its own turn. The present point is that the weapon 
turned on Bayle by Leibniz is a weapon that backfires. Leibniz 1 
theodicy also, and in turn, and equally with Bayle f s, is an
example of epistemology "exercising its rights". Consequently,
37 by attaching theodicy to the controversial rationalist doctrine,
the justice of God is made to turn on the success of that 
doctrine. That procedure does not seem to be very satisfactory, 
for then only the rationalist could claim to be able to defend
15
God's justice. Must believers become rationalists to know God 
is good?
There is a different point to be made also, and it concerns 
the temporal priority of the epistemological doctrine over the 
theodicy. Leibniz, linking together "truths" whereto the human 
mind could attain naturally without being aided by the light of 
faith, developed his notion of pre-established harmony, a notion 
which under-girds his theodicy. But, as Farrer comments, once 
Leibniz had this notion he was the man of a doctrine, a man with 
an idea, with a philosophical nostrum, a man who carried his new 
torch into every corner, to illuminate dark questions. Farrer 
also observes that the reflective historian will suspect that 
the applications were in view from the start. And that is the 
rub. Leibniz is judge, advocate, and jury in the one court. He 
lays down the rules, advances the case, declares it proven - 
all on the basis of a nostrum whose validity needs demonstrating, 
not illustrating.
Leibniz' Theodicy is, thus, a very extended corollary to 
his epistemology. Coherence has been achieved, but at a high 
price. His theodicy may even be indefeasible, given his rules. 
But those rules he knows intuitively. Theodicy along Leibniz 1 
road is ultimately intuition. Epistemological intuition.
b) Do the same kinds of point hold in relation to
Hick's Evil and the God of Love? I think they do. Hick's
39 
epistemological thesis, Faith and Knowledge, was a long
maturing set of ideas concerning faith as interpretation, as the
interpretative element in religious experience, as "experiencing-
40 
as". Now, in the Preface to the 1974 edition of Faith and
Knowledge Hick makes the connection between these two books clear:
16
This approach to the epistemology of religious 
faith still seems to me to be basically right; 
and I have built upon it in trying to grapple 
with the problem of evil in Evil and the God of 
Love.41
There is, therefore, the same kind of logical and temporal 
connection between epistemology and theodicy as there is in
Leibniz. And with the same effects. It might be objected that 
this contention is not altogether fair to Hick in that his 
epistemology is not simply the application of a philosophical 
idea, but an attempt to offer an analysis of religious experience 
in epistemological terms. Thus, it might be said, there is a 
natural, unforced,and internal connection between his epistemo- 
logy and theodicy. What then does one make of Hick's comment:
This analysis of religious faith as interpreta- 
tion is not itself a religious, or an anti- 
religious, but an epistemological doctrine ... 
It therefore now remains to show how this view 
of faith might be integrated into the theistic 
and antitheistic world views respectively?^
It seems clear from this quote that Hick's epistemology is a 
freestanding thesis, and that his theodicy is a corollary which 
stands or falls with it. Indeed, in Hick's case, the identity 
of theodical thesis and epistemological thesis is remarkable. 
His thesis is presentable thus:
"human freedom vis-a-vis God presupposes an 
initial separateness and a consequent degree 
of independence on man's part.""God must set 
man at a distance from Himself, from which he 
can then voluntarily come to God." "The kind of 
distance between God and man that would make 
room for a degree of human autonomy is epistemic 
distance." "The world must be to man, to some 
extent at least, etsi deus non daretur." "God ... 
must be knowable, but only by a mode of know- 
ledge that involves a free personal response on 
man's part, this response consisting in an 
uncompelled interpretative activity." "Given 
this willingness (which is the volitional element 
in religious faith), we become able to recognise 
all around us the signs of a divine presence and 
activity." 43
17
I say "thesis", unqualified, because the above is an account 
equally of Hick's epistemological and theodical theses. The 
primacy of epistemology, and the derivotiveness of the theodicy, 
is apparent. And one suspects that Farrer's point about a man 
with a doctrine is also appropriate, and can perhaps be 
illustrated from the historical typology that underlies Hick's 
theodicy and in which he identifies two major theodical strands 
in Christian thought, and argues in favour of the one that fits 
his epistemology - the test being that that epistemology is 
right, as the first quote above shows.
Now Hick's theodicy is meant to be explanatory as to the 
presence of evil in this world, and offers many keen insights 
into theodical problems. But can the underlying thesis actually 
bear the weight he puts on it? Firstly, "Epistemic distance" 
may necessitate finitude, but does finitude require, as a matter 
of logic or a matter of fact, "sin"? Thus, Hick claims that 
man's evolution from lower forms of life meant that man's 
attention was monopolised by the problems of physical survival - 
and that this "initial situation produces the self-centred point
of view and self-regarding outlook from which human sinfulness 
in its many forms has arisen." 44 But is it impossible to imagine
it might have been otherwise, and that adversity from the 
beginning led men to seek cooperation amongst themselves - and 
even with God? Secondly, "Freedom" is a highly complex notion, 
and Hick provides some account of the difficulties associated
with it - but when he advances as part of his theodicy his
46 
account of freedom as "limited creativity" he has to admit his
definition derives from the needs of his epistemological thesis. 
Thus:
18
Some such concept of freedom seems to be a 
necessary postulate of the Christian view of 
the relation between man and God. The primary 
point at which it is required is that at which 
man in his freedom is willing or unwilling to 
become aware of God. For it is man's 
cognitive freedom in relation to his Creator 
that must be insisted upon. And the concept 
of freedom as creativity would make it 
possible to speak of God as endowing His 
creatures with a genuine though limited 
autonomy.47
But, thirdly, there is a deeper point, too, (one which 
affects all theodicies which seek a"solution" by use of the 
notion of freewill). Should theodicy, in any case, be attached 
to the success of a free-will doctrine at all? "Freewill" is 
itself a problematic notion in philosophy, and indeed rejected 
by some major thinkers in the Christian tradition. Should not 
theodicy be based on what is essential and irremovable from 
Christian belief? But moving on to Hick's other points, neither 
does there seem to be any need for evil as a necessary condition 
of our attaching religious significance to life-experiences, or
indeed of our relating to God on the basis of personality. Only 
in the case of religious ambiguity does evil seem to be required 
in relation to his thesis. The world as we know it, taken as a 
whole, does present in its good and evil faces a genuine religious 
ambiguity. But as this ambiguity is susceptible of other 
explanations, Hick's thesis can only remain a candidate for 
theodicy. In assessing this candidate we are left finally, as 
with Leibniz, with the question whether the justice of God 
depends on our adopting a particular epistemological thesis. 
If it were replied by Hick that his intention is not to justify 
God actually but to seek to understand his justice, then the 
reply in turn might be that our understanding that God is just is 
an essential part of the notion of the actual justice of God, for
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if he were just and we did not know it (or if we understood him 
to be just when he is not) what kind of situations would those be?
c) There does not appear to be any way in which 
constructive theodicies can escape the problems identified 
above, for the nature of constructive theodicy lies precisely 
in giving an account of evil within a world view and according 
to a provided epistemology. It is one understanding of theodicy 
that this constructive activity is what it should do, but in 
contrast, and in pursuit of a descriptive understanding of 
Christian belief, an epistemology is sought in this thesis that 
is internal to the shape of Christian belief.
4. Fourthly, consider the world view within which any 
theodicy is set. In what ways does this world view affect what 
a theodicist seeks to do? Let us concentrate and simplify this
issue by focussing attention on what might be said about the
48 
"presiding concept" of the world view with which we are
concerned, as everything that comes under that presiding concept 
must share in its characteristics. What then is the theodicist 
to make of "theos" in Christian theodicy?
a) First, many see theodicy as in some way
interested in the existence of this God - does evil contradict 
it? My intention on this point is to make two moves. Discussion
of what is meant by the existence of God is delayed for reasons
49 50 that will become clear. Also, it has already been indicated
that my primary interest is in a descriptive understanding of 
the shape of belief held by those for whom God is a reality. 
In this sense God's existence is a "given" for this thesis. But 
not quite. For it is also argued in Section Two, in discussing 
the unbeliever's problem, that there is no formal connection 
between God and evil as an ontological problem.
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b) When one turns to the question of the nature of 
God, the theodicist is faced with making a decision, for there
are on offer in Christian theology quite different notions as 
to the nature of God, each calling for a different kind of 
discussion. There is, firstly, that notion which attributes 
personality to God in the sense of the traditional creeds. Let 
us call this classical theism, albeit that it includes the 
views of both "finite" and "infinite" theists. What makes 
them the same, despite real disagreements over the nature of God, 
is that they share the same framework of thought in metaphysics: 
God exists as personal, and as distinct from his creation.
Secondly, there is that notion which has been termed "quasi-
52 theism". This view proposes a different metaphysical basis for
theism. In one way or another "theos" is seen as being not 
distinct from creation, but in some intrinsic relationship with 
it. Of particular interest here are the theodical claims of
those whose thought has its basis in the process philosophy of
53Whitehead, and who are sometimes called panentheists. In "hard"
panentheists, theism is specifically spelt out in terms of a 
di-polar nature of God, and God and creation are in dynamic
relation. In "soft" versions the explicit links with Whitehead
54 
are less clear, but the ideas are similar.
The result of this fundamental difference of view of the 
nature of God is that process theodicies, whilst they may make 
sense within their own sphere, and have much to say about theodicy, 
use terms in such a different way that connections with "classical 
theodicy" become obscure. What is meant by "power", "freewill", 
"God", etc., is too different. And when panentheists claim to 
have "solved" the problem of evil, they may well have done so, 
but it is not the classical theist's problem they have solved.
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c) Perhaps G.D. Kaufman can help to clarify the 
issue here. He argues in God the Problem that at the root of 
these differences lie two models of theological language built 
on different ways in which in our own personal experience we
are aware of "transcendence", these two models being self-contained. 
One awareness of transcendence occurs in the way other people 
stand over against us, as available to us only if they will.
This type of transcendence he calls "interpersonal transcendence", 
and argues that it leads to dualistic-type language. The other 
awareness is of the way in which goals transcend the present. 
This type of transcendence he calls "teleological transcendence", 
and regards it as leading to monistic-type language. When such 
differing notions of transcendence are applied to "theos", 
the theological language systems that result are different 
through and through. One has to argue within the one or the 
other, but cannot move back and forth between them.
d) If Kaufman is right, and it appeals to me as a 
workable thesis, then theodicy will also be an activity within a 
language system. This thesis is confined to examining theodicy 
within one of these language systems - that built on inter- 
personal transcendence - and specific use of the language model 
of "interpersonal" transcendence is made in my attempt to offer 
a descriptive understanding of the classical theist's view of 
evil. The nature and role of theodicy built on the other 
language system is not considered. This decision is not a 
judgement on the worth of that language system, or its theodicies, 
but a recognition of distinctiveness.
e) There is an important implication of accepting 
Kaufman's thesis. It is that language systems used in relation 
to God are means by which theists refer to God. This referential
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role of theological language reinforces the point made earlier
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about the connection between theology and experience. The
conceptualisation of God is, by the very nature of theology as 
a language system based on a model, less than the believer's 
experience of him, though dialectically related to that 
experience. For this reason, I develop my description of the 
use by the believer of that language by reference to the point 
above all where Christian language and experience come together, 
namely in the offering of worship. A third option, that 
religious language is self-referring, is considered and rejected 
in section three.
f) It could be objected that this approach to
theological language avoids all the hard questions about how we 
know that it is God who is experienced, and how the language 
connects to God, and how we know that it is the same God in all 
Christian experiences of worship. But such questions, though 
interesting, do not affect the task of description within a 
language system, for what is described are the internal 
connections between the nature of worship and the believer's 
view of God. As already argued, it is not the descriptive 
theodicist's task to pronounce on the validity of belief, but 
to seek to understand the shape of that belief. The problem 
of evil for the believer pre-supposes the reality of the one 
God, praised and thanked in worship, as indubitable. Given 
that situation, what is the believer's view of evil as also an 
indubitable reality?
5. Fifthly, if theodicy is an activity, it is needful 
to raise a quite different kind of input which has to do with 
the frame of mind of the theodicist. In a philosophical thesis 
this topic might seem to be out of place, or even impertinent,
23
but in theodicy it seems to me to be of great significance. 
Two aspects of this topic are in mind. First, optimism and 
pessimism. Second, forms of advocacy.
a) Optimism and pessimism enter in a substantial 
way into theodical writing. The point is simple to state, but 
its ramifications are complex. The issue concerns how a 
theodicist reads the evidence of the way the world is, and
also the degree of seriousness with which he treats the reality
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of evil. Some theodicists stress the evil in the world, and
the content of theodicy concerns evil and God. In protest a 
very few theodicists talk of the problem of good for the 
atheist. Others stress the harmony of the world, and Leibniz' 
notion of this world as the "best possible world" is sometimes 
referred to as Leibnizian optimism. J. Cowburn is so impressed 
by these different ways of reading the evidence that he 
organises Shadows and The Dark around this tension, and 
proposes as his thesis to incorporate both sides of the tension 
in juxtaposition, preferring to be optimistic about physical 
evil, and pessimistic about sin.
My position is that this factor does not enter into 
theodicy as the activity of descriptive understanding, for the 
descriptive process is neither optimistic nor pessimistic on 
the part of the theodicist. I therefore disregard it in relation 
to my understanding of the shape of belief.
A further reason for disregarding it is that goodness is 
a reality in the experience of the believer no less than evil - 
it is that fact which creates the fundamentally ambiguous
r- -o
situation rightly stressed by Hume and Hick. It might be 
objected to this point that, for the believer, goodness is a 
more fundamental reality than evil (witness, for example, the
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"privative" view of evil ), and that Christianity rejects a 
simple dualism. That objection, however, is not the point. In 
saying that neither optimism nor pessimism have a place in 
descriptive theodicy, one is making a methodological remark, 
which is that no attempt be made to deny the reality of evil 
(however defined) as an experience of those who talk within 
the language of interpersonal theism. Otherwise there would be 
no genuine problem, which there is. The descriptive theodicist 
is interested in the moves by which this fundamental tension is 
handled in belief, not in adopting a stance towards it. How is 
it, he asks, that believers, in proceeding from God to the 
world, take both good and evil as realities?
b) A feature of theodicy is that the issues it
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raises have personal implications. Philosophical discussions
of "causation", "free-will", "soul", "immortality", "body-mind 
relationship", etc., leave one relatively undisturbed in terms 
of one's way in the world. For example, I will not be 
substantially affected in particular actions whatever I make of 
free-will, for neither a determinist nor a libertarian can
properly derive reasons for action from his philosophical theory. 
But what one makes of theodicy affects whether one prays, and 
if so in what terms; for within theodicy lie the convictions 
about God which make demands on the believer. And insofar as 
Zuurdeeg is right in saying that, "We are our convictions", 
theodicy has to do with what one is; - "I am an atheist", "I am 
a Christian" (Contrast "I have free-will"). Even if these 
remarks are only partly true, they perhaps help explain the 
proneness of theodicists to be polemical - what theodicists 
write matters to them. They use philosophy for an end, whether 
it be for or against theism, for theodicy is self-involving.
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What is in mind in making these observations? First, 
could a theodicist argue a disinterested case? Behind this 
question is a broader question - could a theist write dis- 
interestedly on theism, that is, in terms of it not mattering 
to him what the discussion revealed? Could the atheist either? 
Could the agnostic? Would not the discussion in each case have 
implications for action? Second, the literature itself is full 
of advocacy, even in writing which purports to be purely 
conceptual analysis. One cannot read Madden and Hare or Flew
without being aware that the authors are in the business of
71 pleading a cause. Puccetti's writing combines advocacy with a
forceable style, and talks of a war to be won. The book of Job
is nothing if not polemical, and Augustine specifically says
72 that he was arguing, in the City of God, against the pagans.
Leibniz wrote Theodicy as part of his argument with Bayle, and 
as we have seenf Theodicy has also to do with Leibniz' particular 
philosophical passion for pre-established harmony. Voltaire's 
reply to Leibniz in _Candide is splendidly polemical, as is
Earth's reductio ad absurdum of Leibnizian optimism in Church
74 Dogmatics.
Even when one turns to historical works in theodicy one 
find a similar situation. Tsanoffs The Nature of Evil has a 
strong underlying principle of organisation, for he aims to show, 
out of an historical study of pessimism, that a philosophy of 
value can be adduced. The purpose of Hick's historical survey
is similarly to adduce a thesis, and Griffin's God, Power, and
77 . . . Evil uses historical analysis for a similar purpose.
But, it might be objected, analytical philosophy is
precisely neutral in its approach, and it is possible to imagine
7R 
that any topic could be analysed apart from advocacy. But
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could this be so in theodicy? For example, to anticipate a 
point to be discussed later, the techniques of analysis them- 
selves implicitly determine the possibilities of the kinds of 
answer which are available. To analyse, say, "omnipotence" 
presupposes that such a term in its religious usage is 
analysable apart from that usage - thus advocating the superio- 
rity of one possibility in philosophy. What is being advocated
in that case as neutral, is normative philosophy.
Is it being suggested, then, that seeing theodicy as 
descriptive understanding is not an advocacy? My answer is 
threefold. First, that description as practised by a main 
proponent, D.Z. Phillips, has a strong polemical element with
regard to philosophical stance and epistemological theory,
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and what believer's must be taken to be saying.
Second, that if it is possible to separate epistemological 
advocacy from philosophical method, then descriptive under- 
standing has as good a chance of avoiding advocacy as is likely 
to be possible.
Third, that descriptive theodicy still carries implications 
for action. Should no coherent account be possible of the shape 
of belief, that might have implications for the believer - 
though he always has the defences that the descriptions so far 
offered are inept, and that his right to believe is not diminished 
by the failure to undertake description adequately. I am not so 
sure that the reverse applies i.e.,that a coherent account of 
belief puts pressure on the unbeliever to make the move to 
belief. I suggest it does not.
c) No comment has yet been made in this context on 
one large category of theodical literature - that written from 
within faith to within faith; in mind are such works as Journet's
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The Meaning of Evil, Farrer's Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited,
O p
Maritain's St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil, and many others. 
Theodical writing of this type is designed to confirm belief or 
provoke action, and may be seen as part of the pastoral work of 
the community of faith. In this sense such writing is beyond 
polemic, but nevertheless does not escape its influence, for it 
is the literature of the faith-community expressing settled 
faith in polemical (apologetic) terms. My interest, however, is 
in the structure of the settled faith in its own terms.
d) What then is my frame of mind? Insofar as
possible, to see things as the believer sees them, and on this 
basis to seek to describe the shape of what is seen. But this 
intention immediately presents two problems. One arises from 
the present state of debate in the philosophy of religion, the 
other with regard to how to handle what was earlier called the 
"unbeliever's problem of evil". The former problem concerns 
what is meant by the existence of God, the latter concerns the 
basis on which the unbeliever's problem rests. Let us consider 
these problems separately.
6.a) A dilemma besets the philosophy of religion at the 
present time concerning the nature of the ontological claims 
apparently made in Christian doctrines. What one makes of this 
issue centrally affects what one thinks it means to see things as 
believers see them. At the heart of this debate is the nature 
of the relationship between language and reality.
Perhaps the controversy can be organised around the
o O
questions, "What is the sense of words in Christian belief?", 
and "What is the reference of words in Christian belief?" 
Broadly, answers to these questions may be classified into 
three types. Firstly, there are answers which claim the sense
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of religious words is carried on their surface, and that such 
words are to be taken in their ordinary sense. If the believer 
says that God exists, then that is simply what he means; the 
words are intended to "refer" to an ontologically factual being, 
and the "sense" of them is that there is actually such a
reality. Some refer to those who take this approach as
. . . 84 
cognitivists. Secondly, there are answers which claim
religious words have sense but not empirical sense, and 
reference but not empirical reference. The sense they contain 
is (e.g. in Braithwaite) "reduced" to some other form of 
meaning, say, moral meaning, and the reference they have is 
taken existentially, and has to do with our attitudes. Some 
refer to those who make such answers as non-cognitivists. 
Thirdly, there are the answers of the philosophers who are 
sometimes called "grammarians". The reason for this designation 
is that they claim religious words have sense, but do not refer 
- at least, if they do, they are self-referring, for if asked
Q -7
what these words say the answer is that they "say themselves".
Now as far as theodicy is concerned the non-cognitivists 
are very little concerned. What matters to them is that reli- 
gious language gives support to our moral life in the world. 
But the controversy between the cognitivists and the grammarians
is crucial.
Hick, for example, as a cognitivist, claims "the core 
religious statements are true or false in a sense that is
0 Q
ultimately factual", and argues that such statements have
meaning because they will be, or will fail to be, verified
89 eschatologically. So Christianity must insist on the properly
factual character of its basic affirmations. It is, of course, 
this understanding that creates for Hick the theodical problem.
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Lose this foothold, and everything becomes arbitary. Categories 
of truth and falsehood no longer apply.
Phillips, as a grammarian, on the other hand, operates 
with a different understanding of the connections between 
language and reality. It is not that he sees himself as a non-
cognitivist as against Hick, though Hick suggests there are
91 
only two categories. It is rather that what the grammarians
92 take to be the nature of cognition is different, though
cognition is not a word Phillips is given to using. The
favourite word is "meaning", and "To say that this meaning is
93 true is to adopt it and to proclaim it". To the objection
that this concentration on meaning reduces Christianity's 
ontological claims to mere religious perspectives, Phillips 
replies that each mode of discourse has its own appropriate way 
of structuring its discourse:
The pictures of the plants refer to their objects, 
namely, the plants. The religious pictures give 
one a language in which it is possible to think 
about human life in a certain way. The pictures 
(and here one should bear in mind that 'picture' 
here covers related terms such as 'model' or 'map') 
provide the logical space within which such 
thoughts can have a place. When these thoughts 
are found in worship, the praising and the 
glorifying does not refer to some object called 
God. Rather, the expression of such praise and 
glory is what we call the worship of God.94
So for Phillips the "distinction between the real and the unreal
95 does not come to the same thing in every context". For Hick
96 this kind of claim is "Theology's central problem".
b) The extent of the impact of this debate on
theodicy can hardly be overstated. It can be seen conspicuously 
in the debate between Swinburne and Phillips, with Hick in the 
chair, on the "Problem of Evil", recorded in Reason and 
Religion.97 The debate is remarkable not for the theodical
30
arguments adduced, but for the lack of agreement in the light of 
the above as to what constitutes argument at all in theodicy. 
Phillips charges Swinburne with "thoroughly investigating
details of a road one should not have turned into in the first
98 
place," and claims that throughout Swinburne's paper the main
emphasis is on the world as a God-given setting in which human 
beings can exercise rational choices which determine the kind of
people they are to become. Phillips remarks, "This is neither
99 the world I know, nor the world in which Swinburne lives".
Swinburne-type theodicies are for Phillips "part of the 
rationalism which ... clouds our understanding of religious 
belief". Theodicy of Swinburne's type is, for Phillips, not 
at all a justification of God, but an illegitimate attempt to 
make causal connections where none exists, and where none can 
exist. The nature of religious language, and the role of 
philosophy in relation to it, mean that the "facts" relate to 
the "grammar" of religious belief, not to how that language 
connects with other orders of "reality".
The interchange between Hick and Phillips reveals, 
further, the extent to which the divide is over fundamentals and 
not over this or that point. For Hick, it appears, language 
mediates, perhaps even regulates, our view of reality. For 
Phillips, language constitutes reality and determines it. For 
Hick, this claim means Phillips has given up talk of the 
existence of God. For Phillips, Hick fails to understand that 
all reality comes under the same type of critique as Phillips 
applies to God.
As Phillips sees it then, "the urge to construct theodicies 
is itself the result of a confused view of what must be the 
relation between the will of God and the lives of men and women",
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this confused view being that God is an existent. As far as 
Swinburne is concerned, however, Phillips 1 case is based on 
assertion rather than argument, and begs the whole question. 
What Swinburne fails to see, however, is that Phillips does 
not contradict him, but refuses to play his game. Phillips uses 
a different picture.
c) My reaction to this demand to take sides is
that there is much sense in what both sides are saying. Outside 
intellectual circles it would come as a great surprise to the 
Christian believer to be told he is not making claims in 
religious language that in some way connect with an "objective" 
reality. On the other hand, the weight of argument presented 
by the sociologists of knowledge as to the relativism in our 
concepts makes one pause before rushing too quickly into 
supposing concepts picture the world in a simple way as it 
actually is. To some extent we have to live with the idea 
that the symbolic "world", which is the network of ideas 
through which we interpret "what is", is "our work" - and a 
possible basis for handling this contention with respect to 
religious belief has already been provided in accepting Kaufman's 
thesis of alternative language systems by which believers may 
refer to God. I take seriously, therefore, on the one hand, 
the extent to which one has to take into account in relation to 
the formulation of religious belief the cultural setting of 
that belief - but it is also accepted that religious belief in 
the eyes of the believer is grounded in the experience of 
something that "is". What is needed in theodicy as descriptive 
understanding, therefore, is a mechanism by which one can offer 
an account which gives due attention to the nature of religious 
belief as having a cultural location, and yet which does not
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make that belief arbitary and agnostic with regard to reality. 
My argument is eventually that attention to the role of adoring 
worship of God in the life of the believing community provides 
the theodicist with criteria of religious belief that stand in 
judgement on culturally relative constructions of belief, and
which might provide the needed mechanism for descriptive under-
IO6
standinq.
However, the conventional debate amongst theodicists, for 
the most part, has been conducted within the kinds of assumption 
about the relationship of language and reality propounded by 
the cognitivists, and concerns the defence or vindication of 
that objectively existing God. The argument assumes one can 
properly connect God and the way things are in this world, in 
that the will of God is exercised in relation to this world. 
There is a difference of approach between those who treat of 
the logical coherence of the statements within which classical 
theism has expressed this relationship, and those who treat the 
issues empirically, but behind both there is a common view of 
what the argument is about, and about the role of philosophy 
in relation to it. The issue is about the compatibility of the 
existence of the God of classical theism and this world as we 
know it with its moral and physical evil. The role of philosophy, 
within this view, is to comment on that compatibility, and to 
resolve the issue if possible, at least from the negative side 
of showing what may not be known or said, but hopefully also
•4-- 1 107
more positively.
But when one listens to believers - or as argued later - 
when one "looks" at what believers say in the context of what 
they do - it is to notice that to be able to worship is to have
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achieved in practice, and to have made the unshakeable basis of 
one's reality, the compatibility of God as a reality, and evil 
as a reality, and to find a certain use of language appropriate 
to that situation. There seems then to be a great difference 
between the shape of the problem of evil as posed by conventional 
theodicists and the shape of the problem of evil as faced by 
the practising "worshipper. This difference raises the question 
of the shape of religious understanding as against the shape of 
philosophical theodicy.
Turning with this last question in mind to the writings 
of D.Z- Phillips, one finds a serious attempt to offer a 
philosophical account of religious belief that provides an 
account at the same time of the believer's view of evil, that 
is, his religious understanding of it. But this account is 
bound up with Phillips' rejection of cognitivist epistemology, 
and is built instead on the grammarians' position of the 
relationship between language and reality.
I remain finally unconvinced by the correctness of 
procedure of both the cognitivist and the grammarian approaches 
to theodicy. In this thesis it is proposed, therefore, to 
attempt to set out an understanding of the believer's view of 
evil, learning, on the one hand, from Phillips as to the role 
of descriptive understanding in philosophical thought (but 
without accepting his precise epistemological thesis), and 
conversely, learning (with modifications) from the cognitivists 
as to the fundamental correctness of claiming that for the 
believer God in some sense "is" (but without accepting their 
method of doing philosophy). Sections two and three set out 
what is meant by this programme of work, and what is involved.
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It means seeking to dismantle both standard conception theodicy 
which is attempted in section two - and Phillips' theodicy - 
which is attempted in section three. To give myself the tools 
for this task, this section on inputs to the activity of 
theodicy has been written. My intention is now to reorganise 
the inputs so that descriptive understanding of the religious 
view of evil held by the community of believers is the nature 
of theodical activity.
7. Before turning to that discussion, however, let 
me briefly make some observations on the basis on which it is 
being taken the unbeliever's problem of evil rests. Now this 
expression is not intended as an absolute phrase but a relative 
one. What is referred to is the problem the unbeliever finds 
relative to the claim made by the believer who worships God that 
God is a reality, and the use by the believer of such terms as 
"omnipotence" and "love" in relation to the nature of that God. 
In the Introduction the unbeliever's problem was posed in terms 
of whether he should make the move, or not make the move, of 
accepting the believer's claim that it is not incoherent to 
hold at the same time that God is a reality and that evil is a 
reality. Accepting this claim of the believer would not mean 
the unbeliever would thereby become a believer. That would be 
yet a further move. What is in mind is that the unbeliever 
would cease to find the believer incoherent in what he claims, 
not that he would believe. It might be objected that the 
unbeliever simply does not have the problem as stated. I would 
reply that unbelievers do in fact seem remarkably interested 
in the coherence of theism in the face of evil; and also that 
putting the issue this way helps to reveal, as is shown in 
section two, a number of false moves believers, for their part,
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have made in theodicy.
But the unbeliever might still object that his position is 
being misrepresented. He is not wondering about making any 
moves. What he is saying is that the believer should wonder 
about making moves to give up his incoherent position. My reply 
is twofold. First, let the unbeliever put his position as he 
will; that is his position, and one must seek to see it as 
he sees it. But that does not affect the main point, which 
is that in relation to the problem of evil there are ways of 
framing it which depend on not, or possibly not, believing God 
exists. But, again, and for reasons which depend on later 
argument, the position is taken in this thesis that to believe 
is synonymous with adoring worship of the true God, as far as 
the practising believer is concerned. Worship is being taken, 
then, to be part of the internal structure of practised belief, 
and of taking God as a reality. There is consequently an 
internal problem of evil which is properly the believer's 
problem. To describe that problem it is necessary to proceed 
in theodicy sensitive to the whole context of life in the 
community of belief in which the beliefs are held. As to those 
such as Ivan Karamazov, and the devils who believe and tremble, 
that is, those who believe in God but rebel against him, I 
think that the shape of such rebellious belief can best be 
understood by contrast with adoring worship, and therefore
-I QO
attention within this thesis will focus on worshipful belief.
Section Two
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Section Two; False Moves in Theodicy
This section offers explanations as to why in this thesis 
the traditional shape of debate in standard theodicy is being 
set on one side. My method is to argue separately, but with 
cumulative force, that three basic assumptions of traditional 
debate are not well-founded. Then, fourthly, there is set out 
the underlying problem of philosophical method in these false 
moves. By implication and negation, there are thus identified 
some aspects of the shape of theodicy based on descriptive 
und er st and i ng.
A. That the Problem of Evil Concerns the Existence of God
1. Nelson Pike, in his article "Hume on Evil" assumes 
that the problem of evil inevitably raises the question of the 
existence of God. He expresses this understanding of the force 
of the problem in terms derived from Hume's presentation of 
it in the mouth of Philo, though I shortly query this under- 
standing. Pike states Philo's argument as he understands it 
thus:
If God is to be all-powerful, all-knowing, and 
perfectly good (using all key terms in their 
ordinary sense), then to claim that God exists 
is to preclude the possibility of admitting 
that there occur instances of evil; that is, 
is to preclude the possibility of admitting 
that there occur instances of suffering, pain, 
superstition, wickedness, and so forth. The 
statements 'God exists 1 and 'There occur 
instances of suffering* are logically 
incompatible. Of course, no one could deny 
that there occur instances of suffering. 
Such a denial would plainly conflict with 
common experience. Thus it follows from 
obvious fact that God (having the attributes 2 
assigned to him by Cleanthes) does not exist.
2. Let me immediately make two observations about this 
statement by Pike. Firstly, in this form this is precisely the
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3problem of the unbeliever, for Pike lists J.S. Mill, J.E.
McTaggart, A. Flew, H.D. Aiken, J.L. Mackie, C.J. Ducasse, and 
H.J. McCloskey as
but a very few of the many others who have echoed 
Philo's finalistic dismissal of traditional theism 
after making reference to the logical incompati- 
bility of 'God exists 1 and 'There occur instances 
of suffering'. 4
Secondly, Pike wants to claim this case is quite unconvincing. 
His challenge is set out, however, on the terms the unbelievers 
have marked out. He accepts the problem they have indicated 
is the real problem for the believer as much as for the unbelie- 
ver, but claims the arguments used lack force. Pike's 
position, then, seems to be that believers are faced with 
answering the question as to whether the God whom they worship 
might not in fact exist. I argue, however, that to understand 
the believer's problem in this way is itself incoherent, and 
that the believer cannot have this as a problem, for the 
unbeliever himself, and on his own terms, has not in fact 
substantiated his claim that the problem of evil can be 
effectively formulated in this way. I am,therefore, here 
concerned with a problem within unbelief. In honour of Hume's 
character Philo,let us call this problem within unbelief the 
"received Philonic tradition".
3. Let us extend Pike's historical reference beyond
Hume to the origins of Hume's argument in Epicurus, on the
5 ground that, as Ahern claims, "all of these writers" referred to
by Pike "from Epicurus to McCloskey, raise the same basic 
problem, the problem whether it is possible for both a totally 
good, omnipotent being and any evil to exist". The presentation 
of the unbeliever's argument can then be divided into two stages,
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the first being that of attempts to find formulations of the 
problem of evil which make a direct formal link between God and 
evil. The second stage, in contrast, sees that something 
further is needed, and seeks to supply it. This latter attempt 
has, however, a surprising result.
4. Let us turn,then,to consider the first stage of the 
unbeliever's argument, and do this by looking at that problem as 
formulated by Epicurus, Augustine, Aquinas, and Hume, and 
attaching comments:
a) Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) as quoted by Lactantius 
(c.A.D. 260-340)
God either wishes to take away evils, and is unable;
or He is able, and is unwilling;
or He is neither willing nor able;
or He is both willing and able.
If He is willing and unable, He is feeble, which
is not in accordance with the character of God; 
if He is able and unwilling He is malicious
which is equally at variance with God; 
if He is neither willing nor able, He is both
malicious and feeble and therefore not God; 
if He is both willing and able, which is alone
suitable to God, from what source then are
evils? or why does He not remove them?^
This formulation is the one lying behind Hume's and is 
the fountain head of the received Philonic tradition. It is 
built round the four possible variations of the two terms 
"willing" and "able". The course of much subsequent discussion 
turns upon the ambiguities of these terms, especially in the 
context of their meaning in relation to a God who is experienced 
as "personal". The formulation serves the negative function of 
detailing three notions of God incompatible with the believer's 
experience of the worshipworthiness of God - that is, the offer- 
ing of Christian worship excludes that God is feeble, and that 
God is malicious, and that God is both feeble and malicious.
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The key sentence is the fourth and last possibility, with 
its plaintive plea for illumination as to the source of evils, 
or alternatively as to the purposes of the God who, though 
willing and able to remove evils, does not do so. Read outside 
the influence of the received Philonic tradition there is no 
necessity to see this formulation as "ontological". In fact 
the two questions it poses are not "ontological" at all. The 
end point of the formulation is a question about the intentions 
and purposes of God, that is to say, about his character - why 
does he not remove evils? It is almost a text for Hick's 
Irenaean thesis, and has to do with the purposes of God.
But the unbeliever's problem also appears in the writings 
of Christian believers. Let us turn, therefore,to : 
b ) Augustine (A.D. 354-430)
Either God cannot abolish evil or He will not: 
if He cannot then He is not all-powerful; 
if He will not then He is not all-good8
This formulation is subtly different from Epicurus', but 
is again built around the notions of "willing" and "able". It 
is specifically stated in Christian vocabulary, and uses the 
key notions of omnipotence and omnibenevolence. It also 
supposes that if God "cannot" do certain things this contradicts 
his omnipotence. On these "Christian" points comment is made 
later when looking at a similar statement of the problem by 
Hick. 9
Augustine's formulation relates to only the first two of 
Epicurus' four positions by a stipulative first word "either". 
But Epicurus has shown neither of these options is adequate as 
a description of the God of the believer, either as they are, 
or in combination - Epicurus states only his fourth position is
40
suitable. Further, in the context of a personal God, lines two 
and three of Augustine's formulation amount to no more than 
assertions, and different insights into the nature of God as 
personal would not accept that these deductions inevitably 
follow. In fact the theist would deny their cogency. Epicurus' 
fourth position is in fact the one Augustine accepts in his 
writings, and is the basis of "Augustinian-type" theodicies.
This formulation, therefore, can serve the negative 
function of warning one not to accept too readily simplistic 
formulations of the alleged believer's problem. The received 
Philonic tradition apart, the formulation does not actually 
pose the question of the non-existence of God, but the problem 
of the nature of the God that there is; it gives the finite 
theist the option of believing either in a God who is not all- 
powerful or one who is not all-good. Traditional theism, 
along with Epicurus and Augustine, however, does not face the 
problem of the finite theist, as it would not accept that the 
first line of the formulation as stated is representative of an 
acceptable notion of God. It is a mis-formulation.
A rather different way of seeking to state the unbeliever's 
problem is set out by Aquinas:
c ) Aquinas (A.D. 1226-74)
If one of two contraries is infinite, the other 
is excluded absolutely. But the idea of God 
is that of an infinite good. Therefore if God 
should exist, there could be no evil. But 
evil exists. Consequently God does not. 11
i) Stated in this manner it looks as though we have 
in this formulation support for the essence of the received 
Philonic tradition, and a clear case of the problem of evil 
being an "ontological" one for the believer - i.e., that the
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non-existence of God is a logical necessity. There are reasons 
for suggesting, however, that Aquinas did not actually see 
this as the form in which the problem of evil is significant for 
the believer.
E. Sillem, in Ways of Thinking About God; Thomas Aquinas
12 
and Some Recent Problems, argues generally in relation to
Thomas' handling of questions relating to God's existence that 
the plan of Thomas' work, especially in the Summa Theologica, 
is crucial for understanding the significance of what he writes. 
He says,
Thus, for St Thomas the question of establishing 
the existence of God is a part of the vaster 
question about theessence of God, and it is 
planned to be treated not for its own sake, but 
for the sake of showing what the divine essence 
is. There are, in other words, three major 
theological questions for St Thomas about God, 
and they concern the divine essence, the 
Trinity of Persons in God and God the creator. 
There is no separate theological question about 
God's existence: the question about God's 
existence is only raised at all in connexion 
with the study of what God is.13
He further argues that, although the modern natural 
theologian may indeed from the point of view of modern philosophy 
start with a separate question of God's existence,
St Thomas is clearly not planning his Summa 
Theologica in the way that a philosopher nowadays 
needs to plan his natural theology. 14
Sillem claims that modern Thomists who
treat Quaestio 2 of the Summa as corresponding 
with their discussion of the proofs for God's 
existence and Quaestio 3 onwards as corres- 
ponding with this treatment of the divine 
essence ... are twisting St Thomas's clearly 
stated plan to suit their own ... he 
provides no separate question an Deus sit to be 
treated on its own before he comes to the 
second question of the divine essence ... St 
Thomas has more than assured us of his certainty 
of God's existence, and that he knows full well 
that all his readers share his certainty, from
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the very beginning of the Summa ...15 
From this argument Sillem draws an important conclusion:
In other words, the question of the existence of 
God, and equally that of how God does not exist 
(which is necessary to show how different God 
is from all created things) is regarded by him, 
not as a separate question to be treated on its 
own philosophically, as though it had nothing 
to do with the revelation of God, before 
treating the divine essence, but as involved 
in the theological study of God's essence ...
The whole of Quaestio 2, De Deo; an Deus sit, 
is therefore put into the Summa for the sake of 
unravelling in the following Quaestiones the 
theological problem of God's essence, or of 
expounding by reason what God has revealed of 
Himself .16
If Sillem is right, and I find it a convincing argument, 
then this formulation which looks on first reading to be an 
"ontological" question for the believer as to whether God exists, 
must be seen, within Aquinas* plan of work, as an "attributional" 
question - not one of whether God exists, but one of how God 
exi st s and how he does not exist .
ii) It might be objected that, however Aquinas 
intended it, taken as it stands we still have here a perfectly 
good formulation of the problem of evil in terms of making a 
formal connection between God and evil. My reaction to this 
contention is to point out that it is easy to be misled by the 
double use of the word "exist" in this formulation. But no 
theist supposes that "evil exists" has a parallel meaning to 
"God exists". The difficulties here can be illustrated from 
McCloskey's God and Evil, where he is offering a critique of 
the privative view of evil (which is the basis of Aquinas' 
solution) i . e. the view that evil has no real existence, but is a 
lack, a privation of a "good". McCloskey raises in reply for 
discussion the way in which evil exists, and what kind of reality 
it has. He writes:
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Further, one can no more have pure goodness, good 
existing alone, than one can have evil existing 
alone. What one finds are good things, good men, 
good actions; as with evil, evil things, evil 
men, evil actions, evil states of affairs. This 
does not imply that good and evil are not real 
phenomena. We think of colours, hardness, and 
other properties of physical objects as real 
features of things, yet they cannot be self- 
subsistent. So, too, with the lack of self- 
subsistence of good and evil ... That the 
theist is committed to the reality of good, and, 
in the context of the acknowledgement of the 
problem of evil as a real problem, to the 
reality of evil, is evident from the insistence 
on God as an object of worship in the full sense 
of worship ... Some positive reference to good- 
ness as real is required to render the concept 
of God a genuinely religious concept. And, as 
argued in this Chapter, unless evil is real, 
there is not even an apparent contradiction 
between God's goodness as an all-powerful 
creator, and the evil in this world.18
And he adds a little later:
The object of this Chapter has been to show that 
good and evil must be attributed objective 
reality of some kind if the problem of evil is 
to arise as a serious problem for the theist. 
Difficulties in the way of attempts to deny the 
objective goodness of a worshipworthy God, and 
the objective reality of evils such as pain, 
suffering, and moral evil have also been noted.19
Now, what are McCloskey's moves here? First, he denies 
that good and evil exist in the sense of being "things". 
Second, he sets up a meaning to "real phenomena" and "real 
features of things" which at one and the same time denies and 
affirms certain relationships between the meanings of the 
words "exist" and "real" or "reality". Third, he denies that 
the theist can make use of the kinds of meaning of "real" that 
he adopts, and asserts that the theist is committed to giving 
evil "objective reality", for otherwise God as an objectively 
good reality cannot be said to have objective existence either. 
Fourthly, he admits that unless this argument succeeds the 
theist has no real problem of evil. His whole argument there-
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fore hinges on making "God exists" and "evil exists" exactly 
parallel phrases in terms of the meaning of existence.
But what is the force of this argument? Firstly, it 
never seems to me to be a good basis for argument to insist 
one's opponent must commit himself to putting things in a way he 
consistently says he does not mean. Quite apart from whether 
the privative view of evil is or is not successful, theists 
have always rejected the notion that evil exists in the same 
way as goodness does - that is what distinguishes the modified
dualism of Christian theism from the unmodified dualism of
20Manicheanism. It is possible to argue here similarly to
21 Phillips in his attack, in "Faith and Philosophy", on those
who confuse the ability to give a philosophical account of 
something, and the ability to believe it. Section three below 
says more about the distinction Phillips is making here between 
surface and depth grammar in belief, but to anticipate it a 
little, he comments on the difference that might be found 
between belief in immortality and confused accounts that might 
be given of that belief. What one must pay attention to, he 
says, is the role that a belief plays in a person's life, the
difference it makes to his life, if one is best to discover what
22that belief means. Now does the "existence" of evil play
the same kind of role in the life of the believer as does the 
"existence" of God? Clearly not in Christian theism. On that 
ground alone I would reject McCloskey's attempt to make these 
two phrases parallel.
But there is a different argument, again bringing forward
23 
a point from later discussion. For McCloskey's argument to
hold, he needs to show that what he says about theism must
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necessarily be true, and be the only truth in this regard. But, 
against the thrust of his argument, there are indeed reasons 
for understanding "good" and "evil" as being evaluative, not 
descriptive, words in theism. What he has to say about the 
real phenomena of evil as adjectival may be not so far distant 
from what the theist says if listened to carefully. Can the 
theist not be understood to mean the following - and this only 
has to be a possibility for McCloskey's argument to fail: 
Just as objects do not possess "redness" in 
themselves but are spoken of in terms of 
"redness", in that in certain contexts of 
experience and language, and with certain 
physiological characteristics in the perceiving 
agent, they are "seen" as "red", so also with 
"good". God, as an object of worship, does not 
possess "goodness" in himself, but is seen as 
"good" by those who worship him in the context 
of a normative tradition grounded in foundational 
revelational event and expressed in a given 
language model, and through the spiritual 
processes of religious experience. Therefore, 
just as what is meant by "red" is determined by 
the physical experience of human beings as language- 
users in community, so what is meant by calling 
God good is determined by the community of 
believers through their spiritual experience.
And this kind of reasoning is of course compatible with seeing 
theological language as being that by which we refer to God, 
as argued earlier. When one looks at believers in the light
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of what they do, it is clear that for the believer God exists, 
that is, God is a reality in his experience. The believer would 
also with McCloskey, talk of the reality of evil. But to 
confuse the absolute nature of the former as the presiding
concept in belief with the non-absolute nature of the latter
25 is not to talk of theism.
d) So, now to Hume and the question as to what he 
did exactly say when he handled the problem of evil . My 
argument is that Hume in fact offers a correct description of 
the relationship between God and the world, insofar as he was 
concerned to argue that it is a non-inferential one, and that 
when understood thus, Hume's argument cannot be used in the way 
the unbelievers instanced by Pike claim - namely, as having a 
negative bearing on the existence of God. My contention is 
that Hume's arguments are basically neutral in this regard. 
Hume
Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? 
then he is impotent.
Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. 
Is he both able and willing? whence then is
i) Hume, through Philo, is claiming to represent 
the dilemma posed by Epicurus. It is the basis of what was 
called above the received Philonic tradition. We have seen that 
Pike regards this dilemma as a logical problem of "ontological"
significance. Ahern uses this formulation to head up his
27 introductory chapter to The Problem of Evil, a chapter which
focusses on the "ontological" issue, in a book whose main 
interest is the logical issue. I dispute this interpretation of 
Hume's position, and argue that for Hume also the dilemma of 
Epicurus is primarily the "attributional" one. Let us set out 
the argument by reference and response to J.C.A. Gaskin's thesis
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in Hume's Philosophy of Religion.
ii) Gaskin argues that Hume's position on theism
90 
was not atheistic, but what he terms "attenuated deism", and
he speaks of "Hume's fundamental assent to the existence of a 
god". He thus sides with those who oppose the group of 
interpreters who claim Hume was an essentially irreligious man 
who does not believe in a god at all. Gaskin argues in the 
following way. Hume, on many occasions, in private and 
published work, gives explicit or implicit assent to the
proposition that there is a god on the grounds that the order
32to be found in nature could be the work of an ordering agent.
In the particular case of the Dialogues, Pamphilius prefaces 
the whole discussion with the comment,
What truth so obvious, so certain, as the being 
of a God ... what obscure questions occur, 
concerning the nature of that divine Being ...
and this observation is agreed to by Cleanthes, Demea, and by 
Philo:
the question can never be concerning the being, 
but only the nature of the Deity. 4
But through the course of discussion that ensues Philo 
seems to say what he does not in fact quite say - that the 
deity is unknowable and therefore has no attributes. Gaskin, 
therefore, thinks that although Hume's belief is not crudely 
atheistic it is "atheism as far as the Christian God is 
concerned just as belief in the Christian God was atheism as 
far as the classical Roman religion was concerned". On this 
basis Gaskin distinguishes two different problems of evil in
Hume's writings. Firstly, the "Inference Problem". Secondly,
37 the "Consistency Problem". The Inference Problem concerns
what can and what cannot be inferred from the world as to the
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nature of the God who exists. This problem assumes the existence 
of such a God and does not doubt this "truth so obvious". 
However, Gaskin thinks that,
as so often in Hume's critical discussion of 
sensitive religious positions his overt discussion 
of a 'philosophical 1 problem lightly conceals his 
real discussion of a crucial religious issue. In 
the present case his discussion of the inference 
problem of evil barely conceals what he has to say 
about the much more vexing aspect of evil which 
simply is the traditional problem of evil: the 
problem of showing that the evil appearances of 
the world are consistent with the existence of a 
god whom we already believe, from a mistaken 
estimation of the design argument or on other 
grounds, to be limitlessly powerful and good. °
It would seem, therefore, that perhaps the received 
Philonic tradition is confirmed in its interpretation of the 
force of Hume's position? The "ontological" problem is Hume's 
real problem, and one should sit lightly on his overt presenta- 
tion of his views? But it does not seem that Gaskin wishes to 
be as definite as that. Indeed, the reverse. For he says,
Philo concedes that the problem of evil might be 
solvable: that the facts of the world might be 
shown to be consistent with the presumption of 
divine benevolence and omnipotence (especially 
if talk about infinite attributes is dropped). "
And even more explicitly,
Hume does not argue that there is a logical 
incompatibility between the belief in an omni- 
potent and perfectly good god and the facts of 
evil in the world.
Hume's position is, rather, that the facts of the world cannot
41 be used as evidence from which to infer the divine goodness.
I would suggest that, in the light of the above factors, 
Gaskin makes a false move when he tries to identify a covert 
"real" problem of an "ontological" nature, for it is fundamental
to Gaskin's analysis that Hume assented to the existence of a
42 god. Hume, pace Gaskin, is not arguing even that the facts of
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the world make the existence of a god "highly improbable", for 
this argument would involve Hume in the very inferential process 
which he is concerned to reject. Hume's point is that the 
world is totally ambiguous on the question of good and evil, 
and that therefore no inferences can be made at all from the 
way things are in nature - from "the present mixed and confused 
phenomena", as Philo describes the situation. But, again, 
the interest of Hume's discussion of the role of inference is 
not whether the existence (being)of God can be inferred, but 
whether the attributes of God can be. So Gaskin again,
... the Dialogues can be understood as a discussion 
of the nature of god, what can be known about him, 
not a discussion of the question whether a god 
exists.44
Does Hume's case argued through Philo, and as formulated 
above, formally connect God and evil ontologically? I cannot 
see that it does. Yet Pike and Ahern both seem convinced that 
the modern logical problem is there. There must be something 
that I have missed. Now others, too, have sensed something is 
missing in these early formulations. What exactly is missing 
has become the subject of recent debate. Let us now turn, 
therefore, to the second stage of the unbeliever's argument, 
and give attention to some recent formulations which seek to 
sharpen the issue so that the ontological problem is made to 
arise.
5. It was a major advance in clarifying the nature of 
the unbeliever's problem when attention was turned to how the 
unbeliever could make formulations of the ontological problem 
of evil work as intended. This advance consisted of the 
realisation that some extra form of words was required to make 
the logical connection between God and evil if ontological
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implications were to be entailed. It was realised that it is not
sufficient to set out, as German does, a "problematic set of
45 
sentences" and to hope the problem can be seen by inspection.
There is nothing immediately inconsistent in saying:
i) God exists iv) God is wholly good 
ii) God is omnipotent v) There is evil in the world 
iii) God is omniscient
This set of sentences could simply be the groundwork for 
the attributional problem - what in the purposes of an all-good, 
all-wise, all-powerful God is the place of evil? But just what 
terms can be made to connect them ontologically? Let us review 
several attempts.
a) J.L. Mackie
J.L. Mackie has attempted to identify what is missing, 
thus. Noting that, "In its simplest form the problem [of evil]
is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil
46 exists", Mackie nevertheless goes on, the
contradiction does not arise immediately; to show 
it we need some additional premises, or perhaps 
some quasi-logical rules connecting the terms 
'good,' 'evil, 1 and 'omnipotent. 1 These additional 
principles are that good is opposed to evil, in 
such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil 
as far as it can, and that there are no limits to 
what an omnipotent thing can do. From these it 
follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates 
evil completely, and then the propositions that 
a good omnipotent thing exists, and that evil 
exists, are incompatible.47
My response to this argument is both positive and negative. 
Positive, in that Mackie is right in saying that for the 
"ontological" problem to exist some connecting principles 
between the terms of the problematic set are necessary. Negative, 
in that, if such principles are to act as quasi-logical rules, 
they need to be analytically true - but those he suggests do not
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measure up to this requirement. To develop this last point
reference can be had to the work done on such principles by
48 M.B. Ahern.
Ahern argues it is not possible to supply such principles 
which show a logically necessary connection between the statement
that there is evil in the world and statements concerning the
49 
all-goodness of God. He first examines the following principles
about goodness:
Epicurus: A being which is able to take away evil and 
unwilling to do so is malicious.
Augustine: A being which will not abolish evil when it 
can is not all good.
Hume: A being which is able but not willing to 
prevent evil is malevolent.
From these he selects Hume's for examination, on the ground that 
as it concerns the prevention of evil and not just its elimina- 
tion it is more fundamental. He comments that in view of the 
possibility of "proportionate goods" arising from these evils 
(goods which could not arise in any other way)
It does not seem possible to make out even a 
prima facie case that Hume's principle is 
analytically true ... there are several kinds 
of case in which a being which does not will 
to prevent the evil it can prevent is never- 
theless a morally good being.50
Ahern therefore tries to re-express Hume's principle to take 
account of such cases. It then reads:
A being which is able but not willing to prevent 
evil is malevolent, unless it is justified in 
not preventing the evil.
This principle is both analytical and true, but fails to connect 
evil and God's non-existence logically. He therefore comes next 
to examine Mackie's proposed principles. The one relating to 
goodness is:
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Mackie: Good is opposed to evil in such a way that a 
good thing always eliminates evil as far as 
it can.
Adjusting this principle to refer to the prevention rather than 
to the elimination of evil, Ahern comments, again with 
proportionate goods in mind, "all of the points raised against 
Hume's principle apply to Mackie's ... the principle is simply 
false". Restating the principle so that it is analytically 
true also yields the same result as before - it fails to make
the necessary connection. Similar analysis is applied to other
52 proposed principles and Ahern finds them equally wanting. He
concludes,
No doubt other similar principles could be
suggested. It seems likely, however, that they
would all fail in the same ways.53
54 Furthermore, Ahern claims other arguments in his book show
55 .. . it is in fact "not possible" to find satisfactory principles,
as he argues yet again that it is possible to show that a wholly 
good God who is omnipotent could exist if some evil exists - 
because that evil may be the occasion of proportionate good that 
could not arise in any other way. With this defence, Ahern's 
claim seems indefeasable.
Let us turn, therefore, to a more thorough attempt than 
Mackie's to set out all the connections that are necessary, 
b) D.R. Griffin
Griffin claims in God, Power, and Evil that a more complex 
set of statements is necessary than German or Mackie suppose. 
He proposes a set of eight terms:
1. God is a perfect reality. (Definition)
2. A perfect reality is an ( definition) 
omnipotent being. J
3. An omnipotent being could
unilaterally bring about an (By definition) 
actual world without any 
genuine evil.
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4. A perfect reality is a /  , ... . . . N
morally perfect being. (B^ definition)
5. A morally perfect being would
want to bring about an /  , ,.. . , . s 
actual world without any (B^ definition) 
genuine evil.
6. If there is genuine evil in (Logical
the world, then there is conclusion from 
no God. 1 through 5)
7. There is genuine evil in the (Factual
world. statement)
8. Therefore, there is no God. (Logical
conclusion from 
6 and 7)57
Griffin accepts the validity of this argument i.e. that its 
logical form is correct, and therefore sees it as having 
"ontological" significance on those grounds. But he denies that 
the argument is sound, i.e. that the premises are acceptable. He 
objects, of course, because, as a process theodicist, term 3 is 
unacceptable. It has already been indicated that this thesis 
is not arguing within that language system. Nevertheless, 
classical theism would not accept term 3 as one of its
premises either so far as any actual world with persons was
58 
concerned, so Griffin's point about unsoundness still stands.
But it is possible to go further. The "success" of Griffin's 
form of the unbeliever's argument depends on the factual 
statement in term 7, a term which connects his two logical 
conclusions, that is, actually connects evil and the existence 
of God. Griffin has of course deliberately talked of "genuine 
evil" to raise the possibility of there being evil for which 
there is no reason of any kind. This talk of "genuine evil" 
would, therefore, seem to undercut Ahern's notion of the 
possibility of "proportionate goods". Perhaps then a synthetic 
principle could be introduced which will serve to make the 
ontological connection?
c) This latter kind of argument is found in
54
59McCloskey's God and Evil, where he claims to identify a non- 
logical problem of evil with ontological implications, a problem 
he claims to have been frequently confused with the logical 
one. He sets this problem up in terms of a moral inconsistency 
that he argues can be found between the claimed nature of God 
and the existence of God. The factual case in this instance, 
then, is within God, whereas Griffin's was in the world. 
McCloskey presents his case thus:
The assertion 'A wholly good person or being 
always does what he ought' is analytic, whereas 
'A wholly good being always lessens the general 
happiness, or always breaks his promises, or 
always lies' are synthetic (and false). To 
assert that 'A always does what he ought' and 
also 'A always lessens the general happiness 
when he can, or always breaks his promises, 
or always lies' is not to contradict oneself. 
However I wish to argue that the latter are 
incompatible assertions which can be shown to 
be such by reference to non-analytic ethical 
principles. This kind of incompatibility is 
as serious as logical incompatibility.60
He then gives as examples designed to raise the theodical 
problem:
X inflicts excruciating pain and suffering on 
his children daily
and
X is wholly good
There is no logical incompatibility here, says McCloskey, 
because the principle
A wholly good man would not cause his children 
excruciating pain and suffering62
is not analytic, and its truth is a matter of dispute. Yet we 
feel that there is a prima facie incompatibility - on moral 
grounds. So McCloskey claims:
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This point rests on the fact that the good man 
is he who acts on the true principles of morality 
(analytic), whilst the true principles are 
synthetic, not analytic truths. They are, as 
I have argued elsewhere, synthetic a_priori 
truths. 63
By way of reply let us refer to Ahern again, as the kind 
of reply I would make follows out of the points Ahern made in 
the context of the logical argument about the search for 
principles that are analytically true. At the close of his
book Ahern comments, in terms that seem to have McCloskey's
64 
contentions at his disposal, that the principles he has
criticised might instead be thought to be synthetic a. priori 
principles and necessarily true. He comments:
But since in the chapter on the general problem 
no fewer than eight principles about goodness 
which could be proposed as likely synthetic a 
priori principles were held to be false it seems 
reasonable to believe that satisfactory principles 
will probably not be found.65
Certainly, it is possible to imagine circumstances that would 
falsify the principle posed above by McCloskey, and which may 
be stated in general terms as:
A wholly good man would not cause his children 
excruciating pain and suffering daily unless a 
proportionate good that could not be achieved 
by any other means ensued.
d) But perhaps Griffin's "genuine evil" need not 
be located in a principle of any sort but just be a brute fact? 
However, this possibility raises a different point argued by 
Ahern which also seems to me to be indefeasible and which can be 
applied here. To show that there is in fact an instance of 
"genuine evil", then
it would be necessary to have an exhaustive know- 
ledge of possible good and its logical connection, 
if any, with actual evil. We lack this knowledge. 
Accordingly, it seems impossible to show, with 
logical necessity, that actual evil could not be
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justified with respect to God.
This being the case it is not possible to determine 
whether the proposed item 7 connects with this world or not, 
and therefore conclusion 8 cannot be drawn. The most that can 
be shown is that we do not know whether there is a God or not 
as we do not know whether there is genuine evil or not. That 
is, Griffin's formulation is ontologically neutral.
However, turning to Griffin's claim that in any case the 
set of eight terms is not a sound theistic formulation, I am 
in complete agreement. What Griffin says in this connection is 
of great importance in assessing why it is the unbeliever's 
problem does not seem to disturb the persistence of belief. He 
writes:
Those who say that the problem of evil is not 
primarily a logical problem are right in the 
sense that the crux of the problem is 
constituted by a set of definitions that are 
not matters of logic or illogic at all, but are 
essentially matters of valuation, and these are 
matters that are at least in part historically 
contingent ...67
He also remarks importantly, that one should "emphasize 
the extent to which the problem of evil is constituted by
/- p
definitions". If this emphasis is made, then the surprising 
result of the unbeliever seeking to pose what he sees as the 
believer's central problem is that what is at stake is the 
nature of his own commitments, that is, the nature of the 
evaluations he commits himself to in framing the definitions 
that underly his problem.
6. There is no doubt in my mind that the unbeliever's 
"ontological" problem has been accepted in standard conception 
theodicy as in need of an answer. There is also no doubt in 
my mind that in so far as theodicists seek to answer this
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question a subtle shift occurs to the "attributional" question. 
I would like to illustrate from Hick's writing the kind of shift 
that occurs when it is supposed there is force in the unbeliever's 
problem for the believer also. This charge is in fact laid 
against Hick by McCloskey:
For Hick the problem of evil becomes that of 
questioning the competence of an all-powerful 
creator in achieving his purposes ... God, in 
terms of the theological senses of good and 
evil laid down by Hick, can be neither good 
nor evil, only competent or incompetent ...69
Now, apart from the charge made here by McCloskey to do 
with Hick's commitments to certain evaluations, McCloskey is 
right in claiming that Hick moves the question. On the opening 
page of his theodicy Hick shares Pike's view that the issue 
raised by the fact of evil for theism is the existence of God:
i) The problem dealt with in this book is thus 
a theological one: Can the presence of evil 
in the world be reconciled with the existence 
of a God who is unlimited both in goodness 
and in power?70
This question leads Hick to pose his problem as a believer in 
terms of the received Philonic tradition:
ii) If God is perfectly good, He must want to 
abolish all evil; if He is unlimitedly 
powerful, He must be able to abolish all 
evil: but evil exists; therefore either 
God is not perfectly good or He is not 
unlimitedly powerful.71
But it has been demonstrated above that this way of expressing 
the problem in the received Philonic tradition does not raise 
the question of the existence of God. Inspection of (ii) shows 
it to be very close to the form examined above in relation to 
Augustine, and the points made there refer. But there are 
further things to be said. First, as noted before, this version 
is really a debate internal to theism as to whether God is 
infinite or not - and it is significant that Hick makes it one
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of his first tasks in Evil and the God of Love to reject
72 theodicies based on finite theism on the ground that "one of
the most fundamental items of Christian belief" is "belief in
73 the reality of the infinite and eternal God". In the context
of theodicy in classical theism therefore the "finite theism
74 option" represents an evasion rather than an answer. Second,
what Hick's theodicy amounts to, however, is an understanding 
of how the Christian terms "all-good" and "all-powerful" 
should be taken in relation to such an infinite God. But that 
again is the evaluative question.
What Hick does in rejecting finite theism, and then 
showing how terms should be taken in infinite theism, is to 
offer a defence of the worshipworthiness of God in relation to 
Epicurus' question "if He is both willing and able, which is 
alone suitable for God, from what source then are evils, and 
why does He not remove them?" In this regard, Hick rightly 
senses here the essence of the believer's proper problem, but 
makes the mistaken move of not starting from the believer as a 
worshipper, and seeking to understand the place of theodicy in 
relation to that, but rather starting from the ground marked 
out by the unbeliever. In that sense he starts out apart 
from the believer's evaluations and commitments. I seek to 
avoid this mistake in theodicy.
In contrast to Hick, Dostoievski in The Brothers 
Karamazov, is more obviously concerned with the believer's 
problem, and poses that problem in terms of the tension he sets 
up between the rebellion of Ivan against God and the continuing 
belief of Alyosha. The believer is truly faced with the question 
as to why he does not "return the ticket" - but that is not an
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ontological question, but one of relationship. In fact Hick 
elsewhere in his book shows the force of this tension when he 
writes:
Even if no one had ever suggested that the facts 
of wickedness and suffering generate a logical 
disproof of God's existence, the problem of 
evil would still present its full challenge to 
theistic faith.78
But he then immediately turns in the wrong direction when 
he says:
For, granting that the divine existence is 
logically possible, the question is whether 
it is reasonably believable in face of the 
appalling reality and extent of evil in its 
many forms.
Belief based on a calculation of the possibilities and
probabilities of God's existence, on the weighing of goods and
79 . . 
evils, on giving the benefit of the doubt, on arguments in
relation to evidence is, I suggest, lacking in the characteristics 
of religious belief which has as its hallmark "though he slay me,
o Q
yet will I trust him". It might be objected that I am here 
confusing two different sorts of religious belief - one being 
the process by which an individual comes to faith, and perhaps 
works through the unbeliever's problem and finds an answer, the 
other being the tension created by evil in the world for the 
worshipping believer. The parallel in mind in this objection 
would be the distinction drawn by Rawls between justifying a
O-i
rule, and justifying in the light of a rule. But this 
suggestion seems to me to reduce religious belief to a form of 
rationalism, for the believer would first believe in God for 
clear and distinct reasons and then live in the light of those 
reasons. But there is a qualitative difference between the God
Q O
of reasoners and the worshipworthy God, for the former is a
60
concept within our mental furniture, the latter constitutes for
Q -D
the believer his form of life. The proper question raised by 
the believer, therefore, is not whether, in the face of evil, 
the God whom he worships as real is real, but how to do the 
will of God.
I agree with Hick, then, in taking the theistic logicians
84 
such as Plantinga and Pike to task for mistaking the importance
of the logical question. I disagree with what he proposes to 
do at that point. The believer has a substantial problem, but 
it is not that of the unbeliever, and therefore he should resist 
the influence of the received Philonic tradition to express 
it that way in ontological terms. Nor is Pike to be followed 
when he says that where "the existence of God is taken as an 
item of faith or embraced on the basis of an a priori argument", 
that "the fact of evil in the world presents no special problem 
for theology", and that "the traditional problem of evil reduces
O C
to a noncrucial perplexity of relatively minor importance". 
Has he never read the book of Job? Or the crucifixion narratives? 
The problem of evil only becomes acute in the context of belief 
because it forces on the believer, as Abraham, Job, Jeremiah, 
Jesus, Paul, and a host of others would testify, the need to 
understand the nature of God, the shape of his dependence on 
God, and the meaning of the language through which he expresses 
his experience of dependence on that God in a frequently hostile 
world - but that is to jump ahead to my final arguments.
7. Let us now turn to a separate, but connected argument 
concerned with the methodological assumptions of standard 
theodicy. I have just tried to show that theodicy should not be 
concerned with defending to the believer the existence of the
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God in whom he believes as a reality. The reason advanced has 
been that it has not proved possible to connect God and evil 
ontologically in a way which calls for an answer, and further, 
that should it prove possible, then what is up for discussion 
are the commitments and evaluations implicit in the proposed 
formulation. A whole area of theodical discussion by believers 
is therefore redundant, or if not redundant, misdirected. But 
as such a conclusion is so much against the grain let us now 
explore further, but separately, what reasons there are for 
declining to engage in theodicy on the basis of analytical 
philosophy.
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B. Second False Move; That Theodicy Should Start With 
Definitions As the Basis for Clear Argument
1. "Facts", it is often claimed, are susceptible of clear 
definitions. Those definitions may come in different types 
according to the nature of the object, and may be ostensive or 
intensive in kind. But, whatever the variations, there is a 
weight of opinion and practice in line with the "Gradgrind" 
tradition that knowledge is intrinsically bound up with 
definitional clarity. Ahead of precise definitions, clear 
thought cannot be achieved. Such an attitude informs the 
approach to concepts taken by analytical philosophy.
2. There is, however, reason to query whether "facts" 
can be known in this way. Phillips, for example, argues that 
theodicy is essentially a description of the view taken of evil
Q *7
within the religious form of life. This idea of description 
rather than definition has its roots in Wittgenstein's later 
thought, for example when he says, "How words are understood is
Q Q
not told by words alone (Theology)". Whether it be chess 
pieces, paper money, or understanding in music, poetry, or 
whatever, meaning and significance of words depends on the 
surroundings and uses of the words in life. So Wittgenstein
again, "Only in the stream of thought and life do words have
  89 
meaning".
This second approach to meaning is a dominant influence 
on followers of Wittgenstein. So, Winch argues that, say, 
prayer can only be understood by those who have some awareness of
its use in the praying community - for to understand prayer we
90 
need to grasp the rules which govern the practice of prayer.
Perhaps the claim is made clear by arguing the reverse, as
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underlies Holmer's approach - that a loss of religious interest 
and practice is accompanied by a lack of understanding of
religious concepts. "Learning-how" is part and parcel of learning-
91
what. Being faithful is, it is argued, essential in order to
get into the position of being able to understand the language 
that is spoken by those who live the faith. This second 
approach to meaning is conspicuously applied to religious "facts" 
in the thought of D.M. High and D.Z. Phillips who particularly 
argue that religious understanding is intrinsically bound up 
with the context within which religious beliefs are held, for 
such understanding is gained by participation in the religious 
form of life. I wish here, however, in a preliminary way, and 
detached from the particular case of the "Wittgensteinians", 
to argue that in the existing debate considerable confusion has 
resulted from starting with definitions. The aim here is to 
prepare ground which will be further tilled later with reference
to High and Phillips. My starting point is the position arrived
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at earlier that the unbeliever's problem of evil is constituted
by definitions. Let us therefore try to be clear as to what is 
involved in this definitional approach.
3. First, with regard to "God" there is a unique problem,
for the believer would want to say that God cannot be contained
93 
within any conceivable definition. The point here is that
"infinity" cannot be contained in finite language. Barthian
94 theology, for example, incorporates this idea centrally.
Traditional uses of the via negativa and via analogia also 
witness to the same claim. Classical theism has never thought 
that human definitions are straightforwardly cognitive on the 
model of ordinary language. At this point traditional theodicy
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has taken two lines of approach. One is to accept this claim
Q <^
forcibly, and to argue against the possibility of theodicy. 
The other is to retreat to the formulations of the doctrines 
of Christianity, and to test the extent to which, as stated, 
theodicy is possible. This latter approach is precisely where 
difficulties in traditional theodicy start, however, for the 
discussion from hence forward assumes that those doctrines are 
true as stated. But that was never the case. Seen in this 
light, the function of theodicy would be at most to refine those 
definitions, as there could be no methodological device in 
analytical philosophy for penetrating beyond the form of words 
to the connection they have with the claimed experience of God. 
To understand the internal connection between doctrine and form 
of life, however, is to abandon this "definitional" approach. 
But standard theodicy is interested in "facts" - the "fact" of 
evil and the "fact" of God. So:-
4. Let us turn to consider some examples of confusions that 
arise in practice when one starts with definitions in theodicy. 
Three have been chosen which relate firstly, to problems with 
making definitions work; secondly, to problems over defining 
evilj and thirdly, problems over defining God.
a) The first example is taken from Hick in Evil and the 
God of Love. Hick clearly accepts that in order to start into 
theodicy there is a need for some definitional hardness, some 
delimitation of concept. One must of necessity start with 
definitions. Thus, he says, "It is important to bear in mind 
what this Christian understanding of God is". He then provides 
a definition as follows: God is
the unique infinite, uncreated, eternal, personal 
Spirit, absolute in goodness and power. 97
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Given this definition, he observes, "the accompanying
98 problem of evil, in its general form, is readily stated".
Now it has already been argued that in his formulation of 
the problem Hick is accepting that the commitments and 
evaluations of the unbeliever as expressed in their formulation 
of the problem are relevant to the believer. But here we see 
that he also thinks that this formulation is part and parcel of 
the definition of the believer's God as believed by the believer, 
in that it is the believer's definition of God which gives rise 
to the problem. But is Hick right to link his "problem" with 
his "definition" in the way he does?
In order to see what is at stake here let us introduce into
99 discussion Miles' account of the role of the "definitional
joker" in debates in philosophy and theology. Miles examines 
the way definitions are "played" in academic discussion and 
likens the situation to the playing of "jokers" in card games. 
In the course of an imagined debate between a philosopher and a 
theologian Miles represents the theologian as accusing the philo- 
sopher of simply taking tricks by means of a definitional joker. 
The theologian alleges that all the philosopher is saying is, 
"God cannot exist, because I am not going to use the word 'exist* 
in that way". (And I have already shown something of the 
difficulty of definitions in relation to the word "exist"). 
Later the theologian repeats his charge, "What I suspected you 
were doing was to rule out God by definition, and then speak as 
though this was sufficient to show that religious belief was 
discredited".
Applying this discussion to Hick's opening moves in 
theodicy perhaps one can ask whether, in his attempts to under-
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stand the intellectual problem of evil, he has not been 
sufficiently aware of the extent to which the problem he presents 
has the nature of a definitional joker. Now, paying attention to 
Hick's definition of the Christian "God" shows Hick includes that 
this God is "absolute in goodness and power". To this phrase my 
response is, firstly, that what is meant by being "absolute" in 
goodness and power is exactly the kind of thing that the 
Wittgensteinians are protesting is not possible to capture in a 
form of words alone. Secondly, and building on this point, 
Hick accompanies the phrase "absolute in goodness and power" 
with the claim that the Christian God is also a personal Spirit. 
Now it is not at all clear to me that it is compatible to 
attribute in a simple way both personality and absolute power 
to God. But, leaving that apart at this point, it is noticeable 
that when Hick formulates the problem of evil in relation to his 
definition, this crucial element of his theodicy, namely, what is 
possible in relationships between persons, is missing. That this 
omission was not simply an oversight can be seen by looking also 
at the following:
the problem of evil does not attach itself as a 
threat to any and every concept of deity. It arises 
only for a religion which insists that the object 
of its worship is at once perfectly good and 
unlimitedly powerful. The challenge is thus 
inescapable for Christianity, which has always stead- 
fastly adhered to the pure monotheism of its Judaic 
source in attributing both omnipotence and infinite 
goodness to God.l°2
What makes Hick spell out his view of the problem in this 
way, a way that omits the very element crucial to Christian 
theism, and to his own thesis? What makes him restrict his 
shared set of terms between the problem and his concept of God, 
so that "personal" disappears? Is it too hard to suggest that
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Hick has accepted the definitional joker that lies within the 
"unbeliever's problem" (though, as noted before, Hick's actual 
discussion shifts to tackle a different problem - one precisely 
in accord with the notion of personality in God)? But this 
suggestion makes me comment also on Hick's use, in the last quote 
above, of the idea that worship also has something to do with 
theodicy, for the worship of God in Christianity has more to do 
with what it means to speak of God as "personal Spirit" than it 
has to do with omnipotence and omnibenevolence - though there is 
of course a relationship. Suffice it to mention here, in the 
context of Hick's problems with his definition, that when 
Christians say God has "absolute power", and talk of "omnipotence",
they clearly do not believe God can do that which is illogical,
104
nor that God can break his promises, and so on. The biblical
use of the word omnipotence is of interest in this regard. 
Outside of the book of Revelation, where it occurs nine times, 
the word "pantokrator" is absent from the New Testament, except 
for 2 Corinthians 6:18 - but there it is precisely in the 
personal context of Fatherhood. It is also in the context of 
Fatherhood that this notion typically appears in the creeds where 
the word "almighty" qualifies God as Father, with his creatorship 
standing independently - thus, "I believe in God the Father- 
Almighty / Maker of heaven and earth", and not "I believe in God 
the Father / Almighty-Maker of heaven and earth". The idea seems 
to be that of the all-sufficiency of God, God as Shaddai. 
However, rather more needs to be said about this love-omnipotent 
than is apposite at this point, and later a different understanding 
of what the believer means by "omnipotence", rather than the 
unlimited power of an infinite despot, be he ever so benevolent,
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will be suggested.-1- ^
My conclusion, then, is that Hick's procedure regarding 
definitions is faulty at two levels. Firstly, and less 
importantly, there are technical difficulties over the relation- 
ship of the definitions he supplies, and whether he actually uses 
the definitions as stated. Secondly, and more importantly, 
given his definitions, one still has to ascertain what they 
mean - I suggest, however, that it is not possible to ascertain 
meaning apart from a description of the rules for use of the 
concepts in a form of life, that is to say, outside of a 
consideration of crucial terms within their use by the believing 
community. But what Hick does here is typical of traditional 
theodicy. Yet, if one is going to start with definitions, it is 
essential, it seems to me, that both these points be met. I do 
not think they can be met in standard theodicy because it depends 
on definitions apart from use. No doubt this methodology is 
useful in other fields, say mathematics, but I would argue there 
has been too ready an acceptance of the appropriateness of this 
model for correct procedure in theodicy, where there is a need 
to look, and listen, and describe. Theodicy can never be an 
activity which is conducted apart from the practice of the 
believing community - for if theodicy has to do with understanding 
how it is the believer accepts as realities both the experience 
of God and the experience of evil, then theoretical definitions 
do not constitute an adequate basis for understanding. Inter- 
estingly, Hick himself argues this point in another place. 
Writing on how the believer understands what the Christian 
community means by salvation, he argues that the starting point 
must be experienced reality:
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... we do not, as Christians, need to ask whether 
salvation through Christ can be a reality, for we 
start from the fact that it ij3 a reality! Through 
their responses to the person of Jesus countless 
people have been opened to the divine presence; 
changed in the direction of their lives; reconciled 
to themselves, to their neighbours and to God; have 
become conscious of the reality of their loving 
heavenly Father who has forgiven and accepted them.
That approach seems as specific a rejection of starting 
with abstract definitions as perhaps one could hope to meet. 
There is within it an important implication that is taken up 
later into this thesis - that is, that to understand the shape 
of the belief of the Christian one needs not only to start with, 
but to make central, the experiences he or she claims of 
forgiveness, acceptance, and salvation in Christ - without those, 
how can one say in a definition what a Christian believer means 
by God's love and goodness?
Now it might be objected that these criticisms of 
definitional approaches to theodicy are a covert attempt to play 
my own perverse notion of a definitional joker. I do not think 
this is the case, as it is not part of my concern to argue at all 
on behalf of the believer. The argument is simply that the 
believer must be listened to in a total context. What he wants 
to say must not be trumped at the start.
b) The second example, of the confusions which arise 
from starting with definitions, refers to definitions of "evil", 
and has reference to some observations of Madden and Hare. 
Sharing my view of the inadequacies of the definitional approach, 
they comment that though such a starting point seems like a 
promising move at first it turns out that the definitional 
approach is inappropriate because the notion of evil is irrelevant 
to the problem of evil. The reason for this, they say, is
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because the problem remains the same for whatever definition is 
accepted, and they cite as an example Augustine's definition
of evil as the privation of good.
Let us take up their point, and illustrate it from the
complete dependence by Journet on this "privative" definition
109in The Meaning of Evil . Journet guotes with approval Plotinus'
claim that those who wish to know where evils come from and 
whether they affect beings in general or a particular category 
of beings, would do well to start their enquiry by asking first 
what evil is and what is its nature. Proceeding on this 
advice, Journet concludes from a survey of a whole range of 
Church Fathers, Eastern and Western, that the definition of evil 
as privation represents the human mind's most delicate and pene- 
trating intellectual handling of evil. He sees this definition, 
therefore, as the key to unlock the problems of theodicy. Unfort- 
unately, as Madden and Hare point out, Augustine's (and I am 
saying, by extension, Journet ' s ) definition of evil as the 
privation of good simply leaves the main problem untouched - "why, 
in the present world, there is so much prima facie gratuitous 
absence of good, so much apparently needless privation". Madden
and Hare, drawing a cautionary lesson from this, say, therefore,
11 2
"we shall not embark upon our own analysis of this term". Let
us concur wholeheartedly. There is apparent in this matter of 
making a definition the lynch-pin of one's argument the same 
structural difficulty of argument as was noted earlier regarding 
epistemology, namely, that the provision of a philosophical 
content to the definition of evil has the methodological effect 
of controlling the shape of consequent discussion. In Journet 's 
case, he has made his defence of God's goodness depend on his
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definition of "evil". I am arguing that that is not a sensible 
procedure. Indeed, it is even less desirable than Hick's 
attempting first to define "God". For, if definitions are to be 
used at all, it is logical for the theist to proceed from his
understanding of his presiding concept "God" towards his
114 
understanding of evil, rather than vice-versa. I am, however,
as noted with regard to Madden and Hare, not concerned to offer 
such definitions at all.
On the other hand, also in agreement with Madden and Hare, 
there is the need for the theodicist, for purposes of discussion, 
to specify what he means by evil. They suggest that "ordinary 
and common-sensical" experiences of evil, rather than "philoso- 
phical criteria" of evil should be the benchmark, and focus on 
apparently gratuitious events which we would, "minus our 
philosophical views", prefer to avoid, as being the specification 
of evil they intend to work with. I have already indicated 
a similar intention to stress the reality of evil as an experience, 
and will therefore at this juncture only specify evil as that in 
reality which we would actually prefer to be otherwise. This 
kind of specification has certain difficulties of its own, such 
as the balance of objectivity and subjectivity, but these do 
not interfere with the usefulness of limiting oneself to the 
specification of evil - it is its reality that is the emphatic 
issue, not its definition.
c) The kind of argument presented in this section is 
also to be found worked out in an illuminating way by M. Novak 
in his Belief and Unbelief; A Philosophy of Self-Knowledge, and 
the third example comes from this book. Novak, also, objects 
to definitional procedures which set up the argument so as to
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determine beforehand the parameters of discussion. Entering into
-j -I O
debate with H.D. Aiken about his essay "God and Evil", Novak
119 
claims Aiken is typical of the "Anglo-American non-believer",
in what has been called above the received Phi Ionic tradition. 
This tradition Novak finds evident in the following quotation 
from Aiken:
By hypothesis, an almighty and omniscient being can 
do whatever it wills. But any perfectly good person, 
so far as he can, will do good and prevent evil. 
Now, if there is a being that is at once almighty, 
omniscient, and perfectly good, it will be both 
able and willing to prevent evil. On the other 
hand, if something is evil, it must be concluded 
that there is no such being, since a perfectly good 
person would prevent it if he could, and an almighty 
and omniscient being could prevent it if he would. 
Either, then, there is no such being or nothing 
is evil. But since, by hypothesis, only such a 
being is God, we are forced to conclude either 
that there is no God or else that there is 
nothing which is evil.1^0
Novak points out that the definition of God used here by 
Aiken is a special anthropomorphic definition - even if it does 
coincide with the way many people think of God. Novak sees 
Aiken as posing the issue in terms of (to use Miles' terminology) 
definitional jokers - and points out that the terms "Omniscience", 
"Omnipotence", "Person", and "Good" are all being set up in a 
particular way. Novak sees as the key to Aiken's procedure his 
notion of moral agency, with both God and man on the same footing 
in this regard. If this concept of moral agency does apply 
equally to God and man, then Novak agrees that manifestly God does 
not measure up to human standards; he is cruel, sadistic, or 
simply nonexistent. But Novak is not prepared to concede this
"if". Now it is not the intention at this point to resolve whether
122 Aiken or Novak is right, though it is of interest that Brian
Davies has recently argued that classical theism does not conceive
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of God as a moral agent (God is not a being; he has no duties
123 
or obligations! he is not capable of succeeding or failing).
The point is that the mere possibility of Aiken not being correct 
prevents him from being able to carry his position definitionally. 
Whatever the difficulties, Novak wishes to argue it is a genuine 
possibility moral agency does not apply identically to God and 
man. He argues that, in the search for an adequate conception
of God, one is seeking to discover what God must be like to do
124 
as he does. This search means, he says, that one must do
125 justice both to the facts of evil and to the nature of God. So,
claims Novak, "the crucial question is, What kind of agent is
T "~) C^.
God? What is his relation to human history"?
For Novak, Aiken's "God" is quite inadequate as an answer 
to this last question, and he agrees with Aiken that such a 
"God" is not worthy of belief, though for very different reasons 
to Aiken. Aiken's "God" is altogether too human for Novak. He 
is supposed to be good as man is good. He is subject to the 
blame to which man as moral agent is subject. Novak reacts:
Kierkegaard might reply that Mr. Aiken is still 
viewing the world on the plane of the ethical, and 
has not yet begun to understand religion. 
Kierkegaard, in short, might turn Mr. Aiken's 
standards upside-down and judge man by God's 
standards, not God by man's. Mr. Aiken's 
argument might in this light represent the 
quintessential attitudes of the nonbeliever: 
God is measured to man's cloth.127
Novak's disavowal of such a God is total. Aiken's God is, he 
asserts, a concept of God developed within the framework of 
classical rationalism, and is one which accords with the conven- 
tional beliefs of middle-class morality. As such, it represents
a God of "order and design", a God content in his heaven and
128 
rewarding his own on earth, even a God of liberal progress.
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In contrast, Novak believes:
In reaction against this God, the truly religious 
will flee to the transcendent, mysterious God who 
makes his own suffer and proves those he loves by 
ways men do not fathom . 1^9
Here in this debate is the heart of the problem of starting 
with a definitional approach to theodicy. Any shift in the way 
the definition is proposed entails a shift in the way we 
conceive the problem of evil and the theodical task to be 
achieved. On the other hand, as in the case of "evil", it is 
needful for discussion to specify what one means when speaking of 
"God". And it is at this point that the religious dimension in 
theodicy enters as a critical factor. The Christian does not, we 
have argued, have to ask whether God is a reality, for he 
starts from the fact that he is a reality. He has by entering 
the Christian community become conscious of and worships a loving 
heavenly Father who has forgiven and accepted him. That 
consciousness is a given that stands in judgement on all proposed 
definitions, and exists in a different dimension from all of them, 
"God" will therefore here be specified as that which is 
constitutive of Christian worship. In the light of this 
religious dimension to theodicy there is a point in the general 
tenor of Novak's claim made on the behalf of believers (though 
I have reservations as to the way in which he puts it in that he 
seems to argue from evil to God) that:
We are not trying to justify God. We are trying 
to understand more clearly, from the fact of evil, 
what he must be like in order still to be called 
good. We are seeking a more profound understanding 
of who God is. We seek it, not for his sake, but 
to assure ourselves that it is no monster we 
worship.
The dialectical significance of the problem of 
evil, seen in this light, is that it makes men seek 
the true God and no counterfeit ... Evil is the 
school in which we are made to put away the God of 
childhood. 132
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5. This dispute between Aiken and Novak brings us back to 
the argument that it should be emphasised that if the problem of 
evil is set up in terms of definitions, then those definitions 
will reveal the nature of the evaluations and commitments of 
the person advancing those definitions. This argument is the 
main thesis in U. German's A Good God? He writes:
The main problem, then, concerns a moral or evaluative 
question. I propose the following formulation of the 
problem in this interpretation:
D Is it reasonable to consider a God as good in 
evaluative sense, given the criteria of goodness 
considered to explain evil in the world?133
Although the translation English is poor here the intentions 
of Gorman are plain in that he appends a list of traits of the 
problem which he intends this formulation to raise:
*Any explanation of evil presupposes a certain 
concept of God.
*The problem arises differently for any particular 
explanation of evil.
*If such a God is considered to be good, the
explanation implies certain criteria of goodness.
*The problem concerns the acceptance or non-acceptance 
of these criteria when ascribing goodness in 
evaluative sense.
*This acceptance or non-acceptance can consist either
in a choice of a moral standard or in a comparison
to a given standard.
*Such an acceptance or non-acceptance involves an 
evaluative commitment.134
Gorman, in fact, does not challenge, as I have, that such 
definitions provide an adequate basis for theodicy, but makes 
the different, but compatible, case that connects with the 
previous discussion, namely, that when it is understood that 
traditional formulations of the problem of evil have this 
definitional character, it is also understood there can be no 
ontological implications of any kind drawn from those definitions. 
He writes:
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The resolution of the problem of evil is mainly 
a moral decision, consisting in the making of an 
evaluative commitment or a judgement based on a 
previous commitment. And from a moral decision 
it is not possible to draw any factual inferences. 
Now Christianity claims to contain metaphysical 
statements describing a purported transcendental 
reality. Hence the impossibility of drawing 
factual inferences from moral decisions will 
apply also to Christian truth-claims.135
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German is right on this point. The definitional approach
to theodicy builds into its methodology the impossibility of 
ever achieving the task which it sees itself as setting out 
to complete - that is, to comment on the ontological question of 
whether it is possible to believe in the existence of God and 
evil at once. But, further, and in agreement with Hume neither 
theist, nor atheist, can make the moral evaluations contained 
in their definitions the ground for statements about God as he is 
either. Theodicy, along this road, cannot be an attempt to 
justify God, nor an attempt to understand that God is just. It 
can, at most, be a comment on the nature of the commitments 
involved in the claim that God is x and y and z, and that events 
p, and q, and r are regarded as "evil" and stand in definitional 
contradiction of x,y,z. The end result would therefore seem to 
be agnosticism regarding what God is, if he is.
6. But the believer, in his worship of God, it seems to 
me, is claiming something rather different, and rather more. That 
is, that he experiences the reality of this all-sufficient love 
and goodness of God in a frequently hostile world. Some other 
approach to these claims of the believer appears therefore to be 
required if one is to offer a description of the shape of the 
believer's thought. Section four seeks to identify how it is 
the believer commits himself to a set of absolute statements about 
God - but clearly this cannot be done within the limits set by 
the type of discussion just considered.
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C. Third False Move; That the Distinction between Physical and 
Moral Evil is One to be Relied on
It has just been argued that it is a false move to 
structure theodicy around definitions of evil. I now extend that 
consideration by denying that theodicy is well served by the 
classification of evil, however defined, into the two classes 
of "physical" (or "natural") evil and "moral" evil, in the 
traditional manner.
1. Some theodicists have posed their questions about evil 
in terms of one notion of "evil" that is common to all those 
occurrences, states, and dispositions that we would prefer to be 
otherwise. The most influential of these notions in Western 
thought has been that of the privative view of evil. This 
view of evil is seen by its exponents as not only providing the 
required universality of application, but also as a means of 
distancing evil from the active will of God. All evil is a 
negation, a privation, a lack, a dissatisfaction, it lacks self- 
subsistence. It is a cosmic parasitism, everywhere the same, 
particularised by the nature of that on which it is parasitic, 
not by any distinctions within itself.
Another approach to evil sees it as having a uniform 
character of unreality throughout its manifestations, and this
•1 OQ
unreality, or illusion, can be dispelled by right-thinking. 
The uniformity in this case is gained by locating evil in the 
misperceptions of the agent; it is his erroneous view of the 
cosmic order that leads him to misperceive the true nature of 
things, and thereby to suffer.
2. Both of these views depend for their cogency on the 
acceptance of an underlying metaphysic. The privative theory of
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evil depends on the universal doctrine of "goods" in terms of 
"ends" present in Aristotelian-type metaphysics. The other 
theory depends on a radical metaphysical account of the relation
between appearance and reality. Both are given life by the
139 
sort of platonic theory that identifies goodness and being.
In each case the totality of the theory of evil runs parallel to 
the totality of the metaphysical scheme. The implication of both 
theories is that as all particular evils are explicable in the 
same terms, there is no need or pressure to seek for categories 
of different types of evil as the fundamental basis for theodical 
discussion.
3. For thinkers for whom, however, the above visions of 
reality lack attraction, and for whom there is no acceptable 
totally-unifying vision of reality linking all the parts in one 
great chain of understanding, what divides is as interesting as 
what unites. There is open to them the possibility that there 
may, indeed, be quite different categories of evil which the lack 
of the above types of metaphysical scheme enables one to see. 
This kind of proposal is stated quite clearly in much modern 
theodical writing, and I choose but one writer,H.J. McCloskey, 
who most acutely raises the argument for distinguishing between 
differently grounded evils, each of which represents the 
opportunity for a theodical discussion constructed in different 
terms. The distinction he makes, indeed insists on, as an 
unbeliever, is also shared by many believers who think in terms 
of standard theodicy. Examining what he says indicates, however, 
that here again the problem of evil internal to belief may not 
best be clarified by using this distinction.
H.J. McCloskey: "The facts which give rise to the 
problem [of evil]] are of two general kinds, and
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give rise to two distinct types of problem. These 
two general kinds of evil are usually referred to 
as 'physical' and as 'moral' evil."140
Now although McCloskey says that the terms thus used "are
141 by no means apt" he nevertheless thinks "this terminology is
too widely accepted, and too convenient to be dispensed with 
here". He continues:
Physical evil and moral evil then are the two general 
forms of evil which independently and jointly 
constitute conclusive grounds for denying the 
existence of God in the sense defined, namely as an 
all-powerful, perfect Being.143
And a little before he had said:
physical evils create a number of distinct problems 
which are not reducible to the problem of moral evil.
So definite is McCloskey on this point that he regards 
attempts by proponents of the free-will defence (i.e. that evil 
such as we know it is properly explicable and justifiable in 
terms of the kind of world which is a necessary condition for the 
possession and exercise of free will by responsible persons) to
link physical evil and moral good together in a pattern of
145 
argument as "completely untenable", and reproaches his fellow
opponent of theism, J.L. Mackie, for having conceded far too much
1 4fito the theist in that:
He implicitly allows that while physical evil creates 
a problem, this problem is reducible to the problem 
of moral evil and that therefore the satisfactoriness 
of solutions of the problem of evil turns on the _ 
compatibility of free will and absolute goodness.
Not so, says McCloskey, for
Moral evil can be shown to remain a problem whether or 
not free will is compatible with absolute goodness.14°
The apologetic value of McCloskey's structured contentions 
is obvious - they are an attempt to cut off from the theist the 
popular subordination of physical evil to moral evil with the 
subsequent argument that God is not culpable in respect of moral
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evil either in principle or fact. Physical evil on this theistic 
argument is the accompanying state of affairs that is necessary 
to the possibility of there being moral beings; unfortunate, 
yes; dispensable, no. Now if McCloskey can drive a wedge 
between these two widely accepted types of evil he can, for 
example, relate physical evil directly to the will of God without 
any complicating side-considerations.
My question is not simply, however, whether McCloskey is 
right in this theodical manoeuvre, but whether any of the 
participants in standard theodicy are right in supposing that 
the notions of moral and physical evil are themselves coherent, 
and if coherent, useful, in theodicy. In other words I pick up 
McCloskey's ignored comment as to whether these terms are apt.
4. Let us start by noting in what ways these distinctions 
might be thought useful. Writers who make these distinctions do 
so in the hope of giving some structural clarity to their 
discussions, and it must be admitted that the differences between 
evils that derive from the conscious and free acts of persons 
and those that derive from the action of impersonal forces do 
seem so obvious that to notice them is to affirm them. It does 
also seem that there is evidence that the differences thus noted 
do have explanatory power, for "solutions" have been generated 
by theodicists taking note of them. Also, it is perhaps not 
without significance that in other fields of study of high 
repute such as science and technology the technique of the 
resolution of general problems by the isolation of distinct 
sub-problems does prove to be a fruitful procedure. It may be 
thought then not to be unreasonable to apply the same problem- 
solving format in theodicy. If the treatment of more easily 
thought-through sub-problems can yield separate solutions, then
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it may be possible to add them together to make a complete 
answer to the general problem, or, if only some parts yield, at 
least a partial solution to the problem. This procedure might 
still be useful even if the individual solutions were not each
on their own entirely satisfactory, for one could use the power
149 
of the cumulative case. Alternatively, it might be shown by
the "ten leaky buckets technique" that, as none of the parts 
yielded a solution, there is no comprehensive answer either.
5. So, let us suppose that it is possible to divide evil 
into these two quite distinct kinds, which by their different 
characteristics give rise to two quite different problems, which 
in turn might generate two quite different answers. And let us 
note down considerations that come to mind as one presses for 
some degree of "hardness" to the terms "moral evil" and "physical 
evil", so that not only are the precise differentiating 
characteristics brought out, but all participants in the debate 
are referring to the same distinctions when using these terms. 
And let us note as a means of starting to think this point 
through that McCloskey himself records the following three 
difficulties:
i) Suffering is physical evil but not strictly 
physical evil.
ii) Within physical evil as a distinct type there 
are further distinct types of evil which raise distinct problems
and have their own solutions which are not applicable throughout
152 the general class.
iii) Conversely, some proposed solutions "relate to 
both kinds and all sub-kinds of evil". 
One might then be provoked into the following arguments, each of
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which indicates that one needs to think twice before tying 
theodicy too closely to the distinction some draw between "moral 
evil" and "physical evil".
iv)(a) First, with regard to the habit in theodicy 
of dealing with all aspects of evil that have a personal orienta- 
tion in terms of "moral evil", and the accompanying habit of 
identifying moral evil with the notion of "sins" in Christian 
language, I would argue that the shape of Christian belief is 
not adequately accounted for. Amidst the wide range of meanings 
of "sins" in Christian language, there is a fundamental difference 
to be drawn between the conduct of men amongst themselves and 
the conduct of men in relation to God. Now, whilst Christian 
belief connects the two, the question is as to exactly how the 
former ("moral evil", "sins") relates to the latter ("spiritual 
evil", "sin"). This issue is clarified by first describing in 
what sense "sin" as a distinct "spiritual" evil differs from 
"sins". This description can be made by noting that for the 
adoring worshipper the fundamental evil would be that of rejecting 
God's person, for that is the essence of blasphemy. But, when 
one turns to the literature, there is immediately apparent an 
ambiguity as to whether such sin is included in moral evil. I 
argue that it should not be, but should be set over against all 
other negative experience. This ambiguity is present in the 
writings of McCloskey in a way not untypical of general discussion. 
He writes, on the one hand, in an article:
Moral evil is simply immorality - evils such as 
selfishness, envy, greed, deceit, cruelty, callous- 
ness, cowardice and the larger scale evils such as 
wars and the atrocities they involve.
and on the other, in his book, going further:
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the theist must interpret moral evil not simply as 
moral fault but as being or involving a breach of 
God's law, and a rejection of God himself.155
McCloskey sets up, then, three possible meanings of "moral" evil. 
Firstly, moral fault = immorality; secondly, = breach of God's 
law - which in the article he terms (quoting Joyce ) something 
which "offends" God; and thirdly, = rejection of God himself. 
Now, in his book, McCloskey confuses these distinctions by
1 RP
saying that beings who "infringe" God's law,
reject him by engaging in such evil actions as lying, 
cheating, being unkind to others, being callous, 
cruel, injuring their fellow men and killing and 
torturing them, showing spite, exhibiting jealousy, 
feeling envy, and manifesting all the unpleasant 
traits ... 15§
He thus runs together the three types of moral evil that he 
himself notices - infringement of God's law is the rejection of 
God's person which is the practice of indulging in the moral 
faults commonly called immorality. Interestingly, in the book, 
McCloskey goes on to quote the prayer for forgiveness:
Almighty and most merciful Father, we have erred and 
strayed from thy ways like lost sheep. We have 
followed too much the devices and desires of our 
own hearts. We have offended against thy holy laws.
I say interestingly, because this prayer relates to only two of 
McCloskey's categories in the way he intends and actually excludes 
the third. Moral faults are, in this prayer, identified with 
breaches of God's law. But, the worshipper, by the very fact 
that he is praying to his "Almighty and most merciful Father", 
reveals that these "sins" are not a rejection of God's person but 
are a lapse, a fault, a weakness, a sin; but not a rejection. 
iv)(b) Coming to the same point from a different 
angle, it is possible to suppose that (logically) man could have 
chosen to reject God's person whilst not committing any of the
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evil acts McCloskey so assiduously itemises, or any others actual 
or conceivable. Man could have chosen, by exercise of his free- 
will, to live out of communion with God, whilst at the same time 
living perfectly at harmony with one another, i.e. without "sins" 
but in a state of "sin". Against this supposition Hick, in his
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generally sensitive discussion of "The Shape of Sin", claims 
the nature of man's relationship with God determines the nature 
of his relationships with his fellow men. I suggest, however, 
that this claim of Hick's is a factual comment made with the 
benefit of hindsight rather than a comment on what must necessarily 
be the case. On this point I am also against Maritain, who 
building on Aquinas' assertion that if it is in the nature of 
things that an event can happen, this event actually will 
happen sometimes, argues:
God, therefore cannot make any creature who is 
naturally impeccable, any more than He can make a 
squared circle; these are not necessities 
independent of God which are forced upon Him from 
without ...; these necessities themselves depend 
on His very essence as His intelligence sees it, 
seeing at the same time all those ways in which 
that very essence can be participated in. To 
annihilate these necessities one would have to 
annihilate first the very essence of God, and thus 
we must admit that God can no more create a being 
by nature impeccable, than He can cease to exist 
and to be what He is. It is the same sort of 
necessity.162
But McCloskey has the rejoinder here when he says that Maritain,
is not obviously saying the necessity is analytic 
in the usual sense, yet the parallels he draws are 
on the one hand with analytic necessity as ordinarily 
understood - and this parallel seems only too 
evidently inapt - and on the other with the necessity 
attributed to God as a necessarily existing being.I 63
McCloskey rejects both these parallels - the former as clearly
164 inappropriate; the latter as a faulty notion of "necessity".
But, even if one accepts that the theist is not being perverse in
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claiming factual necessity for the nature of God's existence, it 
remains the case that Maritain's point is only comprehensible 
within the framework of a metaphysics which incorporates the idea 
of the necessity of the plenitude of being. Outside of that 
theory, "Failure is not a logical necessity, simply an empirical 
fact". 166
It is not an idle supposition, then, that man need not, in 
rejecting communion with God, also of necessity breach God's 
law, that is, commit immoralities. What I am saying is that moral 
evil, pace McCloskey, cannot be equated with the fundamental evil 
in Christian theism of rejecting God. For this we need the word 
"sin" - that is an essential and unique category of evil in the 
shape of Christian belief. But in terms of theodicy, could there 
be any conceivable explanation or accounting for such a fundamental 
irrationality? The situation is that the believer could not 
account for this. And the unbeliever would not need to do so, 
for to him there could not be such sin. It might be objected 
that many Christians see an internal relationship between 
honouring God and keeping his law, between rejecting God and 
rejecting his law. But this is to confuse what it is to express 
one's love of God, or one's rebellion against God, in certain 
ways, with the different issue of simply rejecting God. Rebellion 
is a way of living before God; rejection is ceasing to live 
before God.
Now, let us consider the rebel and suppose that men can 
continue to accept God but become involved in breaches of his law. 
But this may be solely breaches of ritualistic law. It is a 
further item to claim, as McCloskey does, that acts of, say, 
selfishness and cowardice are immoralities and therefore evils
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and therefore breaches of God's law. Of course, there may be a 
great deal of confused thinking on all sides on the relationship 
between "sin" and "sins" in Christian theism owing to its desire 
to give expression to its commitment to hold all life before God,
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but that does not mean the shape of its belief at depth is
confused. What is spoken of as God's law may be precisely human
169 law held before God. I contend that it is. Men may fail in
regard to such law held before God, but that does not equate 
with failing God. Paul's doctrine of the co-existence of the 
old and the new man in Christ seems to me to be just such a 
distinction, for it allows a perfect status for the believer 
before God whilst his actual state is that of a worshipping 
sinner, that is, one who lives before God, but inauspiciously. 
Paul's letters to the Corinthian Church should be sufficient to 
indicate that those who are the sons of God by redemption, and 
thereby reconciled to God, continue to breach both ritualistic 
and moral law - whilst worshipping. Conversely, the moral 
integrity of the unbeliever is also a possibility, for he may 
hold to human law, though not before God.
iv)(c) Let us pursue this matter a little further, 
and give the point an application. It seems to me it is the 
running together of "moral" and "spiritual" evil which enables 
Hick to construct his Irenaean-type thesis. But if that is the 
case, then therein lies its Achilles' heel. The notion of man 
being placed at an original epistemic "distance" from God so that 
man could freely develop as a moral being who finally comes into 
eschatological fulfilment and full fellowship with God, makes 
man's spiritual life a moral pilgrimage - with the spiritual 
being the dependent factor. Is it the case that there is a
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correspondence between man's moral and spiritual condition, so 
that as he progresses in the former so he progresses in the 
latter? Is it the case that it is man's moral state that fits 
him for the presence of God? It may be, but it would be hard to 
represent this as the content of the New Testament evangel. The
emphasis in the soteriology of the New Testament is the other
172 
way around - it is man who sets himself at a "distance" from
God. Insofar as Christian belief equates knowing God and loving 
him this might, in terms of the rebel, be termed "agapeistic" 
distance, for rebellion is one way of expressing a relationship. 
But for the unbeliever, the one who has ceased to live before 
God, the notion of "distance" is perhaps inappropriate, for his 
form of life has no epistemological structures in relation to 
God at all. Stating things in this way does justice to the moral 
life of the unbeliever in a way that Hick's account does not -
for although Hick sees his epistemological thesis as compatible
174 . ... 
with both belief and unbelief, is it not implicit in his Vale
of Soul-Making thesis that the unbeliever who is moral is willy-
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nilly implicated in progress in the way towards God too? But
how can that be the case? I would contend that one thing which 
constitutes an "unbeliever" is that his moral life is not lived 
before God. No amount of moral progress can make a difference 
there. But to hate God is another matter. That is a way of 
living before him.
v)(a) But in the literature "moral evil" is set over 
against "physical evil" rather than "spiritual". Now, in regard 
to this distinction there is a remarkable lack of agreement 
among theodical writers as to where the boundary lies despite the 
claims noted earlier that we have here two quite different types
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of evil. Some writers include both the act and the effect(s) of 
the act in moral evil - thus, they designate as "moral evil" all 
physical sufferings caused by moral agents acting evilly. Others 
limit the class to the acts of the moral agent alone, and put all 
resulting suffering under "physical evil". There is, therefore, 
a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding a whole range of 
actual evils as to the type of "solution" which might be approp- 
riate to them, if, that is, the contention is accepted that there 
are different solutions to the two classes. But it might be 
objected that even if there is a combined or overlapping set in 
the middle, there are still the distinct classes on either side. 
But on the "physical" side there is the added difficulty of 
stating exactly what is meant by terming a physical event "evil" 
- for example, in what sense is pain necessarily evil? And if
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the further notion of "metaphysical evil" is admitted (which 
is really a way of saying that "physical evil" is a problematic 
concept) then the difficulties are increased, for a pincer 
movement occurs which, when persisted in, eliminates "physical 
evil" as a class. And on the "moral" side there is the difficulty 
of determining the relationship between actual, but culturally 
relative, moral evils, and the concept of "moral evil" itself - 
for if moral evil is to be of significance as a basis for 
theodical argument, then it would be needful to show that the
alleged case is intrinsically a moral evil. But as argued
179 . before, to show that it is an intrinsic evil would be to show
that it is a genuine evil, and we lack the knowledge to make this 
judgement. In the case of both physical and moral evils there- 
fore, one is back again to the question of evaluations according
 *.   180 to criteria.
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v)(b) There is the further question in relation to 
moral evil as to whether intention is a relevant factor; if 
one causes suffering unintentionally, does that lack of intention 
remove this act from the class of moral evils? If so, to what 
class do such evils deriving from unintended personal action 
belong? Similarly with ignorance. I take it that knowledge is
-1 Q -1
relevant to moral activity, and that culpable ignorance would 
be a moral evil. But what of non-culpable ignorance? And the 
question of negligence also refers. Is all negligence clearly of 
moral significance?
The point here is that there are types of personal act 
which can cause, or be contributory to, suffering but which 
escape the categories proposed by McCloskey and others for 
discussing evil in the world. In general terms the issue here 
is one of the relationship between the moral acts and the social
I Q O
acts of free, rational, personal beings.
So, for example, if a dentist inflicts pain in the course 
of his freely chosen professional duties it is a free act of a 
rational personal agent who intentionally causes suffering, 
albeit he would it were otherwise. It might be replied that it 
is not his intention to cause suffering, but that the suffering 
is there apart from his willing. His intention is to reduce 
suffering. This would be to suggest the by-products of our 
activities are not our responsibility. But let us suppose the 
social acts of a dentist are in no way "moral" evils. Are the 
pains then simply "physical" evils? If so, one is saying that 
physical evils deriving from social acts are distinguishable 
(un-blameworthy) from physical evils deriving from moral acts 
(blameworthy). But can one so easily distinguish all along the 
line between moral and social acts as has just been done in the
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case of the dentist? Moral behaviour and social behaviour are 
so closely intertwined it is unlikely such a distinction could 
be made with any degree of security. It somewhat blunts the 
contention, however, that moral evil is a "distinct" class of 
evils if it proves, on the one hand, that it is open to the 
inclusion of "physical" evils committed by moral agents, and on 
the other, that the activities of moral agents in their social 
acts are such that the physical suffering they cause is not 
"moral evil" but "physical".
v)(c) And suffering, as McCloskey hints, would seem 
in any case to transcend the impositions of classification imposed 
in claiming there are two "distinct" classes of moral and physical 
evil; it can be physical, social, psychological, mental, moral. 
Yet suffering is perhaps the major part of the problem of evil. 
And even then, as Irenaean-type theodicies show, suffering is not 
to be taken as "evil" in a simplistic way.
vi)(a) The distinction between moral and physical 
evil is based on giving importance to the activity or passivity
-I Q O
of moral agents in relation to states of affairs adjudged to 
be evil. Earthquakes naturally occurring would be instances of 
physical evil; caused by men they might be moral evil. But, 
picking up a point from above, and by way of example, is a 
naturally occurring earthquake in and of itself an evil? I 
suggest that it is only relatively an evil - relative, that is, 
to there being an agent to judge it is an evil, and that things 
would have been better without it. Austin Farrer is right when 
he says that,
Nothing is called bad but by reference to the spoiling 
of a nature, the inhibition of an activity, the 
frustration of an aim, or the saddening of an exis- 
tence which we take to be good. 184
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But there is also the need for a judgement that there is a 
"spoiling", an "inhibition", a "frustration", a "saddening"
•I Q IT
that it is an evi1.
vi)(b) Further, again following Farrer, it is often 
the interaction between natural "goods" that is judged to be 
"evil", rather than things being evil in themselves. Writing 
of a "weed" he comments humorously, but cogently, "when we call 
it bad, we mean it's bad for us, or for the plants we are trying 
to grow. It's a fine, flourishing thing in itself".
vi)(c) It would seem, therefore, that it is 
impossible to escape with regard to physical evils from the 
element of evaluation incorporated in the notion of physical 
"evil", and that this evaluation is with reference to a moral 
scale of values - what counts as "suffering" and as physical 
"evil" depends on the evaluative system to which one is committed. 
Approval or disapproval of the destruction of bacteria; 
vegetarianism; use of pesticides; vivisection; use of human 
guinea pigs; all involve differing evaluative criteria as to 
whether the suffering involved is an evil, and if so at what 
level of sentience it becomes so, and so on. The notion, 
therefore, of a "distinct" class of physical evils which can be 
listed apart from the criteria involved in moral evaluation 
begins to look too simplistic an understanding of what is 
involved in calling anything that is physical, "evil". But what, 
it might be objected, of cancer? Is that not clearly an evil, 
nature gone wrong? Again, one needs to ask from what viewpoint 
the question is asked. Applying Farrer's point, and difficult 
though it is to say it, "it is a fine flourishing thing in 
itself" - by calling it "evil" we reveal our judgement that it is
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"bad for us", not that it is evil in itself.
vii) On a different plane there is in any case the 
widespread use in theodical argument of the idea that physical 
evil in its entirety is the responsibility of a free personal
1 R "7
rational agent - God. All physical evil is in this sense 
moral evil if one follows those who say that physical effects of 
moral actions are to be included in the class of moral evil. It 
is the heart of the critic's case that physical evil shows 
directly that God is morally reprehensible. As the creator of 
the way things are, God cannot escape moral responsibility. But 
in addition, human moral evil is also, indirectly at least, 
a feature of the universe by the "permission" of God. In 
relation to God, therefore, - and it is in relation to God that 
the problem of evil arises - all evil is moral evil. The 
classification of a distinct category of physical evil would it 
seems, after all, be superfluous as far as theodicy is concerned. 
The only question which matters is that disputed by the theist 
and atheist as to whether God may be thought to be morally 
desirable or not. The atheist would argue the burden of proof 
lies with the theist, and that the criteria are straightforwardly
-I Q Q
the same as are applicable to a human moral agent, the 
difference being the totality of God's responsibility. It seems 
to me that the atheist has no need to search for different types 
of evil, and that in fact his case is strengthened if he doesn't. 
Any evil of any type at any level of analysis constitutes the 
problem because, as the "cosmic moral agent", God is morally 
responsible for all of it. This realisation is in fact, as Hick 
points out, one of the items of agreement between the 
"Augustinian" and "Irenaean" traditions in Christian thought on
93
189 the problem, and it is an emphasis in danger of being lost
by discussions that locate distinct evils which are apparently 
not "moral". As Kane has argued, theodical argument becomes 
self-defeating if it seeks to mitigate the problem of evil by 
attempting to show by means of the free-will defence that God 
is absolved of complicity in human moral evil, and also that 
physical evil is, after all, not evil at all (in that it serves 
an ultimately good purpose) - self-defeating because when added 
together these responses deny that as far as God is concerned
there ever was a problem, because in relation to God it turns out
190 there is no responsibility at all for evil. The problem has
been resolved at the expense of one of the things that the 
believer knows most truly - that the experience of evil is a 
genuine experience that must be treated in those terms and not 
dissolved away. There is evil and there is God. Setting up 
categories of evil that reduce that double experience is to 
avoid the full force of the problem as it is known by the 
believer and to fall for the magic of words. When Austin Farrer 
points out that evil must always be given a personal reference, 
by asking of physical evil, "Evil, yes, perhaps, but whose 
evil?" then he is indicating physical evil has a moral 
dimension. That is where we should, perhaps, leave the business 
of categorising evil for the moment. Further categorisation only 
obscures this fundamental point.
viii) This interpenetration of the "physical" and 
"moral" aspects of analysis is witnessed to by those theodicists 
who, having divided them, seek to show a close relationship 
between them.
viii)(a) Some claim there is an ascending parallelism
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between orders of good and orders of evil such that physical
and moral goods and evils are reciprocal. So, for example, pain
192 
and fortitude are two aspects of the same state of affairs.
viii)(b) Some claim one solution is sufficient to 
account for both moral and physical evil. For example Swinburne
argues on the one side that the free-will defence is a solution
193 to both. McCloskey suggests, however, that for "utilitarian
194theists" everything comes down to a problem of physical evil,
and conversely criticises Mackie for implying that the problem
195 
of physical evil is reducible to the problem of moral evil.
As noted earlier the privative and illusory views of evil see 
them as manifestations of the same universal phenomenon.
It would seem the common emphasis in such suggestions as 
these is that, although separable at a superficial level, 
physical and moral evil are not in terms of theodicy ultimately 
distinct. One cannot treat one without what is said having some 
bearing on the other. It would also seem that the various and 
competing arguments as to what to do with these distinctions once 
they are made brings their usefulness into question for, taking 
the debate as a whole, any position appears to be possible 
depending on the intentions and interests of the writer. In view 
of such being the case, my own proposal will seek to use an
approach to evil which relieves the theodicist of such
i 9fi difficulties. D
6. However, supposing for the moment there is merit in 
distinguishing types of evil, I would like to develop a reductio 
ad absurdum argument, using the refinements of analysis employed 
by theodicists as they try to make sense of moral as against 
physical evil. My method is to see if this first level of
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distinction would need to be followed by increasingly refined 
distinctions, each naturally arising from the preceding, until 
the process breaks down under its own weight. It should be noted 
that each of these refinements has been advocated by theodicists 
in the interests of useful and accurate classification.
The first step in the process is McCloskey's claim that
197 
moral and physical evil are radically distinct types of evil.
The second step also comes from McCloskey. He notes within 
these categories further distinct sub-problems. Referring to 
physical evils he says,
I shall be arguing that no one 'solution 1 covers all 
these evils, so we shall have to conclude that 
physical evils create not one problem but a number 
of distinct problems for the theist.^S
And regarding moral evil he says, "Three types of moral evil need
199to be distinguished". These are, in summary, moral evils of
omission, moral evils of commission where the instigator knows 
he is doing wrong, and moral evils of commission where the 
instigator mistakenly thinks he is doing right. Let us call 
these respectively, acts of omission; acts of intentional- 
commission; and acts of commission-in-error.
The third step also depends on McCloskey. It concerns the 
distinction already in mind between moral evil as breach of God's 
law, rejection of God's person, and neutral moral evil. Let us 
simplify these a little and call them neutral moral evil, and 
theistic moral evil.
Fourthly, in both McCloskey and Ahern we find a distinction 
is made between actual evil as specific and actual evil as 
abstract. 200
Fifthly, from general discussion, there is a difference 
proposed between intrinsic evils and instrumental evils (= goods).
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Finally, for my purposes, though not necessarily 
absolutely, there is a distinction found in the literature 
between "prima facie" evil (which can be sub-divided in terms of 
context and perspective), and "genuine" evil.
Now let us suppose the plot in which Bonhoeffer was 
involved, to murder Hitler, had in fact been "successful". 
Would Hitler's premature death count as a case of a moral evil?
Prima facie, this is a moral evil, because it is a murder, 
or if that is thought to be a question-begging word, because 
it is an intentional death brought about by unauthorised people. 
Some would see the latter as intrinsically evil, and would 
therefore say it is a case of a genuine moral evil, albeit they 
might feel some sympathy with the deed. This would, therefore, 
be the case even if God did not exist and so it would be an 
"intrinsic neutral genuine moral evil". Now in the case imagined 
the death was brought about intentionally in full knowledge of 
the moral principles involved, and so it is an "intrinsic neutral 
genuine moral evil of intentional-commission ". And as the 
analysis concerns a specific actual instance, it is an "intrinsic 
neutral genuine specific actual moral evil of intentional- 
commission". But what does this add to saying that it is an evil?
But, conversely, suppose one accepts Mackie's quasi- 
logical rule that "good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a
202 good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can", and
auppose in the judgement of the plotters there was no other way 
to eliminate this evil without eliminating the evil-doer. Then 
one finds that the "murder" is not a genuine evil, but an only- 
apparent evil, because it is instrumental to the achievement of 
one's quasi-logical principle, a principle one regards as
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fundamental to one's ethical conduct. Now, if the plotters are 
right in their understanding of the principle, they are doing 
'good by intention"; if wrong they have done "evil in error". 
Spelling this out, this means one or other of the following is the 
case rather than the "accurate" designation detailed above:
Either: Hitler's "murder" is in fact an example of an 
"intentional genuine good", i.e. "an intentional-commission of 
an actual neutral specific instrumental (only-apparent) moral 
evil, from the perspective of the plotters". But, again, one 
is left with a question in one's mind - this time, whether such 
classification only leads one into equivocation: what moral 
evil cannot be designated good by such a process? - and the 
modern world affords many examples of aggrieved groups who 
justify their actions in just this way.
Or: an "erroneous commission of a genuine actual intrinsic 
specific neutral moral evil". Such might be the case as pleaded 
by the defence lawyers. Perhaps the plotters would hope that at 
least God would take this view. Or perhaps hope that in the 
moral sphere there is room for the notion that evils are justified 
if a countervailing and proportionate good arises that could not 
have been achieved by any other means.
But there is the further complication that the "death" may 
not be a "neutral" evil at all, but a "breach of God's law", or 
perhaps a "justifiable breach of God's law", or perhaps a 
"fulfilment of the justice of God's law", or perhaps "permissible 
within God's law". It would therefore be a "theistic evil" of 
varying types depending which of these is so, and one would need 
to add a suitable list of alternatives to those given above. And 
there is the further consideration, within the theistic context,
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of whether it would count as a "rejection of God's person" -
especially if it was done in his name and for "Christian"
203
motives.
The permutations begin to multiply rapidly and it is not 
necessary to track one's way through their increasing complexity 
as explanatory power seems to decrease with each step, and 
therefore it is a path it is not proposed to tread. It has been 
engaged in only to expose the difficulties that arise as 
theodicists seek to bring clarity to the broad categories of moral 
and physical evil they themselves propose.
7. What general points may be seen as coming usefully 
out of this discussion? Firstly, that the proposal of many 
in theodicy to proceed by way of the separate routes of moral 
and physical evil looks decidedly more problematic than appeared 
at first sight, and that McCloskey's initial reservations were 
fully justified. The classifications proposed lack the requisite 
definitional hardness, and are at the same time too broad, too 
narrow, too interpenetrating, and too elusive to give one 
confidence. It might be objected that I have been critical of 
the need for definitional hardness as a pre-requisite of 
discussion, but that I am now insisting on it. Such is not the 
case - what is being said is that those who wish to follow the 
classification trail need such hardness; but it is not available. 
That is the same point as before. It might be replied that I am 
altogether overstating the complexities here, and that my first 
comment on the obviousness of the categories of moral and physical 
evil outweighs all complicating argument. My reply is that, of 
course, those who have built their theodicies, or their anti- 
theodicies, on these distinctions will be reluctant to give them
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up. But it is incumbent on them to show precisely what it is 
they mean by moral and physical evil and precisely how a more 
rigorous approach to these categories affects their arguments.
My own lack of confidence in these distinctions leads me 
to propose, secondly, that the theodicist is better served by 
seeking to understand on a fresh basis how it is that the 
believer comes to terms with all those experiences in life which 
stand over against him and which he would actually prefer to be 
otherwise. The word "negativity" will be used to act as short- 
hand for such an all-embracing specification. That specification 
then leaves one free to approach the central question of the 
nature of the judgement involved in judging negativity to be 
"evil". From where does the Christian believer derive his 
evaluative criteria?
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D   The Underlying Problem; Strictly Theoretical Analysis
I have tried to show why it is that when standard 
conception theodicists discuss the problem of evil progress does 
not seem to be in proportion to the effort expended. Such 
theodicy is wrongly formulated in that it is assumed (i) that 
believers have as a problem what unbelievers say they have; 
(ii) that believers have been prone to the temptation that if 
they can get their definitions of "God" and "evil", etc. right, 
they will be in a position to try to answer the problem of evil; 
and (iii) that believers have tried to erect defences of the 
existence of God in terms of "moral" and "physical" evil. Lying 
behind each of these is, however, a single assumption - that 
philosophy can tell us what we can know, and that the tool by 
which it does this is strictly theoretical analysis. I now 
argue against the use of this tool in elucidating the believer's 
problem of evil.
1. D.Z. Phillips contends that to ask whether God exists 
is not to ask a theoretical question. If it is to mean anything
at all it is to wonder about praising and praying; it is to
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wonder whether there is anything in all that. Or again, that
as to know God is to love Him, there is no theoretical under-
205 
standing of the reality of God. The man, Phillips says, who
construes religious belief as a theoretical affair, distorts 
it. 206
2. In contrast, U. German claims his interest is in the
intellectual problem constituted by the fact of evil within the
207 
context of Christian faith. He says he is not interested in
the practical problem about the management of evil, but rather a
208 question of rationality.
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3. Matters are not quite so simple as such claims at first 
reading imply. Phillips is contrasting the narrower activity of 
analytical philosophy with his broader agenda that takes in the 
practice of the community within which the language of belief 
finds its role. German, however, has in mind the contrast between
armchair discussion and the fight against evil. But there
it
remains the point of contact that what German speaks of as
rationality is what Phillips rejects - for German rationality is 
an intellectual matter; for Phillips rationality is the "grammar" 
of a form of life.
4. The intention in this item is to move from German's 
approach towards Phillips'. The critique relates to the use in 
theodicy of strictly theoretical analysis. My contention is that 
religious belief is distorted if a separation is made between 
the synthetic and experiential practice of the community of 
believers, and the forms of words in which its beliefs are 
expressed. A case is made for descriptive understanding of that 
unified experience as the proper activity as far as the philoso- 
phical input to the activity of theodicy is concerned.
5. First, let us note the breadth of support for German's 
claim. Thus, from constructive theodicy:
A. Farrer: "... if we are to start with the sufferer,
there are two problems, the first practical, 
the second theoretical ... The practical 
problem is pastoral, medical, or psycho- 
logical ... We are concerned with the 
theoretical problem only." 209
And from process theodicy:
D.R. Griffin: "Some writers argue that the problem of 
evil is an existential, practical problem, 
so that it is wrong to attempt to give any 
theoretical answers...
I reject this line of reasoning ... 
...the theoretical side of the problem of 
evil is a significant aspect of the
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existential problem to be met, and a 
theoretical problem can only be met with 
a theoretical solution."210
And from analytic theodicy:
M.B. Ahern: "There are many problems concerning evil, 
some of them practical and others 
speculative. How to prevent a specific 
evil is a practical problem of evil. 
Since such problems are not philosophical, 
they will not be discussed at all."^11
All such approaches will be called strictly theoretical analysis.
6. How should one react to the dichotomy which these 
authors insist divides the practical and the theoretical aspects 
of our experience of evil?
a) The first section quoted a number of authors who
agree with this dichotomy, but who come down firmly on the prac-
212 tical side. They argue the Christian religion concerns
what one does with evil, not what one thinks about it. But that 
is to fall into the converse error to that about to be shown in
strictly theoretical analysis.
213b) B. Hebblethwaite in Eyilj._Suffering and Religion
admits the dichotomy, but recognises the importance of both 
aspects. He sees there is (i) the distinction that can be drawn 
between suffering and wickedness, and (ii) the distinction between 
the practical and the theoretical. These distinctions can be 
brought together by treating the problems of pain (suffering)
and wickedness (moral evil) on the one hand as a matter of
214 
religious practice, but also as an intellectual problem.
Each problem can then be considered separately. He first puts 
on one side the question of explanation and concentrates on the 
problem of coping with suffering and evil, and surveys the reli- 
gions of the world for the practical resources they offer men. He
2i5 then turns to the theoretical problem, and offers a discussion.
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But finally his interest in life and experience leads him to 
reduce the value of that theoretical discussion, for he writes 
that the practical problem of coping with suffering and evil will 
never be solved by reading books and thinking. One has actually 
to meet religious people, Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, Muslims, 
Jews, and see how they confront the world's evils if one is going
to grasp something of the resources of religion for coping with
? i fi 
suffering and wrong. In order to understand properly, he says,
one must put oneself in the shoes of believers of many traditions a
217 they pose their "why?" questions, and try to see how reality
2l8 
appears to them. Eventually, therefore, he is unable to
keep apart the problems of coping and explaining, of theory and
219 practice, for they are interdependent. Writing of the
resurrection and the afterlife, he observes that such beliefs 
help men both to cope with suffering and evil, and also to
explain, if not their presence in the world, then at least the
220 
worthwhileness of creation despite the world's ills. What
Hebblethwaite interestingly shows here is that, even granting 
the distinction of theoretical and practical, there is an inter- 
relationship between them in that what men do is a function of 
what they believej and conversely. His initial insistence on
theory and practice being distinct problems in belief, and his
221 
claim that these distinctions need to be clearly drawn, is
modified in the end to being a tool of analysis rather than a
representation of how the problem of evil is "felt" by the
222believer.
c) But is it necessary to work with this dichotomy at 
all? A writer who is successful in incorporating into his basic 
analytical structure an inescapable interpenetration of the 
theoretical and the practical is J. Hick in his "Irenaean" thesis.
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Hick does not deny or affirm the importance of either dimension 
because each is the counterpart of the other. The "vale of 
soul-making" thesis is at one and the same time a theoretical
and a practical insight into the significance of evil for the
223believer. To accept the thesis is also to take up a
practical stance. How man understands evil and what he does in 
the face of it are inseparable philosophical aspects of Hick's 
theodicy - the theory has empirical fit. From many possible 
examples of this interpenetration, the following is typical:
in a world that is to be the scene of compassionate 
love and self-giving for others, suffering must fall 
upon mankind with something of the haphazardness 
and inequity that we now experience. It must be 
apparently unmerited, pointless, and incapable of 
being morally rationalised. For it is precisely 
this feature of our common human lot that creates 
sympathy between man and man and evokes the unselfish 
kindness and goodwill which are among the highest 
values of personal life. ^4
This position is both theoretically creative and practically 
significant. It encourages one to look further into the 
relationship between the theoretical and practical in theodicy, 
and to query the rejection of either in the way advocated by 
writers mentioned before.
7.a) How should one respond to the contention that theodicy 
is a philosophical task that is strictly theoretical? My 
response is to grant that theodicy as an activity must not be 
less than philosophical in character, but to contend it is not 
just philosophical. Thus, whilst rejecting the claim that there 
is a normative conception of philosophy as theoretical analysis, 
I would nevertheless argue that a descriptive theodicist should 
have a view of the reasonableness and defensibility and applica- 
bility of that way of doing philosophy which he or she espouses. 
Theodicists should, therefore, aim for internal coherence of
105
methodology, and fruitfulness of outcome. But they should also 
bear in mind that there is a further requirement in the context 
of religious belief. Theodical activity should be such as to 
reveal, if possible, the shape of the rationality of belief in 
its own terms, and not bend the shape of belief to fit that of 
the philosophical methodology in use. That approach to theodicy 
means of course the theodicist must give some account of how he 
sees his methodology as appropriate to the purpose in hand, and 
that he is not engaging in a form of philosophical imperialism. 
Now in this regard, it would be an advantage if the discussion 
were to be recognisable by the believer as referring to belief as 
he knows it to be a factor in his way of life. Religious 
believers hold their beliefs to be not strictly theoretical - 
indeed, such an understanding is rejected in Christian theism 
which gives specific attention to the interpenetration of belief 
and life. As has just been seen in Hebblethwaite and Hick, 
religious belief is not just a set of ideas, but motivating 
thought. Theodicy needs must reflect that fact. My interest is 
to see if philosophy as descriptive understanding is adequate to 
the theodical task thus understood.
b) Developing this point, let us attend to theodicy as
225 deriving its character jointly from theology and philosophy.
Can theodicy be a task of strictly theoretical analysis if it 
must have regard to theology as a separate and distinctive input 
to its activity?
Now, not the least of the factors that make theology a 
separate discipline are the notions of "revelation" and "normative 
event". These notions occupy a central place in any Christian 
theology. Theodicy cannot, therefore, proceed without regard to
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those features of theology which make it Christian and not 
something else. Whatever the links with philosophy, theodicy 
must remain internal to Christian theism.
But what is involved in saying that Christian theism derives 
its life from particular claims about certain events which are 
taken to be normative and revelational? Crucially, that the 
Christian community also claims, by virtue of the fact that it is 
a living religious tradition, to enter still into the revela- 
tional experience, for it is by entering existentially through 
worship into the historical elements of its faith that the 
community experiences the God who is normatively revealed in the 
foundational events and in their experience. The continuing focus 
of this revelational experience being the practice of worship, it 
becomes clear that the theodicist must have reference to the 
practice of worship as the context in which utterances of belief 
have their significance for the believer, if, that is, he is to 
follow how those words are used within the lived experience out 
of which they have arisen. This existential experience of God 
through worship is manifested in the daily practice of the 
believer as he lives out his life on the basis of that experience. 
The believer is what he believes. His thought and action cannot 
be separated.
A proposal, therefore, that theodicy should be strictly 
theoretical is a proposal to cut theodicy off from the living 
roots of continuing Christian experience, and to place it in the 
alien environment of "neutrality" or of disbelief. To the contrary 
it is the day-to-day lived experience of the community, as it 
expresses its self-understanding in the context of the tradition, 
that gives meaning and significance to the words within which
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22fi the tradition has been encapsulated. The meanings of these
theological encapsulations would thus be determined by the role
they play in the life of the on-going, worshipping, practising
227 body of believers.
If theodicy, then, should proceed apart from the "religious" 
context in which Christian theism is embedded, it would be 
proceeding on the basis of an inadequate methodology. It is 
only to be expected that attempts to engage in strictly 
philosophical, that is theoretical, activity in theodicy will run 
into difficulties, and will fail to satisfy believers as to the 
relevance of standard theodicy to their concerns, for theodicy 
is only "at home" in the context of a living, worshipping,
O OQ
community of belief.
c) It is worth emphasising that what has just been said 
is also true about theology itself. Insofar as theology is an 
abstraction, an encapsulation, a set of summary statements, in a
form of life, it is not what the believer is certain of. This
229 is the point of I.T. Ramsey's On Being Sure In Religion. When
he argues that the believer can be sure of God, yet tentative
230 
about theology, and exhorts Christians frankly to acknowledge
theological uncertainties, and not to conceal them from
congregations or audiences, and to acknowledge points where they
231
are doctrinally unsure, he is recognising that it is not
inconsistent for believers to claim at the same time that they 
are sure of God. He puts it in the form that all the believer's
language, all his discursive theology, all his pictures, are at
232 best temporal projections. There is thus a need for theology,
and thereby theodicy, to be constantly brought to the believing 
community for it to say whether that is what it is "sure" about.
108
The believer's certainty is to be found in the unformalised 
language of psalms as -well as in systematic theologies, in the 
hymnbooks as well as in the creeds. As Gorman points out, the 
believer doesn't typically talk "theodical" language, but in
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terms of grace and love, and of God as king and father. Such 
words have contexts in life, and it behoves the theodicist to be 
very sure about how they translate into "omnipotence", "omni- 
science", and "perfect being".
d) When, contrary to these points, the theodicist takes 
key "theological" terms on their own, neat, and uninterpreted by 
informal networks of understanding and religious practices, he 
is invariably committed to giving such terms abstract definitions 
which are indebted to etymological factors and to cognate uses 
- thus, for example, "omnipotence" is taken to mean "all" and 
"power", and the meanings of all and power are determined by
the theoretical theodicist by reference to cognate uses. But as
234I.T. Ramsey argues in Religious Language, a "qualifier" such
as "all", in the logic of theological statements, is a special 
operator the purpose of which is to disclose a meaning to the 
"model" qualified (here "power") which is unique to God and which 
lies outside of the cognate uses. But that is an argument 
precisely to control the meaning of the word, not by an ordinary- 
language analysis, but by its use by believers. And, in any case, 
as noted, the concentration by theodicists on a limited range of 
theological terms selected from the whole network of terms used 
by the believer is itself a distorting factor - and the importance
of not omitting or diminishing the notion of God as personal when
235 discussing omnipotence has already been mentioned.
e) It is also arguable that at a deeper level strictly
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theoretical analysis of religious belief is, despite its intended 
aims, dubiously neutral, for there will be incorporated into the 
analytical process working criteria and presuppositions that set 
the framework of discussion. The problem is well-known in the 
social sciences, where even empirical research is recognised as 
having methodological problems in that the interpretive model 
chosen enters into what counts as evidence, as well as into how 
the evidence is organised into a pattern. The way in which 
interpretive models distort what they seek to explain is a main 
thesis of D.Z. Phillips' Religion Without Explanation. He argues
that Tylor, for example, works in his investigation of religion
o o a 
with a heuristic model of religion as a natural phenomenon.
Phillips asks in turn the philosophical question as to whether,
if one understands religious beliefs in that way, one is
237 illuminating or obscuring possibilities of meaning.
But, it might be objected, strictly theoretical analysis 
is not empirically based, and is intended to avoid just such 
problems. But, there again, a second thesis of Phillips is of
interest, for he argues that it is the philosopher Hume's
. . . 235 influence that pervades attempts to account for religious belief.
Phillips 1 contention is that if one sets attempts to account for 
religious belief against the use which religious language
actually has in practice, then the methodological confusions of
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so doing quickly become apparent. There is, of course, the
philosophical task of giving an account of religious belief,
but were one to do so on the basis that ordinary-language analysis
is the appropriate model, one needs to ask again whether such an
240 
approach illuminates or obscures possibilities of meaning.
The philosophical route to reaching a clearer understanding of
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what it means to believe, or not believe, in God would, with 
this in mind, be better directed towards understanding the kind 
of language that religious believers, or unbelievers, use. 
Phillips' argument is that to be clear about the kind of language 
expressed in religious beliefs it is essential to have an 
understanding of affirmation and denial in relation to religion. 
There are, he maintains, important "grammatical" differences of 
which the philosopher must be aware between such affirmations 
and denials and those in other contexts. He expresses the matter 
thus:
The task facing the philosopher is that of giving an 
account of the questioning of religious beliefs in a 
way that does not distort the kind of necessity 
associated with them, but also that of giving an 
account of this necessity in such a way that the 
possibility of questioning religious belief together 
with its possible rejection is not diminished.241
As Phillips goes on to comment, this careful approach to religious 
belief brings one to face the odd position of the philosophy of 
religion as commonly understood in relation to the object of its 
investigation, for it is uniquely expected first to establish the 
truth or falsity of the object of its study, to show God exists - 
but his argument is that, however the proposition concerning God's 
reality is formulated, God's reality does not get its unshakeable 
character from its inherent nature, or from the kind of abstraction 
which philosophy tries to make of it so often, but from its 
surroundings, from all the activities that hold it fast - above 
all from the activities involving the language of praise and 
worship. As much of this thesis revolves around such a claim, 
it is left for the moment there. The point is that descriptive 
understanding of religious belief needs to be sensitive to the 
inter-relationships of religious language and the form of life
Ill
in which it is embedded.
f) There are reasons, then, of a general nature that 
lead one to question the adequacy of strictly theoretical 
analysis as the contribution of philosophy to the activity of 
theodicy. Rather, my argument is that it is only when theodicy 
is "at home", that is, when it follows the moves made in actual 
Christian experience by practising believers, that it can discern 
the features of religious belief, and so be in a position to 
describe the shape of the belief that holds together God and evil 
as realities. The importance of the "practical" element in 
theodicy thus becomes apparent, for it is the practice of belief 
in a community of belief that carries with it the actual weight 
that words have for the believer. Words such as "omnipotence" 
and "all-goodness" in themselves are no more than tokens, which 
can be encashed in their full value only by those who know how 
to tradej but that is a skill learned through membership of 
the community and participation in its form of life. If the 
enquirer seeks the meaning of such terms, he will find it in the 
way they are used, in the role they play in the believing 
community, rather than in dictionaries,for "know-how" (rules of 
use) is critically important in giving appropriate "weight" to 
words. This is not to say that only the insider can make sense 
of religious belief - though to some extent that is the case, 
however offensive that fact may be to the strictly theoretical 
analyst - but it is to say that the outsider must be very careful 
to follow the use of words in context, and not be tempted to 
say from outside what words must mean. The outsider needs to 
remain responsive to the community if it consistently says that 
his or her understanding of its language is not what is meant.
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There is a difficulty on the other side, too, for one can become 
so accustomed to using words that one fails to be aware of the 
real significance of the way they are used. Here the outsider
might have a useful function in bringing the believer himself to
24"3 
understand more clearly the shape of his belief.
Descriptive understanding of religious belief may, therefore, 
enter into dialogue with users of religious language, for it is 
concerned with how to describe accurately the structures of 
meaning in religious language. Such description is a philosophical 
task, but one that takes into account the "weight" of words in 
a way that theoretical analysis cannot, that is it is sensitive
to the nuances of practice that crucially determine meaning in a
244 context. This location of meaning in a context is such a
commonplace idea that it is extra-ordinary that so few theodicists 
start from how words function rather than from definitions. What 
is appropriate, and what is not, in the use of words cannot be 
deduced from the words themselves - Wittgenstein's example of
the dangers of analysing, outside its religious context, "God's
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eye sees everything", stands as a permanent warning.
8. Why, then, do some theodicists handle religious belief 
in a strictly theoretical manner? To see what is fundamentally 
at issue here reference needs to be had to the larger debate in 
philosophy concerning the way language functions. Let us, 
therefore, tackle this question by, first, a specific discussion 
of the word "evil", and then a general account of the "religious 
use" of language.
Suppose that the theodicist is concerned specifically to 
discuss the assertion "evil exists". What is involved in 
tackling this basic point in theodical discussion? What can be
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said about the word "evil"? Let us resist the temptation to 
provide a definition, or to discuss the origin of evil, and all 
such common responses of standard theodicists. Rather, let us 
ask the "language" question as to what kind of word "evil" is.
Take, for example John Wilson's discussion in Language and the
246 Pursuit, of Truth. Starting with the place of words in
language, Wilson argues that we use words with one general 
purpose in view - so that other people shall understand us. 
Words enable us to achieve this purpose for one all important 
reason. They act as signs, and as such convey meaning and can 
be interpreted. What is common to signs is the fact that people 
have agreed to use them in certain recognised ways, and it is 
our agreement about use, and not the signs themselves, which 
enables us to communicate. From this argument Wilson claims a 
very important conclusion arises: signs do not have meaning in 
themselves, but only in relation to agreement about their use. 
It is thus misleading to talk of words "standing for things", or
"having" meanings. They only have uses, and those uses are
247 largely determined by the rules of language.
It follows from this discussion, of course, that ontological 
claims apparently present in "evil exists" need to be viewed with 
some caution, for, as Wilson goes on, in considering whether a 
word does have ontological significance we must ask the right 
sort of questions. As he says, a question like "What does so- 
and-so stand for?" or "What is such-and-such a sign of?" is 
likely to mislead us, for such questions take it for granted that 
for each sign or word there is a "thing" in the world outside to 
which the sign or word corresponds. It is, he comments, not as 
easy as this. It is not the case that we find the world
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parcelled up for us into "things". It is we who do the parcell- 
ing. And many words do not "stand" for anything at all - for
example, "symmetry", "liberty", "humanity", and "squareness".
248 Nor "equal", "unfortunate", "good", "evil".
Now, argues Wilson, the strong, and almost inescapable, 
prejudice in favour of naming the various experiences that we 
have from childhood onwards, and the strong bias we have in 
favour of treating all nouns and adjectives as if they were 
proper names, as if there were objects to which they could be 
attached, should not be underestimated. But strictly, all we 
can say of such words as "justice" and "humanity" is that they 
can be used in certain circumstances, are nouns, and that they 
have to be used in accordance with grammatical and syntactical 
rules. 249
But, given this discussion, what follows for theodicy? It 
is that the theodicist is largely concerned with just such nouns 
which are open to the "naming" temptation. But such words, as 
signs, do not "have" meanings, but uses. They are not things 
that can be detached from their context of use. The relation 
between language and reality is such that words such as "evil"
depend for their meaning on agreement in a form of life as to
250 the weight that they carry. This agreement is not a neutral
and antiseptic process of theoretical definition, nor one of 
attaching "names" to realities which are "things". Specifically, 
the context of worship, being the context within which theological 
and thereby theodical language belongs, provides the matrix for 
the use by the believer of that language, and is an inescapable 
factor in determining the meaning of language used in the 
Christian community. The total behaviour of the worshipping
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community in the application of its agreed signs, that is agreed 
uses of words, cannot be filtered out. The question is, 
therefore, what role, what use, the believer has for such a 
word as "evil", that use being within the speech-act of which 
it is a part. It is quite clear, when approached thus, that 
"evil" cannot have a meaning in theism as a practised belief 
apart from its relation to "God" as the presiding concept. What- 
ever that use is, it is a use that is conceptually subservient 
to the presiding concept. Attempts to give it any other status 
fail to take account of the way language functions in a form of 
life. "God exists" and "evil exists" cannot be given equal
conceptual weight, or contradictory use, within a form of life
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which takes both with utmost seriousness.
Let us pursue this a stage further. Wilson notes that the 
type of question one chooses to ask about a given topic carries
within it certain implications as to what constitutes an
2 53 acceptable answer. This point has of course been recognised
in the structure of this thesis in that the unbeliever's and 
believer's questions have been taken to imply the propriety of 
different discussions. But the point applies at the detailed 
level, also. For example, in relation to "evil" typical 
questions in theodicy are, "What is evil?", "Whence come evils?", 
"What is the purpose of evil?", "Can evil overcome good?", as 
though there were an inevitable implication that the reification 
of evil implied in such questions is appropriate. But is it? 
Is it not possible, in fact, to eliminate entirely from talk of 
"evil" all notions of substance and ontology? This could be 
done by talking in the adjectival and/or adverbial modes. Thus: 
not: Evil exists
116
but: Evil men exist
or: Men exist who act evilly.
Now the first of these examples is cast in "objective" form. 
But the others are cast in evaluative form. But why, it might 
be objected, should it be supposed that it is not correct to 
allow the substantive "evil" to give rise to an associated range
of questions probing the nature of "evil"? Reply? Because
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"evil" is not a name that conveys its meaning in itself. But
if it is more appropriate to treat "evil" as an evaluative word, 
it is also to be borne in mind that the believer reveals his 
own place in this language in providing the evaluative criteria 
in use in evaluation.
In such ways we place our mark on what we take to be reality; 
it is we who do the parcelling, and it is often we who fall into 
error in not spotting the implications of the parcelling that we 
do. Forgetting that the way we use language often makes use of 
shorthand devices, especially the one of naming, we take the 
grammatical form of the questions we ask as true signs of the 
status of that signified, and about which we wish to know. So 
likewise, for example, important questions in theodicy about the 
"goodness of God", the "will of God", and the "purposes of God", 
need to be approached with care - their grammatical form may 
contain traps for the unwary. I am, therefore, taking Wilson's 
comments as successfully identifying a basic weakness in 
strictly theoretical analysis - it fails to take into account 
central features of the way in which words and questions function 
in language as it is embedded in life. There is more to such a 
question as "Does evil exist?" than simply seeking to define 
"evil", and so on.
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9. Turning now to a general discussion of the "religious 
use" of language, let us for purposes of clarification object to 
the run of argument above, based as it is on the suggestion that 
theology is a summary statement of Christian experience, and 
that it is only in a context of experience that words have 
weight. Is there not, it might be objected, a danger here of 
retreat into a quagmire of shifting meanings? Let us reply by 
dealing with three issues involved, and let us put them as 
questions. First, who, if anyone, is likely to be misled by the 
use of words in a context? Second, isn't "religious-language-in- 
use" far too blunt a tool for useful philosophical work to be 
done? Thirdly, what is meant by saying that in the use of 
language it is "we who do the parcelling"?
a) Ryle in his article "Systematically Misleading 
Expressions" asks the question whether anyone is really misled 
by the misuse of nouns in the "naming" way Wilson describes. 
Ryle's thesis is that when philosophers indicate such features 
in language, they do not imply that the naive users of such 
expressions are in any doubt or confusion about what their 
expressions mean or are in any need of the results of philosophical 
analysis for them to continue to use intelligently and intelligi-
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bly their ordinary modes of expression. It is true, he says, 
that for philosophical purposes such expressions need to be
reformulated into expressions of which the syntactical form is
257 ... proper to the facts recorded. But in saying this, Ryle is not
denying that there is a logic in the mode of discourse of the 
common user. He is claiming that the mode of expression is 
"misleading" because it couches the facts recorded in a syntactical 
form that really belongs to facts of another logical order. Such
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is the case, he says, with "quasi-ontological statements". 
Anyone, he argues:
the philosopher included, who abstracts and generalises 
and so tries to consider what different facts of the 
same type (i.e. facts of the same type about different 
things) have in common, is compelled to use the 
common grammatical form of the statements of those 
facts as handles with which to grasp the common 
logical form of the facts themselves. For ... as the 
way in which a fact ought to be recorded in expressions 
would be a clue to the form of that fact, we jump to 
the assumption that the way in which a fact is recorded 
is such a clue. And very often the clue is misleading 
and suggests that the fact is of a different form from 
what really is its form.258
Now, previous discussion has indicated that Ryle's 
contention applies also to the language of the believer. Is the 
believer, one asks, making evaluative claims in a form that leads 
systematically to them being misunderstood by the philosopher, 
who thinks, because of their grammatical form, that they are 
descriptive in intention? If so, then "evil" and "good" 
naturally become for the philosopher quasi-ontological expressions 
which are the "names" of "things". Such phrases as "evil is to 
be shunned" and "evil exists" are taken to indicate, on the 
basis of their grammatical form, that there is a quasi-ontological 
reality "evil". But, if one looks on "evil" and "good" as the 
believer stating in descriptive form the evaluative judgements 
he would make, on the basis of his religious commitment, about 
the way things are, one sees that such evaluative judgements, 
not being descriptive, do not have straightforward ontological 
implications. But why would the believer want to put in one 
grammatical form facts of another type? Again, Ryle is of help 
here when he turns his attention to what he calls quasi-platonic 
statements, universals. Arguing, similarly to Wilson, that these 
are not objects, he claims that their use is to enable people to
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speak concisely, emphatically, and elegantly, and that this is 
what the language-user is interested in doing. For the language- 
user there is no philosophical mistake. The mistake occurs
when the philosopher is misled into asking the wrong questions
259 in relation to them.
Again, strictly theoretical theodical discussion forces 
itself to mind. To speak concisely, emphatically, and elegantly, 
the believer might well pray to be delivered from evil, may well 
confess to the evil he has done, and so on. But just as 
personification can be a concise, emphatic, and elegant mode 
of communication (e.g. "wisdom" as a woman ), so reification of 
evil can be for the believer. But one can no more draw simplistic 
conclusions from one than from the other. To make comments on 
the nature of the essence of evil is no more appropriate than 
to ask the colour of wisdom's eyes.
But, it might be objected, if the philosopher is so easily 
misled, is not the believer, too? Now, is this objection not 
the point of emphasising the location of language in a form of 
life, where speech and context belong together? To be misled is 
not to feel the weight. But in the practice of worship the
believer feels the weight. He learns "at home" the role that
9 ft 1 
words have, appropriately used.
b) It might be objected that this discussion implies 
that believers are more sophisticated than they in fact are - for 
it implies that when believers state beliefs in the "naming" 
grammatical form they are well aware that the weight is evaluative. 
But, it might be insisted, believers often take the beliefs as 
literally as the philosopher. Their words are thought by them to 
point to "things" - the language-in-use approach is, therefore,
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too blunt a tool for effective description.
Now, the possibilities here are either that such believers 
are to be understood straightforwardly, and they are indeed as 
mistaken as the philosopher; that would be to reject the whole 
form of life as a blunder. Or, they speak in a manner that needs 
reducing to some other form of meaning - say a moral or existen- 
tial meaning; and believers are in fact confused on this point. 
Or, that what believers say is in order as it stands, but its 
meaning is to be ascertained by placing the words in context, 
and it is the demand that believers give an account apart from 
that context of what they are doing which needs to be challenged, 
on the ground that an ability to give an account of what one is 
doing is not the same thing as the ability to do properly what 
one does.
Is it possible to set out an account of the last of these 
alternatives, and to show how literalistic language functions in 
the religious use of language? Here, two suggestions can be 
made which indicate that words are in order as they are in a form 
of life. The first suggestion is that one keeps to the forefront 
that meanings arise from the role words (as they are) play in a 
life-situation. The second suggestion is that a possible account 
of what believers are doing in their use of language can be 
outlined by reference to "form" and "function" in the way 
parables make their impact on those who understand their point. 
To understand a parable, to feel its weight, for it to have a role 
in one's life, is at the same time to pay attention to the story 
as stated, and to place it in a life-context within which the 
parable "works". What is essential to the parabolic use of 
language is that the point of the parable is exactly what it is
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in the story, and exactly not that at all I The word of judgement, 
the word of warning, or whatever, depends on taking the story 
literally; but also on allowing that word to have a role in 
life, a function, which lies outside the terms of the story as
o c. o
told. Parables cannot (as Jeremias showed pace Julicher ) be 
reduced to a generality, nor do they necessarily state facts in 
a form which has a simple, one-for-one, correspondence with the 
form of the facts to which they refer. To understand a parable 
is to take it as being in order as it is, but also to know how 
to feel its weight, to know how to give it a role.
Now, when Farrer says that statements about God cannot be 
anything but parables; that the art of balancing parables is 
acquired in use by believers; that it is impossible to study 
the art except from within the serious personal use of it; 
that the believer has the art but that to the unbeliever it is 
all nonsense because he lacks the criteria of use; and that
O£^ O
"sympathy" is not enough, he is pointing us in a useful 
direction for descriptive understanding of religious belief. 
If it is protested that one needs an objective point of reference 
to control parables, then Farrer suggests that the Christian
"parable" (story) has reference to the historical Christ, and
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must be compatible with what is revealed there. But Crombie
makes a further important point in saying that it is better to 
attend, not just to what religious people feel or say about the 
world, but to how they dispose themselves towards God - that is, 
to learn what worship is. To describe religious belief, then, 
may be to leave everything in order as it is in the Christian 
story, but to have reference to the use of that story in the 
existential worship of Christ by the community as the context of
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what is said. This is the line of enquiry which is developed 
later.
One is, therefore, distinguishing usage from use, not 
in the form in which Ryle proposed this distinction, but in the
o/r c
form M.B. Foster argues it. Linguistic mastery in knowing 
how to "use" words (Ryle) is not enough; for example with 
"moral" words we need to be initiated into the basic moral 
attitudes by which the use of the language is determined. Proper 
"use" is relative to the basic attitudes which speakers and 
hearers assume - "we"-sentences, as Foster argues, reveal this 
commitment. Literalistic "usage" may, therefore, not be the 
best test of what believers mean in what they say and do, even 
if some believers give an account of their religious use of 
language in those terms. What matters is how the Christian 
"parable" works (functions) in the believing community. What is 
the basic rationality into which the literalistic language of 
those believers fits? This literalistic language is the story- 
form of the parable; what needs to be understood is the weight 
that the parable has. The attention of the theodicist needs, 
thus, to be given not only to the "literal" words in the parable/ 
story, but, more importantly, to the use of the story as the 
community enters into relationship with its God. There is the 
question therefore of meaning as it is attained in the community, 
c) Finally, in this section, let us develop this last 
point in the broadest terms by looking at what is meant by saying 
it is we who do the "parcelling".
"?f-\
i) Dallas M. High in Language, Persons and Belief 
offers an important discussion of the relationship between 
language and reality, a discussion which not only brings together 
emphases made above, but identifies what comprises "meaning"
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in a form of life. High questions whether words and statements 
can be analysed in the abstract, as theoretical analysis implies, 
for such a procedure makes arguable assumptions about the nature 
of both language and meaning. Such assumptions can be variously 
expressed - not only in "naming" theory, as above, but also in 
terms of words standing for ideas or thoughts in the mind, or 
in claims that language asserts or denies "facts", or that 
language can be studied much as a specimen may be by the 
scientist, or that the roots of language lie in ostensive 
definition, etc. But the difficulties of all such theories 
about language and meaning are not hard to see. Understanding 
language and meaning in these ways covers at most a primitive 
level of language development, and does not represent the 
complexity of our human form of life, which does many more things 
with language than such theories allow - making commands, 
offering praise, pronouncing people dead or married, uttering 
exclamations. Language does not simply correspond piecemeal 
with the world of objects, and meaning is not another thing in 
the world which can be independently categorised. This model 
of "meaning-itself" as a "thing" has, High suggests, more to do 
with a general view of the world as impersonal and mechanical 
than is sometimes allowed.
High's contention is, then, that any theory of meaning 
leads us astray if language is seen as a theoretical abstraction 
from persons as speaking men. The problem of meaning, he 
thinks, may be better approached by seeing it as less a problem 
of language than of understanding. To support this argument he 
rejects the three assumptions he finds in common to the seemingly 
diverse doctrines about language and meaning mentioned above. First
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the assumption that 1anguacfe is a detached, abstract, and 
theoretical object suitable for critical investigation. Second, 
the assumption that meaning is detachable from the words uttered 
and from the understanding carried on between speakers and 
hearers in the linguistic act, such meaning being thought to 
reside in an intelligent universe of ideas, or in the predictable 
and quantitative world of bodily responses examined by behaviour- 
ists, or in the external world of objects and informative facts, 
or in conventional sets of logical, semantical and taxonomical 
rules or formulas. Third, and lying behind the previous two, 
the assumption that there is a radical dualism between speakers 
and hearers of language.
High, as noted, contends instead that a more adequate 
approach to language-in-life is to be found by paying attention 
to the notion of "understanding", and he develops this argument 
from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Words and 
sentences in themselves are neither meaningful nor meaningless; 
they attain these characteristics insofar as they have something 
done with them, and insofar as more than one person "understands" 
what is said. But what is it to understand? It is to engage in 
a public use of language such that both the speaker(s) and the
hearer(s) relate to the circumstances in such a way that they
269 
are "able-to-go-on". In part this "being-able-to-go-on" (this
"understanding", "meaning", "language-using") has to do with 
coming to know how to "follow-the-rule" which is relevant to the 
circumstance. But such "knowing" is not to be equated with 
private mental processes which are privileged to the individual, 
for foilowing-the-rule, or understanding, requires at least one
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other person to grasp and be satisfied with what I do.
"Understanding" is, then, not a question of mental processes, 
nor of behavioural responses, but has to do with personal 
activity and speaking in community. Nor is it a matter of 
simply knowing the criteria or rules of use, but has to do with 
being able to speak in the first person, "I can go on". In 
this approach to "understanding" one is not referring to rote 
learning, or a technique, but with the actual using of a language, 
that is, with what I_ do in and with my speech as I_ express the 
rule. The contrast here with the naming (word-object) theory 
of meaning is sharp - naming an object does not tell one how-to- 
go-on, what to do next; being able to express (use) the rule 
does. Indeed a "name" (definition) only has point insofar as 
one already knows how to do something significantly with it. 
Words, therefore, are given meaning by being used by those who 
understand how-to-go-on in a social context of speech - there 
is no extra-logical order available to man higher than the human 
order of meaning and speaking, and there is no further clarity 
to be found in breaking language into parts (words/sentences), 
for the meaning (understanding) does not lie in the parts but in 
knowing what-to-do-next in the circumstances, context, employ- 
ment, and application of speech in life. The clearest essence 
of meaning does not lie in the most reducible elements of 
language, nor in theories of meaning known in advance, but in 
the use of the language in social understanding.
ii) Lying within this discussion of High's is the 
notion that language is a form of action. To be "understood", 
the person acting in speech must act within a social matrix, or 
form of life, wherein the language-in-use has a history and a
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literature and a grammar. The speech-act, to be meaningful,
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needs to be "felicitous" or "happy". Such an environment
does not necessarily lead to a fixity of use (as is displayed in 
dead languages), but it does have fixedness - that is, there are 
rules of appropriate and inappropriate use, but also rules for 
appropriate development, expansion, change, and decay of present 
use. Fixedness of use therefore has two aspects - firstly, 
fixedness is essential if more than one person is to know 
how-to-go-on, but secondly, fixedness is not so rigid as not to 
allow more than one person to agree on a modified or new happy 
use of words. But such fixedness is one way of saying what 
constitutes a form of life, for a form of life is that community 
of use of speech and language where there is a shared practice 
as to what constitutes a happy use of words. Such an account 
of "form of life" allows for the flexibility needed to recognise 
variety within a community of use, but is not so flexible as 
to allow anything to be entertained.
There is, then, no world of objective meanings to which 
human language corresponds, but patterns of language-use where 
the language-users know how-to-go-on. Whether one understands 
depends on whether one can say "I-can-go-on", and be able to say 
it happily. Language is intimately connected with its users, 
and consequently meanings are not reducible either to rules of 
grammar, dictionaries, logical environments, behavioural factors, 
ostentation or anything else (though all of these have their 
place); language has life in being used happily, and this is 
the context in which questions of language and reality should be 
approached. Words, symbols, sentences, actions, belong together 
in human life as expressed in its social, cultural and inter-
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personal forms. What we understand and count as reality (our 
"world") is closely connected with the interpenetration of 
language and human life. In claiming man as a language-user 
does something with words in a social context, and that it is 
impossible properly to consider words used apart from the user(s) 
of those words (they are only instruments for man's action), one
is also saying that man's intellectual beliefs and linguistic
272 performances are (to use High's expression) "indwelt" by man,
that is, man lives in and through his beliefs and uses language 
to live in a community of shared beliefs. His thought forms, 
attitudes, categorical commitments, analogies, and presupposi- 
tions, can thus be seen to be his efforts to understand (know- 
how- to-go-on) in a particular "world" or reality, that world or 
reality being inseparably bound up with both the language-user 
and the language-used.
iii) What are the implications for theodicy of
refusing to separate man, language, and reality, and of suggest- 
ing that personal understanding in a social matrix is the proper 
focus for the study of theodical language? First, that it is 
proper to look at what believers say (formal and informal 
theology) in the context of what they do (worship) if one wishes 
to offer a descriptive understanding of theodicy. Second, that 
the "religious use" of language, as instanced in theodical 
language, is not to be explained in terms other than would be 
appropriate for all language. Of course, religious language has 
distinctive characteristics, for religious users of language are 
constructing a distinctive reality in which God is real - they 
are putting their personal signature, their "I-can-go-on", to a 
construction of reality of a certain kind. It is this commitment
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to act, to use language in a certain way, with certain under- 
standings, that creates the living and concrete speech of the 
community sharing that form of life. The same however, in 
principle, is, as High points out, the case generally. Poetry, 
mythology, logic, mathematics, creeds - all require personal 
commitment, attachment, signature, indwelling, to be meaningful 
modes of comprehension. Each and all are rooted, for their 
status and legitimation, in the "I-can-and-will-go-on" of men in 
community.
Third, that as an activity, language is grounded, not in 
fixed entities beyond itself, nor in the language itself, nor
in logic, nor in anything other than ourselves in this world in
273 interpersonal relationships. There are no higher courts of
appeal for meaning, for those which might be proposed are 
themselves underwritten by man in his putting his personal 
signature to particular ways of constructing reality - models, 
disclosures, metaphors, myths, facts, analogies, thought-forms, 
etc., are ways men and women act in the world as language-users; 
and insofar as these acts are man's "indwelling" in language, 
they are self-affirmations. As High argues, linguistic modes 
are neither without foundation, nor are they self-evident 
principles detachable from the world and history, but are concrete 
activities of speaking man - and that is their status, meaning, 
justification, and legitimacy. To ask whether a construction 
of reality as expressed in language has meaning, is justified, 
has_ legitimacy, is in fact to ask whether the sorts of beings who 
are committed to those forms of life should be the sorts of beings 
they are. To seek to answer that kind of question is, however, 
to seek to evaluate not just language but language-users, not just
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definitions but definition-holders, not just beliefs but 
believers. But, one asks, who is sufficient for such a task?
Theodicy cannot, then, proceed without reference to 
describing how it is that Christian believers are "able-to-go- 
on" as they tell their story, that is, without seeking to 
describe the moves by which the believer holds together in his 
experience as mutually compatible the realities of both God and 
evil. This section has shown that traditional theodicy cannot 
succeed in this task because it makes demands of the believer 
which are outside his intentions and interests - in each case 
the demand is incompatible with the living and concrete experience 
of adoring worship by the believer as a language-user. He 
cannot, and should not, allow that his experience should become 
an abstract item for debate, his language judged by definitional 
analysis. To understand the believer's holding together of both 
God and evil it is necessary to seek to describe how-he-goes-on, 




Section Three: Theodicy and Grammar
A iB.troducjtion
1. Thus far, I have set on one side investigating theodicy 
as found in process thought on the ground that process theology 
belongs in an alternative model of theological language to that 
of classical theism, and the procedure in constructive theodicies
of providing a predetermined epistemology was found to be a
2
serious weakness. Some of the assumptions of standard
conception theodicy have been examined and it has been found that 
when such discussion is understood as an attempt to engage in 
theodicy on the unbeliever's terms, it becomes clear that what 
is at stake are the criteria of evaluation written into both 
believer's and unbeliever's use of theodical terms. Let us, 
therefore, now turn to examining the nature of the evaluations 
that believers make as they "go on", and the implications of 
this for descriptive theodicy.
2. How is it possible for the believer to provide justi- 
fications or reasons for his or her basic evaluative assumptions? 
Whence do these criteria of evaluation derive? Specifically, 
what is the ground for saying what it means for the believer to 
call God "all-good"? As already said, it is intended to argue
with Hume that no inferences as to the nature or existence of
3 God can be made from how the world is, and therefore no use can
be made of natural theology or even of analogy for help in 
establishing criteria. It has also been accepted that the 
way things are in the world is ambiguous between good and evil. 
This ambiguity would seem to cut off any appeal to natural law 
or naturalistic ethics. And I do not wish at this point to take 
the shortcut of appealing to supramundane criteria, whether they
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be in the form of supernaturalistic ethics or objective ethics, 
as this would beg the question as to the relationship of 
language and reality. Rather, the question is posed now as to 
whether theodicy depends on commitments by the believer (or 
the unbeliever) which are in some way arbitary. Perhaps there 
are no criteria for deciding between these rival claims?
3. The nature of the impasse here can be illustrated 
from the difficulties Wilson gets into when he tries to push 
through his account of language to its final position. Wilson 
claims that evaluative words, that is, those we use to praise,
blame, commend, or criticise, have evaluative character because
4 they give or deny value to people or things. If one concentrates,
he says, on almost purely evaluative words such as "good", 
"ought", and "right", one sees that what underlies their use 
is that a commendation is in mind - for example, to talk of a 
"good" horse does not really tell one anything about the horse, 
but makes a judgement relative to some criteria that are in mind, 
and in reference to which we wish to commend it. But we are 
not logically compelled to have any particular set of criteria 
in mind - "The word can be applied to anything on any criteria, 
provided we have some criteria: it is like a blank cheque which 
we can fill in with anybody's name, provided we have reason for 
paying him money". It follows from this contention, of course, 
for Wilson, that different people can come to diverse and even 
opposite evaluations - according to the criteria they are 
applying. What to one person is "courageous" is to another 
"foolhardy". 7
This factor of diversity of evaluative criteria is perhaps 
the point Novak and Aiken had arrived at in their dispute over
132
o
the kind of "goodness" theists ascribe to God, for each is 
commending a different set of criteria for what the theist means 
when he calls God all-good. Aiken, Novak alleged, had a human 
model of goodness in mind. But what, it might be asked, is 
meant in any case by such a notion as human goodness? Aiken 
seems to presuppose moral agency - but what then are the tests 
for describing human activity as moral, and if moral, good? 
Wilson hazards a suggestion:
... for most people today the 'criteria of goodness' 
for men ... include such tests as whether he is kind, 
whether he is honest, brave, straightforward, good- 
tempered, and so forth. These criteria are really 
the method of verifying our value statements.9
But simply to quote this highlights immediately the 
difficulty, for not everyone would agree this is an adequate 
account of human goodness. But such disagreement would hold 
for all other proposals too, including Aiken's. Aiken is thus 
faced with first providing criteria for human goodness, and 
then the criteria for ascribing this particular model to God. 
But meanwhile, Novak will have none of this talk of human 
criteria with regard to God's goodness. However, he is left 
with the problem of where to find another set of criteria; 
but all he can propose, in turn, is a rather rhetorical position 
more clear in what it rejects than in what it affirms.
Wilson, similarly, has to face the difficulties of how 
one can ground or verify value judgements. Arguing that value 
statements ( Joe is a good man ) are distinguishable from 
attitude statements (Good old Joe'. ) in that the former are 
verifiable in the way he has suggested above, and in that 
they involve assigning value on the basis of these criteria, 
he is faced with the problem of explaining differences in the
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criteria adopted by different people - for example, Humanists 
and Christians. Clearly some set of higher criteria would be 
useful, not to say necessary, for resolving such disputes - 
just such a dispute as, it has been argued, underlies the 
definitional approach of standard theodicy, in that its 
definitions have an evaluative basis.
Now, Wilson concludes, and I think correctly, that no
12 
such higher criteria are available. This is because the
identification of such an agreed set of higher criteria would 
be on the basis of reasons for agreeing they are the higher 
criteria. But that could not be the way such disagreements 
could be resolved, for what counts as a reason depends on the 
higher criteria. Whatever was agreed on as ultimate must be 
unverifiable; must, because an (infinite) regress of reasons 
for reasons removes the very basis of reason - compare the "third
man" problem in Plato's theory of forms; unverifiable, because
13 
verification is the application of criteria, not the provision.
However, Wilson's suggestion at this point is disappointing. 
He proposes the way out of the impasse is to admit there are 
psychological reasons why people should seek to agree on 
evaluative criteria, even though there are no logical reasons - 
a move reminiscent of Hume's concerning the entrenched position 
of causality in our thinking. This proposal is disappointing
because the envisaged resolution of this dilemma amounts to a
14 . quantitative basis for morality. Wilson suggests it is
possible that in fact all men will come in the future to agree 
on the ultimate criteria, and
Then we shall be in a position to say what is true 
and what is not true in ethics with certainty ... 
for all that is necessary for discovering truth is 
that we should all be agreed about what method is 
appropriate.15
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But how then could one distinguish the enforced unanimity of 
the Brave New World from the voluntary unanimity of Utopia? 
Some other factor than total agreement appears to be required 
if one is to be able to decide between different possible 
unanimously-held sets of criteria. And, in any case, the 
religious believer typically claims that his criteria of 
evaluation have an absolute character that belies this whole 
analysis. His criteria do not derive from this earth at all, 
and are neither enforced on the one hand, nor dependent on his 
agreement or approval on the other. Wilson in fact shows some 
awareness of this feature of belief, for in his chapter on 
"Freedom and Evil" he writes:
there are two things which must surely fix the 
criteria of goodness for Christian believers. 
'Good' must have some reference to what God is 
like, and to the state of affairs which we may 
crudely call 'being in Heaven 1 . These, in 
Christian belief, are the ultimate facts: God 
and Heaven exist permanently, and our world is but 
a short sojourn. It seems somewhat inconsistent 
with Christianity, therefore, to derive criteria 
of goodness from this world, and not primarily 
from God's nature or from the heavenly state.16
4.a) It would be possible in standard conception theodicy 
to put forward at this point an outline thesis picking up many 
of the points that have surfaced. It might run something like 
this. The Christian and the unbeliever do not disagree that 
there are in experience events they would prefer to be otherwise. 
They disagree, however, as to whether, and in what sense, these 
experiences are to be described or evaluated as "evil". They 
disagree on this issue because they are committed to different 
sets of fundamental criteria of good and evil. Specifically, 
the Christian identifies his criteria with the nature of God and 
Heaven which,he claims, provide him with absolute criteria. The
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application of these criteria is his method of verifying his 
value statements. The Christian can, therefore, within these
basic commitments to God and Heaven, argue variously that "All
17 
was well, and all shall be well", or that "All is well, and
-I O
all things shall be well", or even perhaps, "All's well that
19 
ends well". These theodical arguments are all simply moves
within the same basic commitment to the absolute nature and 
source of criteria as located in "God" or in "Heaven", and have 
to do with differing applications of these criteria.
There are, however, substantial difficulties in such a 
thesis. The first is that no means is provided for knowing what 
the nature of either God or Heaven is, that is, no means is 
provided of showing such criteria to be objectively "true". 
Typically, of course, information on these points has been 
derived from Revelation and from Natural Theology. The basis 
of both of these has, however, traditionally been to attach the 
will of God to the way things go (or should go) in the world. 
The nature of God, that is the will of God - for we only know 
of God's nature as expressed through his will- is seen in terms 
of God's active love towards us in the world. But therein 
precisely lies the problem of evil, for the problem of evil 
concerns how to reconcile the nature of God, as all-good, with 
the state of affairs in the world which provides prima facie 
evidence of either a defective or a malevolent will of God. 
What purports to be an answer is, then, a restatement of the 
problem. And as far as "Heaven" is concerned, how does this 
amount to more than yet another "two world" theory that seeks to 
solve the problem in world-one by positing a supposed (but 
unknown) world-two, the chief feature of which is that it
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absolutely lacks the problem we find in world-one? That 
procedure does nothing to mitigate the problem in world-one. 
Indeed, in one sense the procedure makes the problem worse, for 
if the problem can be absent in world-two, it is logically and 
actually possible for moral and spiritual beings including men 
to exist apart from evil. The implications of this outline 
thesis are then, either, that in world-two men are no longer 
men, or, if they are men, the world as we know it is not a 
necessary condition for being a man. It might be replied that 
the world as we know it is necessary for becoming a man; but 
that suggestion raises a whole host of problems, concerning the 
integrity of man as he now is, at least as difficult as the 
problem to which it is offered as a solution.
But if taking "Heaven" straightforwardly proves to be 
problematic in understanding religious belief, what then is the 
point of talk in the Christian community about "Heaven"? Now, 
we have already seen when considering the Christian story as 
parable that a possible way of understanding the religious use 
of language is to distinguish the "form" of what is said from 
the "function" it has in the life of the believing community. 
With "God" as the presiding concept, the absolute qualities 
attaching to the notion of "Heaven" can in this way possibly 
be seen to have the function of giving absolute status in the 
story to the life lived by the believer in the presence of God. 
There is thus a possibility that if one is sensitive, in a way 
sometimes not considered, to how language is used in the 
worshipping community, and one does not depend too simplistically 
on the form of what is said, that a different approach might be 
needed to describe the function of such absolute notions as
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"Heaven" in the Christian use of language. There is a need to
clarify, therefore, as argument proceeds in this section, the
20 
role of "absolute" elements in the religious use of language.
b) But, it might be replied, both Wilson's approach, 
and the one just suggested, in any case miss the main point, 
 which is to do with the commitment of an absolute kind to a set 
of criteria. It is the absolute character of the commitment that 
is represented by the notions of God and Heaven. Further, it
may be argued, this same point lies behind the ascription to God
it 
of all goodness and all power. For example, German argues, in
the light of his argument that the problem of evil is a question
concerning the commitment made by the Christian when he ascribes
21 goodness to God in the face of evil in the world, that it is
the nature of this commitment which is made absolute:
When claiming the goodness of a person, this can 
be done more or less definitely. The commitment or 
commendation can be made more or less unconditionally, 
and the criteria for goodness can be considered as 
more or less fulfilled. The Christian says sometimes, 
not only that God is good, but also that he is all- 
good or wholly good. I think this is adequately 
interpreted as implying, both that the commitment 
is made unconditionally, without tacit reservations, 
and that God is considered to fulfil the criteria of 
goodness to the utmost degree. 22
The flaw in this approach, as German states it, is that it 
can be transferred at will to any supposed entity to which 
unconditional commitment as a psychological phenomenon is a 
theoretical possibility. Also, it locates the nature of God in 
the strength of the indiv_idual_'_s commitment. Against this needs 
to be set the argument that the shape of religious belief can 
only be understood in the context of its location in the 
community of belief. But when one spells out what it means to 
talk of "commitment" to belief in terms of a community, then one
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is talking about the way in which words have a role within the 
practised belief of that community and of the requirement for the 
members of the community to use the words with those meanings 
if they are to be understood. The qualifier "all" would then 
be seen not to refer to the pyschological condition of individual 
members of the community, nor to that of the community itself,
but to the fixedness of the use of words, that is the fixedness
23 
of meanings, in that community. "God is all-good" would, for
example, refer to the fact that in the pattern of meanings that 
constitute the form of life of Christian believers, there is a 
fixedness of relationship between the use of the word "Good" 
and the word "God" such that only God can be used as the ultimate 
criterion of goodness in the community; there is an internal 
connection of meaning between the words "God" and "Goodness" 
which is made absolute in "happy" and "felicitous" understanding. 
But am I saying, then, that Christians are committed to a 
language, and not to God? Not at all. What they are committed 
to is the use in the Christian community of a language with 
reference to God. But, it might be objected, wh_ich language? 
Are there not many Christian languages in use? What of the 
apophatic, the mystic, the evangelical, the liberal? And 
further, do not different experiences connect with these different 
languages? Of course. But let us remember that insofar as all 
these variations locate themselves within the Christian tradition, 
there is a limit to the differences that can be tolerated. For 
example, "God" c_armpt. in Christianity be the criterion of evil; 
and the experience of God musj: be compatible with the revelation 
of God in Christ. This objection reinforces in fact my earlier 
point that, with regard to any particular theological formulation,
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the "form" of words propounded (the story) must always be seen as
not being what the Christian is fundamentally sure of - what he
24 is sure of is the experience of the forgiveness of God. Now,
as said before, the place where language and experience meet 
crucially in religious belief is in the worship of God, for 
therein lies both the believer's experience of the judgemental 
grace of God - that is, the all-sufficiency of God's power to 
impart love in forgiveness to the repentant sinner - and what 
the words "God" and "goodness" mean. What is in mind here is
not, again, any specific form of worship, which is highly
25 
variable within the Christian tradition, but all that is
involved in the language of praise. Perhaps Temple's account 
of the nature of worship fills this out, though what he says 
needs to be given a community dimension. He thought of worship 
as the submission of the whole nature to God; the quickening 
of conscience by his holiness; the nourishment of mind with 
his truth; the purifying of imagination by his beauty; the 
opening of the heart to his love; the surrender of will to his 
purpose - all gathered up in adoration as the most selfless 
emotion of which man is capable. Clearly, if one is to attempt 
to place theodicy in the context of Christian life, it must be 
a key task to locate the shape of the believer's belief concerning 
the all-goodness and all-powerfulness of God in the nature of his 
worship of that God,that is, in all that is involved in the 
language of praise.
5. But has this discussion broken at all the impasse of 
the status of the believer's criteria? Not yet; but certain 
things have become clearer for the descriptive theodicist. 
Firstly, that in considering the nature of the believer's
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criteria it is necessary for the theodicist to have regard to 
tne absolute (unshakeable) nature of the believer's claimed 
experience in worship. Secondly, that the theodicist have 
regard to there being an interrelation between the language of 
belief and the specific experience of the community - and that 
he note that religious belief is not merely a "set of ideas" 
which is claimed to be superior to alternative and competing 
"sets of ideas". Thirdly, that when he seeks to ascertain the 
meaning of words used by the community, he has regard to the 
role words play in the practices of that community. But to pay 
attention to such factors is to give attention to the shape of 
religious belief - that is, to the structure of meanings in that 
form of life. It is to take account of the rules in a community 
for the correct applications of words, that is, to the "grammar"
O£^
of belief. To ascertain the nature of the believer's criteria 
would thus be to ascertain the standards of intelligibility 
implicit in the language and activities of the Christian tradition,
It would be to understand what can, and what cannot, be said
27 
when one knows-how-to-go-on as a believer.
On the other hand, what has not become clear is the issue 
posed in the wider debate in the philosophy of religion as to 
the ontological status of the God worshipped in the Christian 
faith, so the question becomes urgent as to what kind of reality 
such criteria as "God" and "Heaven" have for the believer. This 
question brings us to face the claim of such as D.Z. Phillips 
that it is sufficient to clarify the points just itemised, for 
therein lies the reality of belief. "God" and "Heaven" (and 
the various other notions that operate in an absolute way in the 
life of the believing community) are, for Phillips, "absolute"
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because they constitute the picture with which the believer 
lives, and which is the reality of the believer, and is his 
"world". To be human, Phillips contends, is to live with some 
"picture" that determines how we act, and determines what counts 
as reasons for actions. The old questions of an ontological 
kind do not arise because they are based on a confusion as to 
the nature of objectivity - a confusion based on a separation 
of objectivity from subjectivity, and one which ignores the 
extent to which the "world" in which we live is a theory-laden
TO
world, a "world" which is our work. The old questions also 
reveal a commitment to the notion that one way of relating to 
the world, using one set of criteria of "reality", can be 
normative of what is to count as reality - so the physical world 
and the criteria for physicality are mistakenly thought to be 
applicable to the religious "picture". On this "old" view, 
only the criteria for physical "facts" are allowable as a test 
of "what is". Religious "facts" (such as God and Heaven) either 
"are" or "are not" in the way physical things "are" or "are not".
And, further, the role of philosophy is to tell us what we can
29 know. Not so, say such as Phillips, for what "is" depends
30 
on the "criteria of logic", or rationality, that lie within a
way of "picturing" the world. Physicality is only one such 
"picture". Its view of reality is not, and cannot be, normative. 
Nor, therefore, can philosophy tell us what we can know. It 
can only describe what can be known within a "picture" - that 
is, it can describe the structure of thought in that area, 
describe its shape, describe its "grammar". What is clarified 
is not what can be known, but what can be said within a 
"picture" coherently. The existence of God is, therefore, to be
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understood in terms of the role that the existence of God has 
within the religious "picture" where he is a fundamental reality. 
To ask the old ontological questions in religion is to betray a
basic confusion as to how we live as human beings, and as to
31 the nature of thought, and rationality. Let us now turn to
examine this position.
B. Phillips and the Religious View pf__Eyii_
1. It is not possible to understand what Phillips has to
32 . 
say specifically about the religious view of evil without
locating his comments in the whole structure of his thought 
about the relationship between God and the world. In thus 
engaging with Phillips' thought, the intention is to identify 
points to carry forward, and these will be of two types. Firstly, 
points well made and which are adopted, though sometimes on a 
revised basis. Secondly, points where his position is found to 
be inadequate, and where there is a need for development.
2. Let us start by raising Phillips* rejection of the 
kind of discussion that Wilson favours, which first divides 
words into descriptive and evaluative categories, and then has
difficulties finding a basis on which it is possible to make
33 
absolute statements in morality. In "God and Ought", Phillips
34 
argues against A.I. Melden in relation to the role of the
father in a family, and charges Melden with failing to distinguish 
who a father is from what he does. The importance for Phillips 
is in relation to God as Father, and the widespread claim that, 
as one cannot derive evaluations from descriptions, so one 
cannot argue from a descriptive statement about God as Father to
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an assertion of an obligation to God.
But consider human fathers, says Phillips. Pace Melden, 
it is the case that -who the father is, namely the father of his 
children, is an important factor in determining what ought to be 
the relationship between them:
So many of the obligations I have to my father do not 
depend on whether he has done things for me or even on 
whether he loves me ... the child who loves his 
father only as long as he is a good father has an 
imperfect love of his father. 36
But what is the basis of this judgement? Surely, says Phillips, 
it refers to the fact that this is the man who begat you, the 
man to whom you owe your existence. There is only one such man. 
And therein lies a lesson concerning God's fatherhood. Now, to 
the charge that this argument confuses description and evaluation, 
Phillips replies that my obligations to my father are independent 
of any decisions that I make, and are internal to my membership 
of a family - within the family the fact that this man 153 my 
father gives a different moral significance to the fact. To 
understand what is meant by calling someone your father, argues 
Phillips, is to understand that one has certain obligations 
towards him. The status of "father" entails certain rights, and 
these rights bring obligatory duties which are the case whether 
or not I meet them. And so also with God. Phillips' points can 
be put together thus:
"To understand what it means to believe in God is to 
understand why God must be obeyed." "The fact that 
the will of God is questioned does not destroy the 
internal connection between the will of God and 
what one ought to do." "The religious concept of 
duty cannot be understood if it is treated as a 
moral concept. When the believer talks of doing 
his duty, what he refers to is doing the will of 
God ."37
The absoluteness of this duty to God can stand in tension
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with moral duty, and Phillips instances Kierkegaard's discussion
of the religious man who finds a tension between what he knows
-30 
to be the will of God and his moral obligations to his family.
But, on the other hand, there cannot for the believer be a total
distinction between the realms of religious and moral discourse,
39 because religion is a way of life, and the importance of its
doctrines and worship and ritual are that they connect with life 
as a whole - for example, forgiveness is worthless if not given 
social expression.
So, by understanding the nature of human fatherhood 
within the family as an institution, one can understand something 
of the type of obligations that a believer has towards God -
obligations that are simply because he is and is the source of
40 
our existence; and one also understands that such obligations
mean nothing unless they lead to internally consistent actions in 
life, in all its contexts.
But, at this point there occurs a move so fundamental to 
Phillips 1 thought that it is impossible to understand how he 
describes the nature of religious belief without recognising 
it as a standard technique. Let us call this his method of 
contrast - precisely what it is that a religious belief means is 
to be identified by what is involved in the use of that word, 
by believers, in its religious role, and in contrast to its
standard use in an every day context.
41 Thus, Phillips maintains that religious duties in the
family of God are distinguishable by contrasting them with moral 
duties, in that religious duties should be meditated on day and 
night; are entirely general in nature; can never be completely 
fulfilled; comprise an attitude to existence as a whole; and
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exhibit acceptance of God's will. To understand the nature of 
religious duties is to understand what it means to believe in 
God. Against this and in contrast, moral duties have temporal 
limitation; are specific; can be fulfilled; need not "be"; 
and do not lead necessarily to a knowledge of God. Religious 
duty can thus be understood by setting it over against what we 
mean by moral duty. Both types of duty, however, are to be 
understood by reference to practice, for moral practices and 
religious practices express the respective meanings of those 
modes of discourse. The importance of the method of contrast 
becomes apparent when it is realised that it forms part of the
basis of Phillips' rejection of natural theology, and prevents
42 
any traditional use of analogy. In this particular instance
of the "father", Phillips makes the move thus:
Unlike morality, which recognises that sometimes it 
is not wrong to decide against one's obligations to 
one's father, religion recognises no circumstances 
in which one is justified in deciding against one's 
obligations to God. This is because in rejecting 
God's will one is not rejecting one claim among many 
within an institution such as the family; one is 
rejecting the foundation of an institution. To 
reject God's claim ... is to reject a way of life 
as such.^3
3. This raising of the method of contrast leads one on 
to note the extent of the division Phillips places between the 
nature of religious beliefs as absolute and other realms of
discourse. I refer for the basis of this point to his
44 
"Subjectivity and Religious Truth in Kierkegaard", where it
becomes clearer why we should love God regardless, and simply 
because he is. The point that Phillips picks up from Kierkegaard 
is the qualitative difference (contrast) between the temporal 
and the eternal - by which terms Phillips refers respectively to 
that which is contingent, dependent on how things go, "world-
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historical" (so Kierkegaard), on the one hand, and that which is 
absolute on the other. The word "eternal" here, for Phillips, 
does not stand as a way of giving infinite temporality to an 
objective God, as though God were to be spoken of, like us, in
terms of time, though uniquely; for "eternity" is not an
45 
epistemological notion, but one which stands in contrast to
temporality - so as to deny its use in any form in relation to 
God. So, in speaking of religion as turning away from the 
temporal towards the eternal, Phillips is referring not to an
everlasting existence but to the way in which the concept of
46 the eternal plays a role in very many human relationships.
For example, marriage vows are eternal in the sense that they 
play an absolute evaluative role in marriage, not in the sense 
that they are everlasting - for a married couple, "the prospects 
which come their way are judged by what they have vowed to be.
This is one reason for saying that the prospects are temporal,
47 but the vows are eternal." The chief mark of the eternal,
therefore, is that it is riot part of the way things go, but 
determines how we respond to the way things go. And this
difference between the temporal and the eternal is absolute.
48 There is no method of infinite approximation by which one
passes from one to the other - no amassing of facts or arguments 
will bridge the gap, it is an infinite qualitative difference. 
For the believer, therefore, - that is, for the person who has 
made the transition to the level of the eternal - faith is cast 
in absolute terms. This absoluteness faces in two directions. 
Firstly, towards God, for God is the one who is entirely 
possessed of the eternal - his love, his will, his forgiveness, 
are fixed in that they are eternal. But the believer faces the
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world also, and, in the light of the eternal, meets the world, 
and assesses the way things go. The judgements he makes will 
thus be very different from those of the world-historical 
perspective, and Phillips instances what the believer makes 
of the Cross of Christ as an example. He quotes Kierkegaard on 
this:
nothing in the world has ever been so completely 
lost as was Christianity at the time that Christ 
was crucified...
And yet, eternally understood, the crucified 
one had in the same moment accomplished all 1^9
The chief implications of Phillips 1 line of argument 
for theodicy, and especially for the status of the criteria 
by which the believer evaluates the way things go, are clearly 
immediate and far-reaching. Firstly, as eternal, the love of 
God is not based on the facts of the way things go, but is 
itself the measure by which the Christian assesses the facts. 
Secondly, to know this love of God is to know God, to have 
eternal life, to become subjective, that is, to walk with God. 
Thirdly, the marks of this understanding of the love of God 
are shown in the way the believer gives thanks to God. These 
thanks will not be based on the way things go, for "the 
possibility of thanking God in all things, a possibility St Paul
speaks of, is, Kierkegaard says, part of the eternity which God
52 has put in men's hearts". Fourthly, it is only when a man
has "died" to the world-historical and temporal view that he has 
the ability to love God and to thank him in this way. And this 
ability to thank God in all things is the goodness of God. The
goodness of God is a given mode of response to both the good and
53 
evil in the world: it is agape. Fifthly, these ideas do not
dispense with the problem of evil, but "On the contrary, it is
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placed on a new level of seriousness". 4
But to such a thesis some objections are obvious. 
Clearly, it might be protested, such a religious faith is mean- 
ingless for it is compatible with whatever is the case, and
55 therefore, as it makes no difference, it has no meaning. But
Phillips is not disturbed by such an objection. Yes, there is 
a difference, he replies, but not of the kind that Hick and Flew 
have in mind. "The kind of difference the love of God makes is 
no more and no less than the difference involved in dying to 
what Kierkegaard calls the objective world-historical view of 
things". This reply, however, put like that, sounds rather 
circular, and perhaps suggests the duck/rabbit "seeing-as" model 
of interpretation. But Phillips 1 use of "dying" suggests some- 
thing more serious, and perhaps the difference may have been 
better illustrated and defended by appealing again to the role 
of vows in marriage. The "difference" in being married is by 
no means the kind of difference found in "now-you-see-it-now- 
you-don't", or even of experiencing a life-situation "as" 
marriage. It is to "die" to one world (mode of existence) and 
to become "alive" in another. It is to allow one's life to 
come under the eternity of the marriage vows against which no 
circumstances of life, nothing in the way things go, be they 
for better or worse, can count as evidence - even if the marriage 
is a necessary condition for those events coming to pass.
A second objection is that the "truth" of this position 
is entirely internal to the religious view, and no arguments 
have been adduced to show why the unbeliever should abandon his 
world-historical view for the eternal and religious view. However 
this demand to provide reasons cuts many ways - it is a quite
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different thing when one asks for reasons within a system of 
thought, as against seeking reasons for it. For example, Hick's 
notion of the voluntary cognitive basis of the theistic and 
atheistic "experiencings-as" provides no extejrnal grounds for 
those voluntary cognitive acts. Nor do notions such as "on- 
looks", "bliks", etc. There is thus a tension in claiming on 
the one hand that religious belief has a non-cognitive ground 
(that is, that the ground is an option, or a perspective, etc. 
from which cognition arises), and then insisting that external 
cognitive reasons be advanced for that non-cognitive ground. 
Phillips frankly recognises this, and makes it a virtue - for 
it becomes the essence of religious belief that it is a form of 
life, not a form within life. Perhaps it is necessary for 
Phillips' critics to show that, at bottom, they do not assume 
the same? Phillips'argument is that by the very nature of 
religious belief, ;they_ cannqt..
C. Phillips and Theodicy as an Activity 
!  The Input of Polemic 
Underlying the approach Phillips takes to theodicy as
description of the religious view ofevil is a distinctive view
of the various inputs to the activity of theodicy identified
in section one - as to the nature of philosophy, the shape of
epistemology, the shape of theology, the use of polemic.
Firstly, some comments on polemic. Phillips would no 
doubt deny there is polemic involved in his philosophy, and inso- 
far as he intends to elucidate the shape of religious belief
in terms of its internal structures, its "grammar", his denial
58 
would be properly made. He consciously argues in several places
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that philosophy, as he practices it, is not in favour of or 
against religious belief, and indeed that, in describing it
accurately, some people might find religious belief objection-
59 
able. Also, he claims what he says applies equally to unbelief
as to belief. But Phillips' position is more complicated 
than this simple denial allows, for Phillips is a committed 
advocate of his view of philosophy perhaps necessarily so, 
for in many regards he has been pioneering a new style of 
philosophy of religion. There is a constant tendency, therefore, 
for Phillips to intertwine his descriptive understanding of the 
shape of religious belief with his defence of descriptive 
understanding as the genuinely philosophical input to theodicy. 
Indeed, as will shortly be indicated, much of his positive case 
for descriptive philosophy is made by his argumentative method of 
contrast and denial in relation to analytical philosophy.
Secondly in regard to polemic, we have seen the importance 
in theodicy of the frame of mind of the theodicist. Here also, 
Phillips should be exempt from polemic, in that description 
should be apart from such factors. However, there is one 
aspect of Phillips 1 work which may be thought to come down on 
the side of optimism. This is his contention that believers 
can only properly praise God, thank God, for that is their duty 
as children of God, as has been seen above. However, later 
argument will show that Phillips has not fully described the
f-\ O
nature of religious belief here. This stance of optimism needs 
to be tempered with an account of how protest is also possible 
for the believer.
Thirdly, Phillips draws a sharp distinction between "true" 
religion and "superstition", the latter being religious belief
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which includes causal notions. Now, where Phillips allows
his own views to surface, he can be read to be defending "true"
religious belief, for at the end of the Con_cept__jpf_Pr_ajer; he
talks of Weil's discussion of the criterion for religious truth
64 
as being "profoundly right". It is true he also there comments
that philosophy alone is not able to bring the blind to see, 
but the implication is that philosophy with help can. And, as 
will be seen, this attitude can enter into his description of
/- £T
particular believers. And all this despite protestations to 
the contrary. Certainly, Phillips makes clear that what he 
thinks "true" is based on his religious and moral judgement, 
but that being the case, his philosophical descriptions ought 
to have described without prejudice differences in understandings 
of religious belief. The tension here is that whilst philoso- 
phical description can show a belief that lacks internal 
coherence, and conclusions can be drawn from this, it cannot 
show that a belief found to be coherent is "true". It can also 
show that beliefs previously thought to be incoherent may have 
been thought to be so owing to a lack of descriptive adequacy 
in the approaches used, but again that has no implications for 
action. Phillips is right, then, when he separates religious 
and moral judgement from philosophy, but perhaps not always 
successful in making the distinction work in his arguments, 
which give the impression that his religious judgements are not 
unaffected by his philosophical descriptions.
There appears, then, to be an element of polemic in 
Phillips 1 work - in favour of a particular view of philosophy, 
and of a particular view of "true" religion. My position here 
is that descriptive philosophy should be content to describe the
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shape of belief. To this end it has been argued that descriptive 
philosophy is the appropriate tool in this case, as one is 
dealing with an "indwelling" of language by a community. But 
the use of that tool does not indicate whether what that 
community says is "true", or even whether some of its members 
know the truth. It concerns the shape of the internal coherence 
of that belief. To make the move into that community, to become 
a believer, is to make a quite different and evaluative move. 
Description and evaluation within the family may be inextricably 
linked in the way Phillips shows - but philosophical description 
of how the community makes its moves does not have that kind of 
implication.
2  Epistemology and Theodicy
a) Let us now concentrate on the issue of how Phillips 1 
epistemological ideas enter as an input into his religious view 
of evil. In earlier discussion arguments were mounted against
C. "~7
the use of predetermined epistemological frameworks in theodicy, 
that is, against epistemologies used to systematise religious 
beliefs. My question now is, does Phillips' epistemology act 
in the same way as Leibniz' and Hick's? Or does his attempt to 
set out the nature of belief in terms of its internal structure 
give rise to the epistemology used?
Phillips comments on what his epistemological thesis is,
f\ P
and is not, in a response to charges of fideism.
An opponent of religion might claim that far from 
leaving the question of religious truth unanswered, 
I have guaranteed that any possible answer is 
favourable to religion by insisting that the 
criteria of intelligibility in religious matters 
are to be found within religion. The objection 
confuses my epistemological thesis with an absurd 
religious doctrine. To say that the criteria of 
truth and falsity in religion are to be found within 
a religious tradition is to say nothing of the truth
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or falsity of the religion in question. On the 
contrary, my thesis is as necessary in explaining 
unbelief as it is in explaining belief. 69
Let us take it from this quote that the essence of 
Phillips 1 epistemology has to do with the location of "criteria 
of intelligibility" and "criteria of truth and falsity". We 
have already seen to some extent the way in which this works - 
the criteria of religious duty are to be found within the institu- 
tion of the family of God, and these criteria are qualitatively 
different from those in non-religious realms of discourse, they 
are characterised by eternity. There is an internal fixedness, 
unshakeability, absoluteness, grammar, within religious beliefs 
because they all say themselves and each other - God is his 
nature, which is his will, which is his goodness, which is his 
love, which is his grace, which is his forgiveness, which is 
to have the spirit of God, which is to walk with God, which is 
to give thanks to God for all that there is. To understand one 
is to understand all. The network of religious beliefs is, 
therefore, rational because internally coherent, and the beliefs 
are true for those who affirm them and false for those who deny
them, for religious beliefs are not in the indicative mood but
70 in the affirmative. To affirm this set of ideas, to know God,
can only be done by, as it were, joining the family, sharing in 
a form of life, coming to know how to use a language, for to 
know how to use this language is to know God, and this common
knowledge of God is religion. He is to be found in the
72 language people learn when they come to learn about religion,
just as children come to know what the world is through the 
language they learn. But language here must be taken in the 
large sense of the role it plays in the community. So, for
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example, the understanding involved in prayer cannot be separated
from the activity of praying. In the most general terms,
74 belief in the true God is synonymous with worship, and it is
here that the nature of the believer's criteria become clear, 
for it is here that epistemology is identified with semantics 
in that "the meaning of God's reality is to be found in His
divinity, which is expressed in the role worship plays in
75 people's lives".
Now, one needs to be clear as to what it is that Phillips 
is rejecting when he identifies epistemology with semantics in 
this way. He is rejecting, as noted above, the transference 
of the criteria of physical objectivity into what he claims is a
I——J £•
"language-game" that has its own criteria of reality, but 
along with this objection there goes a whole set of denials 
which spell out what is involved in claiming that knowledge of 
God as a reality is not at all comparable, or related, to the 
knowledge of physical objects as realities:
i) it is denied that ordinary-1anguage analysis is 
a suitable model for establishing what is the case in religion. 
It has already been shown that Phillips regards religious 
beliefs as being quite other than ordinary world-historical 
pronouncements, and also that they are not in the indicative 
mood. But there is a further contention, and it is that religious
beliefs can only be analysed in ordinary-language terms at the
77 level of their surface grammar. But, says Phillips, this surface
contention assumes "too readily that words such as 'existence',
'love', 'will', are used in the same way of God as they are used
7 8 
of human beings, animate and inanimate objects". On the
contrary, "Depth grammar is made explicit by asking what can and
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what cannot be said of the concept in question. To understand
the limits of what can be said about a concept, one must take
79 
account of the context in which the concept is used".
ii) it is denied that religion as a whole stands 
in need of j ust ification. "The whole conception, then, of 
religion standing in need of justification is confused. Of 
course, epistemologists will seek to clarify the meaning of
religious statements, but ... this means clarifying what is
RO 
already there awaiting such clarification". Forms of life
are givens, they just are.
iii) it is denied that religious beliefs are
explanatory. This denial is linked to his rejection of religious 
beliefs as ever being intended to be explanatory hypotheses. The 
whole of Religion Without Explanation is a presentation of this 
fundamental point in his thought. It connects to his rejection 
of religious language as being in the indicative mood. Rather, 
religious beliefs provide the "picture" that a man lives by. 
"But what does believing in a picture amount to? Is it like 
believing in a hypothesis? Certainly not ... It does not 
involve the weighing of evidence or reasoning to a conclusion. 
What it does involve is seeing how the belief regulates a
Q-l
person's life". Conversely, not believing a "picture" is
not like not believing a hypothesis. The importance of this
point comes out when one asks, as was done earlier, whether
believers and unbelievers could find some higher criteria to
settle their differences on the goodness of God. "Beliefs,
such as belief in the Last Judgement, are not testable hypotheses,
but absolutes for believers ... The absolute beliefs are the
p 9
criteria, not the object of assessment". It is an implication
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of this that believers and unbelievers do not contradict each 
other, but affirm and deny a given picture - the unbeliever
Q O
simply declines to use the believer's picture, and vice versa.
iv) it is denied, in consequence, that the way
things go in the world constitutes evidence in favour, or against, 
the religious "picture". It is usually thought that one needs 
reasons for religious belief, and that evidence is relevant to
proofs of the validity of those beliefs. Not so, says Phillips,
84 for we are dealing here with "bedrock" matters. For example,
what reasons are there for saying that one's sins are forgiven? 
How does a believer know this to be so? The believer might be 
tempted to look for evidence of this forgiveness, and say that 
he had experienced God's mercy, or that this mercy was shown in 
Christ dying for us. But what does the claim to forgiveness 
really amount to? To the believer pointing to expres^ipns of 
God's mercy, not his searching for evidence for it.
If one is thinking of evidence for saying that one 
knows these things, there doesn't seem to be any. 
Wittgenstein says that the believer has 'what you 
might call an unshakeable belief. It will show, not 
by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for 
belief, but rather by regulating for all in his 
life'. These beliefs are taught not as beliefs 
which require further reasons to justify them. 
They are not opinions or hypotheses. 86
v) it is denied that inference is possible from the 
world to God. This denial is, again, an ubiquitous idea in 
Phillips' writing, and has as its basis not only the kinds of
O "J
argument that Hume adduced, but also the Kierkegaardian 
qualitative distinction between the temporal and the eternal. 
"Would it not be odd if the Creator were assessed in the light 
of his creation, rather than the creation being seen in the light 
of the Creator's nature? ... God is not to be judged by the
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world, but the world is to be judged by God".
vi) it is denied that it is needful to be
reasonable in religion. This denial brings together Phillips 1 
thesis in a sharp way, and has to do with the attitude of the 
religious believer. In contrast to all theodicists who seek to 
show that the way things go is reasonable if rightly understood, 
Phillips regards the religious believer as facing an unfair 
world with a determination to "overcome". This determination is 
not a reasonable attitude, nor is it arrived at by the use of
reason, but is the espousal of a certain kind of love, to
89 possess which is to know God and to have eternal life. What
"the believer calls 'success 1 will seem a failure in the eyes 
of the world, what he calls 'joy 1 will seem like grief, what he
calls 'victory' will seem like certain defeat. So it was, it
90 is said, at the Cross of Christ".
b) There are many fine critiques of this whole
91 
epistemological thesis of Phillips, but let us raise only
those points of criticism which are centrally relevant to this 
thesis.
Firstly, although Phillips denies that he has applied a 
predetermined philosophical position and epistemology to 
religious belief, and claims that the reverse is the case, that
the struggle with problems connected with prayer led him to his
. . 92 position in philosophy, it is arguable that he has here a
general thesis which cannot be shown to derive from the nature 
of belief, but which seems to be applied (with great benefit) to 
characterising religious belief. Thus, he says:
What I tried to urge was that the distinction 
between the real and the unreal does not come to 
the same thing in every context. To think otherwise 
is to fall into a deep confusion about the relation 
between language and reality.93
158
But it is not all obvious how this claim can be deduced directly 
from the traditional language of religion, certainly not that 
of Christianity. The chief reason for saying this concerns the 
nature of Christianity as an historical religion set in time 
and space with all its particularity. There will be a need 
later to return to this neglect by Phillips of the historical 
dimension to Christian belief, when it is sought to incorporate 
the historical element centrally in an epistemology which is 
derived from the way religion is practised within classical 
theism. Whether that attempt proves successful is secondary to 
the important point that if there are epistemological claims 
made in Christianity, they must be deducible from the shape of 
its beliefs and practices if internal coherence is to be found,
and described. Phillips' thesis does not seem to meet that test
94 
adequately.
Secondly, it is not at all clear that, when applied to 
the problem of evil, Phillips 1 thesis is centrally concerned 
with what Christians are trying to say. This objection may 
sound surprising, but as is shown in a moment in discussing 
Phillips 1 input of theology to theodicy, Christ and his death 
are not really needed for Phillips 1 account of the view of evil 
which the Christian believer has. Indeed, it has already been 
shown that Phillips 1 basic pattern of description concerns 
such non-historical and general notions as religious duty and 
the eternal. To this description the person of Christ is at 
best illustrative. Again, it seems not unreasonable to claim 
that to describe Christian belief one must incorporate irremova bly 
the place of Christ in "Christian" epistemology - that is, in 




Thirdly, it is open to question whether Phillips has not 
taken the same position at bottom as was rejected above in 
relation to German; namely, that what is absolute in religion 
is the commitment of the believer rather than the criteria to 
which he is committed. J.E. Smith makes this point (in relation 
to Wittgenstein)when he writes,"It is important to notice that 
the 'unshakeability' in question has nothing to do with the
logical status of a belief, but only with the absolute tenacity
96 
with which it is held by the believer". There is no doubt
Phillips would protest vigorously that Smith has misunderstood 
this point, but how can Phillips argue against the fact that, 
say, marriage vows are only eternal, on his position, so long 
as the commitment to them remains tenacious, so long as the 
picture holds? The problem for Phillips is that, if he is 
successful against Smith's charge, then as Sherry says, his
account of religious language leaves it "rather like a balloon
97 floating in the air without any attachment to earth". But, again,
Christian belief is characterised by the "scandal of particularity" 
Just how does what is "known" in the Christian "picture" relate 
to history and specifically to Jesus of Nazareth?
But positively it is accepted, despite these problems, 
that Phillips has made out a case worth pursuing concerning the 
internality of criteria of intelligibility and their fixed 
relationships within a realm of discourse, and that understanding 
such internal coherence relates to identifying and describing 
those criteria, and that the whole context of belief and practice 
is needed to ascertain the role concepts play in a form of life.
What I am saying, then, as a response at this point to
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Phillips amounts to this. There is a proper role for philosophy 
to play in describing the shape of belief within a "language- 
game", but it is another thing to claim that a particular 
epistemological thesis concerning the distinction between the 
real and the unreal not amounting to the same thing in every 
context means that in this context it does not amount to the same
thing. It is one thing to claim the nature of the object
98 
addressed determines the grammar of the talk, but it becomes
merely circular to claim at the same time that, from the grammar 
of the talk alone, one can determine the nature of the object 
addressed. Either one assesses the "grammar" by knowing the 
nature of the object, or one assesses the object by knowing the 
nature of the "grammar", or one holds them dialectically in a 
process of conjecture and refutation. For Phillips to say that 
what the language says is itself might be perfectly alright, if 
it could be demonstrated that the object of that language is 
necessarily of the sort that Phillips supposes. But description 
itself cannot show that the terms of description used are 
necessarily the only ones that might be suitable - compare the 
various types of descriptive language that have arisen in the 
disciplines to tackle the question "What is man?". One's unease 
is increased by the fact that pervading Phillips' thought is a 
generalised theory of rationality which says that there is no
general theory of rationality available. What is the game within
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which such a statement could be made? To make this epistemo- 
logical theory work in the religious language-game Phillips uses 
his method of contrast. Illuminating as this is on many occasions 
as to the character of religious beliefs, it nevertheless has, 
as Phillips uses it, the methodological effect of making the
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content of whatever belief is thus handled onlj£ what is known by 
contrast. When infinite qualitative difference is added, then 
of course religious beliefs turn out to be radically different 
from ordinary-language uses - but does that tell one about the 
beliefs, or the philosophical techniques? Now, various points 
were noted above that one must bear in mind when seeking to 
describe the status of the believer's criteria. The third of 
these was that there needs to be a coherence between the 
theodicist's understanding of what the believer's words mean and 
the role those words play in the community that uses them. In 
the light of my unease at this point about whether Phillips* 
epistemology and the techniques which he uses to apply it are 
external to religious belief, rather than internal to it, let us 
now turn to an account of his theology in his own terms, and at 
the end of it seek to resolve the difficulty. 
3   Phillips' Theology and Theodicy
a) In section one some observations were made on the 
Christian world view by commenting on the type of language 
system that is used in classical theism in relation to its 
presiding concept "Theos", and it was determined to write 
within the interpersonal language system. A difficulty arises, 
however, concerning the connections between the type of reality 
Phillips holds God to be and whether God is personal, that is, 
personal in the "normal" sense of the word. Two lines of 
approach are possible at this point. One is to tackle this 
question directly, and to decide whether or not "person" is the 
sort of notion that can be entertained under the criteria that 
for Phillips constitute the Christian language-game. The other 
is to take a look at what Phillips has to say about Christian
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theology and to see what it means, within his way of talking, 
to talk in personal terms. The latter course is taken for the 
reason that there lies in Phillips' use of the method of 
contrast a barrier to moving from ordinary use of language to 
the religious use of language. The word under discussion has 
to be understood within its religious use or not at all. What 
is not in doubt, however, is that Phillips uses the language of 
persons in relation to God. My interest now is in what it means 
in Phillips 1 theology to speak in absolute terms of God as a 
person - for as noted earlier (in some discussion of Hick) one 
of the unresolved problems of standard conception theodicy is 
how to handle this notion.
Distributed through various of Phillips' works there is a 
comprehensive account of Christian doctrine on offer relating to
God as person, an account which almost amounts to a systematic
103 theology. Now it has already been claimed that theodicy
needs to be set in the jfull_ range of terms in which believers 
seek to speak of their experience of God rather than in a short 
set of "theodical" terms. It will become clear in examining 
Phillips 1 theology of the "personal" God that what Phillips 
has to say about the believer's view of evil has reference to 
just such a wide range of terms.
b) Let us start on this point by picking up again 
Phillips' locating the believer's absolute obligations to God 
in terms of the family of God in which the Father, as the sole 
source of the existence of the children, has certain rights, and 
the children consequent duties. Phillips' point is that "to
understand what it means to believe in God is to understand why
104 God must be obeyed". Indeed, to be a believer, is to look at
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life in this way and to regulate it accordingly, and to admit
of no exceptions to one's obligations to God. The Christian
is, therefore, concerned with what God's will is, for in knowing
God's will one knows God's nature for "God's nature is the
107 grammar of God's will". A connection arises, therefore,
between what the nature and will of God are and the Christian 
community, for it is in the family of God that one finds know-
1 QQ
ledge of the known will of God. "What can conceivably be
said to be the will of God is determined by prevailing beliefs
109 
about God", that is, what can be said about God's will lies
within the general beliefs about the nature of God as set out 
in Christian traditions. It follows, Phillips argues, from this 
location of meaning in the public language of the community, that 
no private opinions can properly be held over against the 
community as to what the will of God is, and certain things 
cannot be said to be the will of God. A chief characteristic 
of the will of God is that, like the will of the dead, it cannot 
be changed for it is possessed of eternity. It is not 
susceptible, therefore, to the way things go. "In this respect, 
the will of the dead is akin to the will of God; it is the
measure in terms of which the individual assesses himself or
112 
understands himself and the world". One cannot argue with
the will of God, but only contemplate it. In this way 
God's will acts as a "given" in the life of the believer in 
terms of which he must resolve the problems he faces. So 
what is it not to be in the will of God? It is to experience 
the anger of God. But what is divine anger? And what is his 
mercy?
Here we come to face both Phillips' method of contrast,
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and also his appeal to semantics as based in the use of language 
by the community. We have seen that in order to know the will 
of God the religious believer must be a participant in a shared 
language; he must learn the use of religious concepts, and 
to know how to use this language is to know God. It is also 
in this way that he knows what it is to be aware of the anger 
of God. To be able to see meaning in religious concepts in 
the sense of being able to use them is "to come to see what 
divine anger means", for it is "to come to view one's life in 
relation to the will of God, and to recognise the horror of
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estrangement from it". But to contemplate the will of God in 
this way is to see the difference between God's will and human 
wills. To be angry in ordinary-language terms means to be able 
to say "I am angry"; it involves a state of anger; it might 
or might not be justified anger. We know what all this is like, 
and we share its language. But the eternal will of God and 
anger of God are not so. Their "grammar" is different. And so 
is the "grammar" of God's mercy. Ordinary-language "mercy" is 
my plea, "Don't do this to me". But, in contrast, when the 
believer pleads for God's mercy he is not asking for favours in 
that kind of way. "What the prayer amounts to is: 'Don't let me 
become that 1 . One is concerned over what one is becoming as a
person. One is talking about what one is in relation to the
119 
unchangeable reality of God". The reality of God's will,
anger, and mercy, therefore, have to do with the internal relation 
that exists between the believer's seeing himself within the 
family of God and the sort of person he is becoming. They have
to do with the believer's communion with God as the source of
120 his hope for himself. They do not have to do with interpreting
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one's relation to God in terms of the way things go, but seeing 
the way things go within a certain picture.
But it has already been indicated that for Phillips the 
believer's way of seeing has to do with dying to the world- 
historical perspective and becoming alive to the eternal. But 
this is to talk of the nature of the believer's love of God, and
also of his love of the world. Both of these are ways of giving
121 
expression to dying to the world's way of regarding things.
1 22 To see the world as God's world would be, for the believer, to
possess this love, but this would not be a cosmological theory. 
It would be to possess that certain kind of love which we have
already seen overcomes the world and to possess which is to know
1 23 God and to have eternal life. It is the "measure which brings
order to whatever is the case; not the order of a plan, but
124 the order or meaningfulness involved in the exercise of love".
So this eternal love, this love of God, establishes for the
believer an internal connection between seeing that there is a
125 God and seeing the world in a certain way. To see the
possibility of such a love "amounts to the same thing as coming
1 o^r
to see the possibility of belief in God". So, belief, and
understanding-in-religion, and love can all be equated with
1 0-7 
each other. Again, by the method of contrast, the grammar
of this love can be told. Temporal love depends on how things 
go, it may change, it may end in failure. Not so eternal love. 
So, for example, on the death of a loved one, the believer does 
not see eternal love as defeated by the way things have gone. 
"The death of the beloved must not rob life of its meaning, 
since for the believer the meaning of life is found in God. 
The believer claims that there is a love that will not let go
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whatever happens. This is the love of God, the independence of
which from what happens is closely bound up with the point of
1 oft 
calling it eternal".
This love of God spreads out to all, for Christianity 
wishes to speak of a kind of love such that no man is excluded 
from it. It calls this kind of love, love of one's neighbour, 
and regards it as contrasting with everyday love of one's fellow 
man in that it lacks particularity, and loves the other simply
because he is - it is thus internally related to the love of
129 God apart from which it cannot be understood. Indeed, love
of one's neighbour is one of the implicit forms of the love of
130 God, and to have this love is to have the Spirit of God, and
131 to walk with God. It is also in this context that one
understands what sin is, for "The believer's sin is to behave
1 32 in relation to people and things as if they were his by right".
To see that the wages of such sin is death is not, however, to 
make a calculation that to be evil is to put oneself in the 
position of receiving unpleasant wages, thus separating the 
deserts of sin from the nature of sin. It is to have a horror 
of sin. It is sin, of course, that puts man in need of the 
grace and forgiveness of God. Phillips 1 comments here are that
clearly forgiveness does not depend on the good in one out-
1 34 
weighing the evil, but on the fact that, whilst still a
sinner, man can walk with God as a present reality (which is 
the point that he suggests unbelievers do not see). But this 
walking with God, this having the spirit of God, is known in our 
forgiving as we are forgiven: "if we forgive others, then we
1 oc:
have the spirit of God in us, and this is our forgiveness". 
There is no gap between our forgiveness of other people and
167
137 . God's forgiveness of us. To be cleansed from sin is to be
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able to carry on despite one's vileness.
It is in this context that the believer understands the
power of God. "The true God is the God we think of as almighty,
139 but as not exercising His power everywhere". The influence
of Simone Weil. becomes significant here, for Phillips builds on
140 her claim that "the spirit of God is the spirit of self-denial".
In this light, the spirit of renunciation is the spirit of God
141 in man, and in this way, for example, Job is able to regard
his life as a sacrifice to God, for the love of God is
142 
sacrificial, it involves a denial of itself. But this
sacrificial element in the believer's life is not meritorious,
for it is linked to the grace of God which cannot be willed into
143 
one's life but has to be contemplated, waited on, for it has
to do with taking account of something (eternal) which is other
144 than oneself. To talk of the power of God, then, is to speak
by contrast as against the power of man. Divine power cannot be
resisted, but it needs to be understood that this power of God
145 
works through the love of God, which is sacrificial, not
146 
assertive.
The ability to give thanks to God is closely linked to
147 
seeing one's life as a sacrifice to God for it is the
ability to offer thanksgiving for life as a whole, with all its
good and evil; to see the world as God's creation is to see
148 149 
meaning in life and not to elevate oneself. To give thanks
in this way is to fix one's attention on the fact that people 
are, not how they are, and to give thanks. Thankfulness to 
God is internally related to talk of the meaningfulness of life, 
which itself connects to the goodness of God in that God's
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goodness "consists precisely in the fact that the meaning of
152 life does not depend on how it goes".
The believer therefore lives in hope and peace. Despair
153 is to think that life itself is hopeless, but this hopeless
despair is to live without Christ. The believer who is 
indwelt by Christ sees that the confession of man's radical 
insufficiency and inadequacy are preconditions for receiving the
understanding or grace that comes from God, and which is the
154 indwelling of Christ. The hope that this indwelling brings
is, however, not a hope for anything imparticular but is "simply
. . . 155 hope, hope in the sense of the ability to live with himself".
It has to do with contemplation, not endeavour. This hope is 
also the meaning of salvation, for salvation is the ability 
of the believer to see his whole life, with its good and evil, 
as a gift from God, and thus to see that the love of God brings 
salvation from despair. The peace of God that comes with 
salvation is the believer coming to terms with the fact that 
he is as he is in the gift of God - and perhaps this kind of 
acceptance is the meaning of saying that the peace of God passes 
understanding. This peace is to know all things are in the 
hands of God, which means the believer knows, whatever the 
contingencies of life, he can say that with God all things are 
possible, for to say this means he recognises that God alone is 
necessary, and that one's love of God is fixed whatever is the
1 CO
case in the contingent world. It is in this context also 
that the meaning of trust is to be found, for it is the commit- 
ment of the believer to the eternal God, whereby the believer
159 ceases to be dependent on the odds for such-and-such an outcome.
Trust is "meeting the danger in God" and "seeing that what is
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of value cannot be destroyed by the way things go". Again, 
in this context one comes to see what prayer amounts to. Prayer 
is to be seen as one of the wider worshipful activities of the 
community in which, through praise and worship, the unshake-
1 /- o
ability of God is held fast, on the one hand, but on the 
other hand, such worshipful activities are the means by which 
the believer reaches an understanding of himself, where he
-i s- o
"comes to himself". So, for example, "although God does not 
come to know anything when one tells one's sins to Him, the
person who confesses comes to know something about himself which
164 he did not know before". It is in this reciprocity of
religious belief and self-understanding that the significance 
of the believer's talk of the afterlife is also to be understood. 
It does not say anything about a further quantity of life, but 
is the believer seeing his own life in the context of the 
eternal. This view may also be expressed in terms of living 
a life regulated by the picture of the Last Judgement.
c) So perhaps one can draw together the main
interests of Phillips' theology, and his view of the nature of 
God as person, in two quotes:
i) The state of a believer's soul is seen by him 
in the light of its relation to beliefs in the 
Fatherhood and Love of God. The notions of 
the fatherhood and love of God constitute 
eternal life, the life of God, towards which 
the soul aspires.167
ii) I am suggesting then, that eternal life for 
the believer is participation in the life of 
God, and that this life has to do with dying 
to the self, seeing that all things are a 
gift from God, that nothing is ours by right 
or necessity ... In learning by contemplation, 
attention, renunciation, what forgiving, 
thanking, loving, etc. mean in these contexts, 
the believer is participating in the reality 
of God; ^ls__is_-what__we_me_an .by_Gpd'_s__r_eality.
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This reality is independent of any given 
believer, but its independence is not the 
independence of a separate biography. It is 
independent of the believer in that the believer 
measures his life against it.168
D. Assessment
1. It has been shown that in Phillips* case theodicy 
runs parallel with the full range of his theology, and does 
not just relate to a few terms abstracted for analysis as 
definitions. It is also clear that what matters in this theodicy 
is the role concepts play in the life of the believing community. 
What the believer says and how he acts are internally related - 
there is no strictly theoretical account possible of religious 
belief. To learn the meaning of the religious "picture" is to
learn how to react, and Phillips calls religious beliefs
169 
"expressive reactions". It is also clear that Phillips offers
a possible account of the absolute and non-hypothetical nature 
of religious beliefs, and that he does this by actually looking 
at what believers do and say. He certainly passes Wilson's test 
of not trying to derive the absolute criteria of Christian 
believers from this world, but from the nature of God and Heaven 
(or the eternal). Again, the language Phillips uses is indeed 
the language of the personal - Father, will, love, goodness, 
grace, forgiveness, etc. - and the role he gives this language
is highly creative in describing the shape of Christian belief 
in the round.
2.a) But there are also things to be said on the other 
side. Firstly, and returning to the epistemological question 
which was left over, what is the degree of coherence between 
the account Phillips gives of theology and what in fact believers
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do and say? How does Phillips in fact react to particular cases 
of belief? Let us refer, in order to answer these questions, to 
his comments on three mothers who had negative experiences to 
cope with as believers as he mentions them in "Religion and 
Epistemology: some Contemporary Confusions". The first 
mother has a mentally handicapped child, and says, "Only my 
religious faith keeps me going. Of one thing I am sure: my 
child's place in heaven is secure". The second mother also has 
a handicapped child, but she says in grappling with the problem 
of evil, "Why shouldn't it have happened to me?". The third had 
become a mother after having as a teacher shied away from 
teaching mentally handicapped children, only to find that her 
own child for whom she had prayed was mentally handicapped. Her 
reaction was that through the birth of this mentally handicapped 
child she had come closer to God. For the first time she knew 
what it meant to cast her burden on the Lord. Now, how does 
Phillips describe these three cases of purported religious 
belief? The first, he says, he does not find "impressively 
religious". Indeed "it has little to do with religion, being 
much closer to superstition". Of the second, he says he 
finds the answer "extremely impressive", but thinks it probably 
needs a respect for a certain kind of religious belief to find 
it so. Of the third, he says nothing directly, but indirectly 
indicates this is true religious belief - she was forced "to 
re-think her whole attitude towards prayer and towards children. 
She did not suggest God had sent the child to her in order to 
change her attitude or as a rebuke for her former one". So, 
for Phillips, two of the mothers hold religious belief - "Both 
mothers refuse to look upon belief in God as an explanatory
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hypothesis. They both, in what they say, participate in the 
love of God, a love which will not let them go, whatever the 
circumstances". But the first mother does not have religious 
belief, that is to say one could call it religious belief if 
one takes "Hick's paradigm of the religious believer", but 
Phillips prefers not to. He wishes to stress that "there is 
another kind of belief in God", the difference in which could 
be brought out "by comparing the roles which worship plays in 
the lives of the respective believers". However, what does 
this latter test amount to in the case of these mothers? I 
suggest it amounts to a predetermined epistemological test - 
does their worship have reference to an objective God and an 
objective Heaven? Yes? Then it is superstition. No? Then it 
is genuine religious belief. Put another way, the test is 
between the indicative and the imperative status of worship. 
What Phillips is doing is to say prescriptively, not descriptively, 
that religious language operates with a vocabulary of personal 
character, but with "grammar" that radically separates the 
imperative and indicative moods. But can this contention be 
carried through? Tilley puts his finger on the issue here:
Phillips claims that the utterance 'There is a God 1 
ought really [to] be read 'God'. ALLELUIA 1.'.'. 1 But 
are the indicative and imperative moods so completely 
separated from each other? ... Generally, in every 
imperative there is implied some indicative claim. 
This can be seen by looking at English grammar, 
where the present and future indicative and the 
hortatory subjunctive can substitute for the 
imperative:
'Praise God'.' (imperative) .
'Now we praise God in song' (present indicative) .
'We shall praise God 1 (future indicative) .
'Let us praise God' (hortatory subjunctive) .
... Until these matters are sorted out and the relation 
of the 'indicative' and 'imperative' elements clarified, 
Phillips' work has problems that need to be solved.!-72
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Phillips might well reply to this objection along the 
line that Tilley confuses surface and depth grammar, and that 
this analysis is ordinary-language analysis reasserting itself, 
whereas what is needed is to understand the depth grammar of 
"God" and "Praise". But one would then sense prescriptivism 
again. What is the test of which of these moods is depth
grammar? And should they be thought in grammatical terms to
173 
exclude each other? Phillips 1 test seems crucially to lie
in the epistemological thesis he provides externally. He seems, 
then, to come after all under the same critique as was applied 
to Hick and Leibniz. Phillips supposes that all accounts of 
theology in the indicative mood are necessarily explanatory. 
This is neither necessary nor accurate, for it is shown later 
that a non-explanatory theodicy in the indicative mood accords 
better with the internal grammar of religious belief. In 
arguing this, most of the content and motivation behind Phillips' 
theological theodicy as outlined above will be of value, but it 
will be used in a different context from his epistemological
theory. Behind my description of religious theodicy lies also
174 
another distinction shared with Tilley. It is that whereas
Phillips has equated statements of fact with conclusions that 
result from finding out, there is no need to do so. Indeed, 
this contention is based in the very discussion by Moore to 
which Phillips appeals for the groundlessness of "facts". 
One knows or is certain of some facts, and it is odd to ask how 
one knows them or why one is certain of them. The oddity arises 
because they are facts and not conclusions. God is just such a 
fact for the believer who adoringly worships - or to put it 
rather differently and in Alvin Plantinga's terms, God is part
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of the believer's noetic structure, and has the presiding 
place in that structure. And just as Moore's facts have to do 
with the real "world in which the commonsense person lives, just 
so God is a real fact in the believer's world. For him God is 
a reality.
b) Secondly, Phillips 1 theology is characterised by 
a number of tensions - the absolute over against the temporal; 
response over against inference; roles and meanings over 
against narratives (no biography of God); pictures that are 
constitutive over against reading facts from the way things go; 
generality of description of Christian virtues (for example, 
hope is hope-in-general) over against particularity; timeless- 
ness over against the historical (acts and events in history by 
God are inconceivable). Now in these regards no quarrel will 
be picked with the affirmative side of this theology as an account 
of how Christianity operates as a way of life - theology is 
about significance in the life of the believer of what he 
believes, and such significance will have the features Phillips 
emphasises by the method of contrast. There is no need to deny, 
however, that religious beliefs and practices are grounded in
particular facts in history and particular contexts in life. As
177 Sherry argues, it does not follow that because religious
doctrines are not simply deduced from the facts, the facts may 
not constitute necessary conditions for the beliefs.
3. There is, then, a proper descriptive task for 
philosophy in theodicy, and Phillips has identified some of the 
key features of religious belief to which such description must 
be directed if the believer's problem of evil is to be understood. 
My argument does not, however, accept the epistemological position
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of Phillips, which has been argued to be externally provided out 
of a predetermined philosophical commitment, but returns to the 
assumption of standard conception theodicy that to talk of God 
is not to talk self-referringly. What the task in descriptive 
theodicy amounts to, therefore, is to have reference to the 
epistemology of standard conception theodicy, but to deny its 
philosophical method (section two above), and to have reference 
to the philosophical method of Phillips, but to deny his 
epistemology (this section).
It might be objected that to have reference to standard 
conception epistemology entails debating after all whether God 
exists as an ontological entity, and that the existence of evil 
is relevant to this, and so one is back at the beginning, and 
that only one of either the atheist or the believer can be right 
on this issue. This objection is to be rejected as a failure 
to understand the part that language plays in our coming to "know" 
anything at all, and the place that convictions play in knowledge. 
"Knowledge" is only available within the structuring constraints 
of the kind of language in use in a community - to "know" any- 
thing is to be able to speak about it in a certain way, to know 
how to use language in relation to it. As language-users we
commit ourselves within communities to using language with certain 
purposes in mind, but that is another way of saying that what we 
know has to do with the role a concept plays in life. But a 
community does not have to be committed to any particular use 
of language. Now, we do in fact commit ourselves to ways of
"knowing" within communities of use, that is, communities
178 
committed to shared meanings. Applying these points it can
be seen that what the believer and the unbeliever amount to are
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people whose forms of life, that is, whose networks of meanings, 
do and do not include God, that is, do and do not give "God" a 
role in their language. The meaning of the existence of God, 
then, cannot be talked about sensibly apart from an understanding 
of the role that God piays/does not play in the language of 
belief/unbelief, that is, in the language through which the 
believer/unbeliever expresses what he "knows". To understand 
this point is to return, but in a revised sense, to the method
of Aquinas - to talk of God is to talk about how he^_exists.and
179 how .he_does not exist. The God who can be spoken about, the
"available" God, exists in the epistemological structures that 
hold in religious belief. He does not exist (he is not 
"available") in the different epistemological structures of 
unbelief. But that is not a contradiction. It is a recognition 
of the shape of human knowledge as it is available through 
language, and is a recognition of the way in which language 
connects with reality as men and women act in the world as 
language-users.
Cognitivists are quite used to living with these relation- 
ships between language and reality in relation to the human 
disciplines. Do the "Id", the "Ego", or the "Super-ego" exist?180 
Do social classes exist? Do the analyses of man-as-a-fact in 
the disciplines contradict each other? Do the "micro" and 
"macro" levels of analysis in sociology contradict each other? 
Is it a contradiction to say that man is made in the image of God 
(theology) and has common ancestry with the apes (science)? Is 
it a contradiction to say that physical objects are, and are not, 
solid? There is one argument in Waismann's article "Veriflability" 
which should have laid such ghosts to rest, but I fear it hasn't.18 -1
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It is worth following his argument closely, and doing so by 
quotation so as not to lose the nuances of presentation of the 
points he makes. What he shows about the relationship between 
language and reality, about the nature of "facts", shows the 
basis of discussion that needs to be entertained when facing the 
simple claims of the cognitivist:
People are inclined to think that there is a world 
of facts as opposed to a world of words which describe 
these facts. I am not too happy about that. Consider 
an example. We are accustomed to see colour as a 
'quality 1 of objects. That is, colour cannot 
subsist by itself, but must inhere in a thing. 
This conception springs from the way we express 
ourselves. When colour is rendered by an adjective, 
colour is conceived as an attribute of things, i.e. 
as something that can have no independent existence. 
That, however, is not the only way of conceiving 
colour. There are languages such as Russian, 
German,Italian, which render colour by means of 
verbs. If we were to imitate this usage in English 
by allowing some such form as 'The sky blues', we 
should come face to face with the question, Do I 
mean the same fact when I say 'The sky blues' as 
when I say 'The sky is blue 1 ? I don't think so. 
We say 'The sun shines', 'Jewels glitter 1 , 'The 
river shimmers', 'Windows gleam 1 , 'Stars twinkle', 
etc.; that is, in the case of phenomena of lustre 
we make use of a verbal mode of expression. Now 
in rendering colour phenomena by verbs we assimilate 
them more closely to the phenomena of lustre; and 
in doing so we alter not only our manner of speaking 
but our entire way of apprehending colour. We see 
the blue differently now ... blue does not inhere 
in it £the sky"] as a mere quality, rather is it 
felt as the vital pulse of the sky; there is a 
faint suggestion of the operating of some force 
behind the phenomenon. It's hard to get the feel 
of it in English; perhaps it may help you to liken 
this mode of expression to the impressionist way of 
painting which is at bottom a new way of seeing: 
the impressionist sees in colour an immediate 
manifestation of reality, a free agent no longer 
bound up with things.182
Adjective and verb thus represent, Waismann argues, two different 
worlds of thought, but there is of course also an adverbial way 
of talking about colour:
Imagine a language with a wealth of expressions for 
all shades of lustre, but without adjectives for
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colours; colours, as a rule, are ignored; when 
they are expressed, this is done by adding an adverb 
to the word that specifies the sort of lustre. Thus 
the people who use this sort of language would say, 
'The sea is glittering golden in the sunshine 1 , 
'The evening clouds glow redly', 'There in the depth 
a shadow greenly gleams'. In such phrases colour 
would lose the last trace of independence and be 
reduced to a mere modification of lustre ... There 
can be little doubt that, owing to this circumstance, 
the users of such language would find it very hard 
to see colour as a quality of things. For them it 
would not be the th.i_ngs that are coloured, rather 
colour would reside in the lustre as it glows and 
darkens and changes - evidence that they would see 
the world with different eyes.183
Now, Waismann imagines that an objection to this set of 
suggestions might be to ask whether it isn't still true to say 
that we have the same experience whenever we look up at the sky, 
whatever language we use. Perhaps with gestalt diagrams in 
mind, he suggests we would be less happy if we were asked whether 
we have the same experience when we look at a picture puzzle 
and see a figure in it as before when we didn't see it. He 
comments:
You may, perhaps, say you see the same lines, though 
each time in a different arrangement. Now what 
exactly corresponds to this different arrangement in 
the case when I look up at the sky? One might say: 
we are aware of the blue, but this awareness is 
itself tinged and coloured by the whole linguistic 
background which brings into prominence, or weakens 
and hides certain analogies. In this sense language 
does affect the whole manner in which we become 
aware of a fact: the fact articulates itself 
differently, so to speak.184
And after further examples of how "reality" is a function of 
characteristics present in a language, in which he considers the 
changes that would occur in one's notion of reality if one's 
language had a different logic, or possessed different modes of 
expression, or even from the conscious use of language at all, he 
asks what the objective reality is that is supposed to be 
described by language. He puts himself in the place of a
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defender of this "reality" apart from language, and suggests 
that what rebels in us against such suggestions as he has made 
is the feeling that:
the fact is there objectively no matter in which way 
we render it. I perceive something that exists and 
put it into words. From this it seems to follow 
that fact is something that exists independent of, 
and prior to language: language merely serves the 
end of communication.^86
He replies to himself that what we are liable to overlook here
is that the way we see a fact - i.e. what we emphasize and what
i 07 
we disregard - is our work:
A fact is noticed; and by being noticed it becomes 
a fact. 'Was it then no fact before you noticed 
it? 1 It was, if I could have noticed it. In a 
language in which there is only the number series 'one 
two, three, a few, many', a fact such as 'There are 
five birds' is imperceptible.188
In explaining what he has in mind he considers a language in 
which description does not take the form of sentences - a map, 
for instance, is not a conjunction of single statements each of 
which describes a separate fact. But in that case:
what, would you say, is the boundary of a fact? 
Where does the one end and the other begin? ... 
Here we begin to see how confusing the idea is 
according to which the world is a cluster of 
facts - just as if it were a sort of mosaic made 
up of little coloured stones. Reality is undivided 
... In describing reality, by using sentences, we 
draw, as it were, lines through it, limit a part 
and call what corresponds with such a sentence a 
fact.189
So he moves towards his conclusion that reality is not made up 
of facts in the sense in which a plant is made up of cells or a 
house of bricks. Rather, he says, if you want a simile:
a fact is present, in much the same sense in which a 
character manifests itself in a face. Not that I 
invent the character and read it into the face; no, 
the character is somehow written on the face but no 
one would on that account say that a face is 'made 
up* of features symbolic of such-and-such traits ... 
The elements of such an interpretation, without our
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being aware of it, are already present in language - 
for instance, in such moulds as the notion of thing- 
hood, of causality, of number, or again in the way 
we render colour, etc.190
And in broad terms he draws out the general points he is making, 
which are that language supplies us with a means of comprehending 
and categorizing, and that different languages categorize 
differently. So, he asks and replies:
Does this not throw a light on what constitutes the 
noticing of facts? I would not dream for a moment 
of saying that I invent them; I might, however, be 
unable to perceive them if I had not certain moulds 
of comprehension ready at hand. These forms I 
borrow from language. Language, then, contributes 
tp_.the._-.C2rma.tion_ and_ participates, in the const it utipn 
of a fact; which, of course, does not mean that it 
produces the fact .191
When it was said, therefore, that reference is to be had 
to standard conception epistemology, it was not unreformed 
cognitivist epistemology that was in mind. The kind of epistemo- 
logy argued for is one in which God is a reality for the believer, 
but what this means is understood with regard to the ways in 
which language supplies us with possibilities of comprehending 
and categorising differently, that is, in High's terms, of how 
we "indwell" language as we learn how-to-go-on in a form of life.
When the unbeliever says that God does not exist, and the 
believer says that God exists, it is taken that they do not 
straightforwardly contradict each other, but participate in 
differing ways of allowing facts to arise, facts which are 
contrary to each other in that the forms of life are contrary to 
each other. Specifically, the facts of classical theism are those 
which arise from the commitment to "draw the lines" by "putting 
one's signature" to the use in religion of interpersonal language, 
that commitment being made by becoming a worshipping participant 
in the community-of-use of that language. The question is,
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therefore, as to the shape of theodicy in a community like that.
E - IlLJ^.at_S.??>_se_ I_s__ Phillips a Thepdicis_t?
Before closing this section, let us quickly clear away 
some misapprehensions that exist about Phillips and theodicy. 
Both Phillips and his opponents sometimes talk of his being an
opponent of theodicy. For example, in the places where Phillips
192 treats the problem of evil in any detail he says, on the one
hand, "I do not know what is meant by a solution to the problem
of evil. All I have tried to do is make clearer a religious
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view of evil", and on the other, "Theodicies are part of the
rationalism which I believe clouds our understanding of
194 
religious belief". And Hick says that he thinks Phillips
"rejects the very idea of a theodicy in the sense of a theory 
which seeks to show how the realities of suffering and wickedness
may be compatible with the existence of an all-powerful and
. . l 95 limitlessly loving God".
But Hick also writes:
Let us remember at this point what a theodicy is. 
It consists in a 'picture' of the universe or a 
hypothesis about the nature of the universe, a 
hypothesis or 'picture* in which evil can be seen 
as ultimately serving a good and justifying purpose. 
The interest of such a 'picture 1 largely depends, I 
would suggest, upon its connection with an actual 
living tradition of religious faith, rather than 
being a mere ad hoc invention of philosophers ... 
What we are asking is whether there are resources 
within that faith for meeting the problem of evil. 1 96
Now, if one ceases to identify "theodicy" with "standard 
conception theodicy", and ceases to talk in terms of "justifying" 
evil by showing that it has an ultimate purpose, and instead 
talks without prejudice about theodicy as asking, as Hick latterly
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suggests, whether there are resources within the internal 
structures of belief for handling or meeting the problematic 
fact of evil, then Phillips is equally a theodicist, but in a 
different tradition of epistemology. His writing is precisely 
to do with the resources of belief, in the view that it takes, 
or in Hick's former terms, with the "picture" that holds within 
an actual living religious tradition. The dispute then is about 
whether or not the "picture" has the role of a hypothesis or not 
and not whether Phillips is a theodicist or not.
Section Four
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Section Four; Religious Theodicy; _The Believer's Problem of
Evil
A. Introduction
Let us now consider the shape of descriptive theodicy, 
the task being to offer an understanding of Christian belief 
held in a frequently hostile world, such belief having as a 
matter of "grammar" an absolute character. How is it within
classical Christian theism - a theism which commits itself
2 3to "drawing the lines" by using the interpersonal model of
theological language, and which does not see that language as
being self-referring - that believers claim they are "able-to-
4 go-on" without incoherence with regard to God and evil? To
answer this question some clarification of how theodicy relates 
to interpersonal theology is required. To achieve this 
clarification let us proceed by the indirect route of hazarding 
a theodicy, the critique of which brings us to a point where 
we can use the arguments developed above. Then, secondly, 
let us develop proposals for a "Religious Theodicy". Thus, 
two attempts are made, one "instructional", the other 
"substantive", to relate theodicy to the interpersonal language 
through which believers "indwell" their belief. In the first, 
a return is made to Kaufman's suggestion that the experience of 
"transcendence" in interpersonal relationships is at the base of 
classical Christian theism, and a descriptive theodicy is 
detailed which builds on this experience as the main operative 
consideration. But the critique which follows finds formidable 
objections to supposing this theodicy would be of interest to 
worshippers. The role of interpersonal language in theology is, 
therefore, looked at again, and a second and full attempt is
184
made, in the light of lessons learned, to describe the believer's 
view of evil.
B. Negative Experiences and Interpersonal Existence
1. First attempted theodicy
"Consider first", the theodicist might say, "what it is we 
believers are doing when we use the language of interpersonal 
transcendence in theology. We are referring for our theological 
understanding to our experience in interpersonal relationships 
of that which is beyond our power of access unless there is a 
giving from the other person. Now, it is part of what it means 
to be a person-in-relationship that there are boundaries within 
which 'I am 1 and boundaries within which 'he is'. To lack such 
boundaries is to cease from being a person. But what are the 
means by which persons relate and get to know about other 
people? Partly by activity and exploration - but such knowledge 
treats the other as an object in the world and by no means 
exhausts personal knowledge. To get to know the other person 
he must reveal himself to us. That lies within his power, and 
it is a gift. And reciprocally. Think now of the reverse 
side of this gift - what is it to receive such personal revela- 
tion? It is to have one's consciousness changed at the will 
of the other. We have to receive what is given or to reject 
it as false - but in either case we have been changed, not 
at our will. We have progressed in knowledge, but not on 
our own terms. Furthermore, it is possible for the other 
person to resist, and to impart nothing of himself at all, or a 
little, or misleadingly. There lies in the structure of
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personal relationships therefore not only, as Kaufman argues, 
an awareness of transcendence that can serve as a basis for 
talk about 'theos'' (theology), but also a basis for talk of that 
which can stand over against us and resist us (theodicy). There 
is nothing wrong of course in this double aspect to personal 
transcendence, it is simply the way things must be for there to 
be personal relationships at all. Ideal personal relationships 
do not consist of the abolition of this 'standing over against 
each other', or of the right of each person to privacy, but 
consist of a way of using these structures of personal relation- 
ship. But do ideal personal relationships require logically or 
actually that people yield up themselves at the request of 
others in all circumstances? Clearly not, for that would be to 
frustrate the rights of persons to become themselves, and not to 
be at the automatic behest of others. There are, therefore, to 
be discerned lying within the structures of even perfect 
personal relationships, occasions for disappointment. I want 
the other to give of himself; he does not, for proper reasons 
of his own,wish to give. That is his prerogative as a person; 
my fate is to be disappointed".
"But", it might be objected to this theodicist, "would 
it not be possible to eliminate from experience such feelings 
as disappointment?" "No", it would be replied, "that could 
not be done if personal relationships are to be loving. On 
the principle of falsiflability, for love to be anything, one 
must know what the negation of love amounts to. Whatever that 
negation amounts to, it could not be regarded as a good 
experience. There is written into the structure of personal 
relationships, therefore, the possibility of resistance; from
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resistance to love flows disappointment; and one thus begins 
to talk in terms of suffering. It cannot be otherwise in a 
world of loving persons in relationship". "But", the protest 
might be, should there not be a pause here to debate whether we
could imagine persons and personal relationships of a quite
9 different structure?" "No", would be the reply. "That is
simply playing with words, for then, precisely, one would not 
be talking about people but about something else". "But", it 
may be further objected, "is there not a big jump from talking 
about disappointment to talking about suffering"? "No", would 
be the answer, "it is not a jump, but an inescapable consequence 
of being persons-in-relationship, and for the following kinds 
of reasons".
"It is part of being persons in this world, or in any 
finite world, that omniscience is incompatible with personhood, 
on the ground that to be a person is individually to have a 
consciousness that is unique (exclude here for the moment what 
is meant by saying God is omniscient, as that specifically does 
not concern finite persons). But to be a finite person is also 
to be physically separate. And it is also to live in relation- 
ship. But again, it follows, taking the idea of ideal relation- 
ships, these cannot be apart from separations. Such separations 
of persons-in-relationship may be geographical, or may be those 
of death, or may be those of goals. Now in terms of goals in 
life, to be a language-user is to be capable of setting one's 
own interpretations of the way the "lines' are properly to be 
drawn (Waismann). To be a person is, therefore, to be able to 
draw the lines in one's own way, with the consequence that goals 
vary between people. But could there be any mechanism for 
ensuring all goals are compatible? To suppose that would entail
187
re-introducing omniscience, and omnipotence too, for not only 
would there need to be complete awareness by all persons of all 
goals, but the power to bring all goals into accord. But 
omnipotence also is incompatible with the notion of being a 
finite person. To be persons-in-relation, then, is to be in a 
structure of relationships that include not only disappointment 
and separation but also frustration". "But", says the objector, 
"frustration can lead eventually to deeper relationships, and 
absence makes the heart grow fonder, and so on". "That", 
replies the theodicist, "does not in the slightest contradict 
the point being made - it only shows it is not the only point 
to be made".
"But", the objector presses further, "is it not the nature 
of love to overcome just such things as disappointment, 
separation, and frustration?" "Perhaps", says this theodicist, 
"but, in overcoming, love admits of their existence. And, in 
any case, there are things to be said about the nature of love 
also. It is being taken for granted that to be a person is 
necessarily to exist in relationships, and also that ideal 
relationships are fully loving. What does it mean to say 
that? It means that each person is not willing to exert his 
own power, for his own benefit, if it is to the hurt of others. 
But to talk in this way of self-restraint is to talk of self- 
denial and renunciation, and perhaps one may categorise all 
such acts of love as being sacrificial in structure; but only 
to the point where the mutual renunciations hold persons in 
equality of esteem. Take, for example, the relationships that 
hold in marriage. To be married on the basis of love is 
mutually to renounce the right to live as before, and is to 
withdraw one's power to dispose of one's life and resources at
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one's own will. And to bring children into being out of love 
is a joint renunciation by a couple in a similar way. Room 
for a child to exist as a person involves a withdrawing from 
that social "space 1 that is needed for the child. Deformed 
parent-child relationships occur where this withdrawing does 
not take place. Similarly, the emergence of the child as a 
person is the process of learning to withdraw from egocentricity 
- the assertion of self, regardless". "But", it might be 
objected, "such parent-child relationships are joyful, not 
sorrowful". "That", says this theodicist, 'confuses a description 
of the structure of personal relationships with a description of 
how we behave as people. One can rejoice in exercising what 
it is to be a person, and willingly and happily participate in 
sacrificial love, without there being any significance in the 
joy and the happiness with regard to it being sacrificial love". 
"Think now," continues this theodicist,"of the separation 
of people through death which was mentioned just now. Clearly 
death and suffering are synonymous. But, let us ask, is death 
a contingent, though unfortunate, circumstance for people, or 
is it intrinsic to being personal? Now, the idea of *Heaven' 
has something to do with the idea of deathless and suffering- 
free persons in traditional language, but D.Z. Phillips has
12 
shown serious problems with such an idea. He rejects the
idea that the pattern of personal relationships we know on earth 
can be conceived to continue in the afterlife, as the pattern 
of such relationships depends on the context of this earth. He 
writes, therefore:
The life which is said to exist after death is said 
to be beyond all change. Yet all the relationships 
we have mentioned depend upon change for their very 
meaning. Mortality is not a limitation in human
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relationships. On the contrary, it is a precondition 
of their being the kind of relationships they are.13
For a believer like Phillips, who doesn't think of heaven 
traditionally, therefore, death is clearly a negative experience 
as it is the final separation. But, of course, if conversely
one argues as Hick does for personal development through many
14 lives, then many deaths become intrinsic to personal existence.
And even in strictly traditional terms, heaven cannot be attained 
before the parousia except through death".
"Link to this", the theodicist continues, "that in the 
process of being-a-person is involved the becoming that inheres 
in any process that has growth. But in personal growth there 
is the awareness of that which is being left behind as immature, 
or alternatively as that which lies ahead as decline. Either 
way, we constantly leave behind what we are, in a constant 
process of separation. Not for nothing do we talk of growing 
pains, and rise and fall, etc. Again, to forestall an objection, 
that is not to say we do not reach out for the future and live 
in hope and have happy memories. Those also have to do with 
our affirmation of the fact that, we are, rather than being a 
comment on the structures of personal existence".
"But", it might be objected instead, "what of suffering 
not linked to relationships? What of pain? Could we not be 
people without pain?"
"Firstly", it might be replied by this theodicist, "all 
of the foregoing bring pain in the psychological sense. But 
mental pain is also entailed in being a finite person. One 
should not think here of the mental aspects of psychological 
pain, though these are not irrelevant. What is in mind is the 
structure of critical reason. To exercise critical reason is to
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hold all one's present thoughts, views, and intentions, 
tentatively, and subject to revision, and this revision occurs 
by the negation of aspects of our present thoughts, either 
absolutely (they are wrong in part or whole), or relatively 
(they are in need of re-ordering or supplementation). Such 
negations occur because of the inadequacy of our present 
thoughts, and come about either by argument within oneself, or 
by force of what comes from beyond ourselves, and in both cases 
they can be understood as experiences of that which stands over 
against us, and transcends us. But to achieve this progress 
on the grounds of internal debate is to be aware of division 
within, and internal struggle. To achieve it on the grounds of 
what comes from without is to yield to the resistance of reality 
to our understandings. These things would, again, be true in 
ideal circumstances. Critical reason entails mental suffering. 
Again", it would be argued, "the joy of study, the wonder at 
discovery, the thrill of revelation do not contradict the 
structure within which such rewarding experiences occur. They 
are the joy and wonder and thrill that attaches to being a 
person, not an understanding of the nature of persons as 
thinking people".
"But", presses the objecter, "what of physical pain"? 
This theodicist might here refer in reply to the description 
of the necessities of any physical order presented by Austin 
Farrer. Thus, he might say, "To be anything at all in a 
finite creation is for that thing to be, and for it to be in its 
own terms. Everything is a fine thing in itself. The problem 
occurs over things being in relation, and, it might be added, 
from the fact that things do not possess personal attributes
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such as imagination and love. It is entirely proper for anything 
to exist if it exists. But, within that properness, there is 
entailed in any finite creation inevitable physical suffering, 
for to say that it is proper for anything to exist that does 
exist, is also to say that it is proper for it to exist in its 
own terms, regardless". "But that argument does not apply to 
persons", it might be countered, "for persons do not exist in 
creation in the same way as things. Having imagination and 
love, and being set in a web of personal relationships, persons 
cannot exist regardless. Insofar as they do they are ceasing to 
exist as persons and exist as things". "Quite so", the 
theodicist replies, "and therein lies the link between pain and 
suffering, for persons are subject to the nature of their 
physical bodies as things in the world, and therefore are 
subject to the factors just mentioned, only they also suffer 
through having imagination and love. Even for persons, there- 
fore, physical pain, and the whole struggle in nature, are 
inescapable aspects of what it is, along with other things, 
properly to be a thing. Being a person simply adds a further 
dimension to that suffering".
"But", it might be objected, "could there not be less 
pain"? "That", it would be replied, "is an odd question. It 
can either mean, could we be less aware of pain, or, could there 
be less instances of pain. The answer to both of those 
questions is obviously, yes. There would be less instances of 
pain if there were fewer things, for example. And there could 
be less awareness of pain if we used anaesthetics on a daily 
basis. Or even no pain at all if the total lack of this form of 
awareness of sentient beings to their environment were thought
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not to amount to a contradiction of personal existence. But 
what kind of an answer would you take it to be if it were said 
there could be less pain if we had less imagination? Or less 
love? For example, the pain of child-bearing is not unrelated 
to being loving and imaginative persons. To be more sensitive 
as persons might be to increase the amount of pain, so perhaps 
the question might be as to whether there should not be more
1 o
pain? And what kind of judgement is it to say there should 
be fewer things? How does one weigh the existence of a thing 
against its right to assert its existence? Such judgements are 
the lot in a finite creation of those things that are also 
persons. As persons there is entailed the responsibility of 
using one's imagination and love on behalf of impersonal 
creation. But this is done, even ideally, without omniscience 
and omnipotence, necessarily. Such a responsibility, therefore, 
will also be the occasion for suffering, as it is to have God's 
responsibilities without God's nature. That is why we talk, 
in terms of this responsibility, of having to make agonising 
decisions".
The argument of this theodicist would be, therefore, by 
describing in a direct way the nature of interpersonal relation- 
ships, that an ideal world in which there are people is a world 
in which there is necessarily negativity - and that, as it is 
not a limitation on God's part not to be able to do what cannot 
be done, the believer can confidently believe in the absolute 
power and goodness of God. The inescapable structures of
negativity are, for people, the occasion of the sufferings
19 
associated with being both a person and a thing. This would
not be to say that negativity culminates in suffering, though 
that could be the case, but rather that when one talks of
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persons one talks of those who are subject for their personhood 
to a way of existing that entails negativities in the psycho- 
logical, mental, and physical dimensions, and, in that persons 
have love and imagination, such negativities make them persons 
who suffer. Further, as it is entailed in being a person that 
one is in relationship with other persons, social suffering is 
entailed too, for we relate together as people in community 
in terms that derive from the structure of personhood.
"But", the objecter might reply, "in general terms, if 
this theodicy is right, it means that interpersonal theology 
has fatalistic implications, for it appears God has no choices 
- as a loving God he needs roust create, and create those who are 
persons who can love in return. But as persons they needs must 
suffer." To this objection, our theodicist could reply that 
such is not the case, for a distinction can be drawn between 
suffering which we cannot end, because it lies within the 
basis of our possibility as persons, and instances of suffering 
which we can end. He might have appeal for a parallel to the 
notion of Kant that it is the nature of experiencing beings to 
think, and to think within certain structures, yet without any 
necessity being implied that those beings think any particular 
thoughts. "Just so", this theodicist might say, "it is necessary 
as persons to suffer, but not to suffer any particular case. 
Indeed, imagination and love precisely allow people to combat 
the need to suffer this or that, and to strive against all 
instances of suffering - though as persons they wilJL suffer 
within the dimensions claimed, even in an ideal world". It is 
then, this theodicist would say, a question of realism, not 
fatalism, for both people and God remain free to act in relation
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to the given structures of personal existence. 
2. Cr_itique of_jfirst .attempted theodicy
What is one to make of such a theodicy? By that I mean, 
not how convincing it is within the terms of standard theodicy, 
but how truly it represents the patterns of thought believers 
as adoring worshippers entertain when they speak of the God 
whom they worship, and of whom they think in absolute terms, 
and in relation to whom they speak within the model of inter- 
personal transcendence?
The first point to be made is that, although this theodicy 
is thoroughly interpersonal, in seeking to understand inter- 
personal talk in Christian theology it in fact tries to proceed 
from the world to God, and in so doing brings talk of God under 
the presiding influence of the structures of actual finite 
interpersonal relationships. What God can and cannot do (his 
power) is determined by what is in fact the case, and which is 
claimed to be necessarily the case, even in ideal circumstances. 
The adoring worshipper, however, in his praise and adoration, 
attributes power to God absolutely, as study of the praise and 
adoration sections in hymnbooks will quickly show. The themes 
there are consistently the celebration of such statements as: 
"With God all things are possible" (Matt 19:26); "I know that 
thou canst do everything" (Job 42:2); "Is anything too hard for 
the Lord?" (Gen 18:14). Now, the meaning of such utterances 
may need careful attention, and perhaps this attention needs 
to have reference to their celebration in the setting of 
worshipful practice, but the fact remains that the adoring 
worshipper (unlike the philosopher or this theodicist) 
expresses himself, and must express himself, without qualifica- 
tion when speaking of God - and yet he does not thereby see
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himself as guilty of hyperbole. That must be taken into account 
in a descriptive understanding of belief. But if one asks the 
question,"What, according to this theodicy, is the role in the 
believer's "picture" of such unqualified praise?"^ no answer 
can be given. But what kind of theodicy is it that cannot 
offer an understanding of the believer's praise?
The second point is that the above description of inter- 
personal relations would hold whether or not God is taken into 
account. It is in effect a non-theistic analysis. God, as it 
were, has to be accombdated by the theist who uses such an 
approach to the shape of this world's structures - if God, that 
is, is to be allowed a place at all. However, the theistic 
claim itself then becomes a matter for argument with the 
unbeliever, and the non-hypothetical character of religious 
belief is thus lost. But,for the believer, God cannot at all 
be left out of account, or made of subsidiary account, or given 
a "possible" and hypothetical role, for God is the one in 
relation to whom all things are held in account. This theodicy 
is not therefore true to the believer's "picture", for it makes 
God a contingency, a perhaps. Matters can be explained without 
him.
Thirdly, this theodicy cannot provide in its own terms 
any notion of the p_ur_p_qse of the existence of people. But the 
purposes of God are paramount to the worshipper. Now, talk of 
purpose here is not purpose as, say, in Hick's theodicy where 
it has the sense of calculated matching by God of means to ends. 
The believer sees purpose in terms of his duty to praise God - 
for does not the believer say the chief end of man is to be to 
the praise of God's glory? This dutiful purpose is well caught
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by Horatius Bonar (1808-89):
Fill Thou my life, 0 Lord my God, 
In every part with praise, 
That my whole being may proclaim 
Thy being and Thy ways.
Fill every part of me with praise: 
Let all my being speak 
Of Thee and of Thy love, 0 Lord, 
Poor though I be and weak.
So shalt Thou, Lord, from me, e'en me,
Receive the glory due;
And so shall I begin on earth
The song for ever new.
So shall each fear, each fret, each care,
Be turned into song;
And every winding of the way
The echo shall prolong.
The fourth point is that, for the adoring worshipper, 
the first in order of transcending relationships that hold in 
his or her life is, as was noted in section three, that of God 
as Father. Now it was shown in discussing Phillips 1 theology 
that when believers talk of God in personal terms (that is, 
within the interpersonal model of theological language) it is 
not a straightforward matter, for the believer's life with God 
as Father has to do with dying to the "world-historical" and 
its "everyday" relationships, and becoming alive to what 
contrasts with those relationships, that is, becoming alive to 
the "eternal". The believer therefore, unlike this theodicist, 
brings order to whatever is the case, the order involved in 
the exercise of love and praise. But to do this is to fix one's
attention on the fact tha_t people are, that the world is, not
20 how they are, and to give thanks. Again, therefore, if there
is a necessity of which the believer as believer is aware, it 
is not the necessity to justify God but the necessity to do his 
religious duty, which duty comprises "Giving thanks always for
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all things unto God and the Father in the name of our Lord 
Jesus Christ". (Eph 5:20).
The fifth point is that there is lying within this theodicy 
a form of the distinction between moral and physical evil which 
was found in earlier argument to be a false move in theodicy. 
The distinction between persons and things may be seen to be 
the basis for a restatement of the old distinction in a new 
guise. There is still a need, therefore, to find a way of 
handling "negativity" without succumbing to the confusions 
previously identified.
The sixth point is that although the theodicy is 
descriptive in the sense of describing the shape of actual human 
relationships, the intent ion is justificatory - not in the 
strong sense of showing that evil has a good and justifying 
purpose, but in the weak sense of seeking to prove that God 
is not to be blamed for what cannot be helped. It retains, 
therefore, an element of apologetic. Perhaps it will be found 
that this situation is an irremovable element of saying any- 
thing at all in this area - but it is worth trying again to 
offer a description of belief which simply intends to understand 
how a believer lives happily with his God in a frequently 
hostile world, and without any intention of seeking to"convince" 
anyone about God in the face of evil.
It would appear, then, that the believer as believer 
does not need logically or psychologically the kind of theodicy
outlined above, for it is outside his interests and intentions.
21 As Phillips said of Swinburne's theodicy, it is an example
of the rationalism which clouds our understanding of religious 
beii ef.
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3. The _Rolg__of Personal Language in Chr i s t ian Theism 
Now it is possible, in the light of this critique, to 
take Kaufman's basic idea of interpersonal theology, and to 
use it rather differently in order to come to an understanding 
of what the believer is doing when he uses the interpersonal 
language model to talk of God. Again, let us refer back to 
Phillips 1 account of the way in which religious language stands 
over against "world-historical" use. God is a person in the 
language of classical theism, yet he is omniscient, omnipotent, 
omnipresent, omnibenevolent, eternal, and infinite. Further, 
God is not a language-user. So in what sense does the believer 
refer to God as a person? As Phillips says, "What eludes us
is the grammar of the concept; we find it difficult to give
22 
an account of it". Perhaps we can say, first, that God, as
absolute, is absolutely that which stands over against all 
things. But secondly, that one way of talking about such a
God is by holding what we know of persons-in-relationship before
23 God absolutely. Persons are known in revelatory relationship;
God can only be known in revelatory relationship. People are 
separate; God is wholly other. Persons can resist giving of 
themselves, but may do so as a gift; God can have no demands 
laid on him, so his gift of himself is the pure gift of grace, 
always available. In love persons withdraw their rights as 
things to assert themselves, but act in sacrificial love; God 
is love. People are temporal; God is eternal. And so on.
But believers, whilst wishing to assert such beliefs, 
also talk somewhat differently. They talk in some senses as 
though God were one of us. Clearly, there is a need to 
distinguish what believers say from what they mean in what
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they say, for they do not mean simply to contradict themselves; 
that is, one must look to the role that what they say about God 
as a person has in the structures of their belief. The question 
concerning the use of the interpersonal model in Christian
theism is, therefore, one as to the function that language has
24 in the community that chooses it as its form of expression.
Let us take a particularly hard example of the use of 
personal language by believers, and ask this time, not about 
man's sufferings, but whether God suffers. To be noted straight- 
away is that this is a matter of controversy in Christian
belief, though certainly the view that has predominated is that
25 God cannot suffer. Now, how should the descriptive theodicist
approach this dispute? My suggestion is that if one takes the 
approach just suggested of looking for the role of what is 
said, that the issue here is seen not to be one of whether God, 
as the reality who is worshipped, suffers, but what it means 
in the language of worship to use the vocabulary of personal 
suffering in relation to the God worshipped. When put this way, 
it becomes possible to see that the traditional reluctance of 
theologians to talk of God suffering was both right and wrong. 
It was right in that they were sensitive to the inappropriateness 
of attributing directly descriptive statements of suffering to 
the God worshipped, but wrong in that they thought this was 
because they could say he actually didn't suffer. If one 
looks, however, at the role talk of God suffering plays in the 
structures of Christian belief, it is by no means apparent 
that, as part of the use of the interpersonal model of theology, 
it is inappropriate for the believer to hold his suffering 
absolutely before God (in the way noted above in relation to 
other aspects of experience). Indeed, I would go further, and
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say that arguments to be made later show the "grammar" of 
Christian worship assumes God and suffering need to be spoken 
of together if the shape of Christian belief held in a world 
that contains evil is to be understood.
It might be objected that what has just been suggested 
is merely definitional, and that the issue of whether God 
suffers cannot be lost in a manoeuvre which locates in a model 
a matter that resides in the experience of God. But that is 
precisely the point. As High showed in his discussion of
o/r
meaning, man's intellectual beliefs and linguistic performances 
are "indwelt" by man as he acts in patterns of language-use as 
a language-user who knows "how-to-go-on". Language has life 
in being used happily, and it is in this context questions 
of language and reality should be approached. By refusing to 
separate man, language, and reality, one is stressing that 
there is an inseparable bond between the language models man 
uses and the "available" God. For man to talk of God as a 
person at all, then, is for man to talk in language grounded 
in ourselves in interpersonal relationships. Is it inappropriate, 
in that case, for man's suffering to "indwell" that language, 
too? The question, approached in this way, is not then the 
empirical one of whether God suffers, but the philosophical 
one of what it means in Christian belief to use the interpersonal 
language model in relation to God. This cannot be a straightfor- 
ward matter in terms of "surface" grammar traditionally understood, 
for reasons already stated. There is a need, therefore, in seek- 
ing to understand the language of persons in Christian belief, to 
attempt to describe the depth grammar by which the Christian 
worshipper holds God and suffering together. S.P. Schilling
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27 in his God and Human Anguish contrasts the points to be
accounted for thus: God is spoken of as, on the one hand, 
transcendent, immutable, blessed in his perfection, and 
worshipworthy, and on the other, as becoming man, near as well 
as other, essentially love, and vulnerable to suffering. 
Schilling rejects the idea that in Christian belief God the Son 
provides no clues as to the Father named in the creeds as the
Tp
creator. My response to Schilling's pertinent remark is to 
attempt shortly a revised account of how it is the believer 
relates God and evil together through interpersonal language, 
an account made in the light of the role played by God the Son 
in the worship of the Christian community which sees itself as 
the family of those forgiven by God their Father.
4. Getting to Know God as a Person
It follows from what has just been said that what one 
understands by getting to know God as a person (i.e., becoming 
a worshipper) will differ from what it is to get to know other 
persons. Getting to know God amounts to two acts. First, 
coming to see oneself as a person before God. Second, coming 
to use Christian interpersonal language to say what it means to 
stand before God. But how does one come to make these acts? 
How does one come into the community of those for whom Christian 
beliefs are true and God is real? Is it not by believing the 
testimony of those who already know God as a person and who 
live before God and who structure the meaning of life in what 
it means to worship that God? But why should anyone believe 
their testimony, and worship God? Not, it would seem, for 
reasons, for the worshipper cannot say, "0 God, I believe in you 
for the following reasons". The person who gets to know God
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affirms he wishes to be the sort of person who believes God too, 
and affirms that he wishes to live, as the believer does, before 
God. Having made this move, life in this world is then judged 
in the light of what it means as a worshipper to use personal 
language of God, that is, in the light of what it means to 
know God.
Religious belief, then, has to do with what it is to be 
a person who has made the two acts above, that is, with what it 
means to participate in the believing community. It is the 
assertion that, on the basis of believing personal testimony, 
that is, believing the persons whose testimony it is, one's 
"meanings" will be from God. In sum, to join the Christian 
community is to become a worshipper; to become a worshipper 
is to come to love God through the use of the language of 
personal praise; to come to love God through the use of 
personal praise is to come to know God; to come to know God is 
to live before him as one who views everything in the light of 
the eternal. The believer, therefore, comes from God to the 
world, but not inferentially.
There is a broader point here. Let us refer to G.E.M.
Anscombe's argument that "believing someone" is a neglected topic
29 in philosophy, and that imparticular "believing God" has been
distorted into "believing in God". She claims that to under- 
stand what it is to believe someone
is important not only for theology and for the 
philosophy of religion. It is also of huge import- 
ance for the theory of knowledge. The greater part 
of our knowledge of reality rests upon the belief 
that we repose in things we have been taught and 
told. Hume thought that the idea of cause-and- 
effect was the bridge enabling us to reach any 
idea of a world beyond personal experience. He 
wanted to subsume belief in testimony under belief 
in causes and effects, or at least to class them
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together as examples of the same form of belief. 
We believe in a cause, he thought, because we 
perceive the effect and cause and effect have been 
found always to go together. Similarly we believe 
in the truth of testimony because we perceive the 
testimony and we have (well 1, often have) found 
testimony and truth to go together! The view needs 
only to be stated to be promptly rejected. It was 
always absurd, and the mystery is how Hume could 
ever had entertained it. We must acknowledge 
testimony as giving us our larger world in no smaller 
degree, or even in a greater degree, than the 
relation of cause and effect; and believing it is 
quite dissimilar in structure from belief in causes 
and effects. Nor is what testimony gives us entirely 
a detachable part, like the thick fringe of fat on 
a chunk of steak. It is more like the flecks and 
streaks of fat that are often distributed through 
good meat; though there are lumps of pure fat as 
well. 30
But how does Anscombe's point link with the previous? 
Through what she says about testimony. Now, we have seen that 
getting to know God as a person is coming to know-how-to-go-on 
in using interpersonal language of God as a result of believing 
the testimony of the community whose reality is thus expressed. 
It is coming to say "_!-can-go-on" through believing the testimony 
of others who say "I_-can-go-on" (or in community terms, "We-can- 
go-on"). If, however, as Anscombe says, believing testimony is 
"quite dissimilar in structure from belief in causes and 
effects", an attempt needs to be made to describe Christian 
belief in terms of that quite different structure. What is it 
for the worshipper to believe God on the basis of testimony? 
That, clearly, is a crucial question for descriptive theodicy.
c   Severest Negativity and Christ ian
1. Second Attempted Theodicy
My second attempt at understanding how believers (those 
who have come to know God) persist in their belief in a world
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that is frequently hostile, seeks to have reference to the
31 
richly nuanced totality of experience-thought-interpretation
which comprises the Christian religious "picture". The aim is 
to describe such "facts" -without destroying that rich totality 
by abstracting items of Christian vocabulary from their life- 
setting, which setting in the case of the Christian community
32 is crucially and paradigmatically located in worship. I am
now, therefore, concerned to bring to the centre of argument 
the claim that Christian theodicy must be judged by tests 
appropriate to understanding credal language. Put differently, 
the claim is that the rationality of Christian theodicy coincides 
with the rationality of Christian worship. Such rationality, 
it is argued, involves believing testimony, commitment to it as 
an interpretive perspective, and the basing of one's life on 
the "facts" as they arise within that perspective and as one 
learns how-to-go-on in it. By application, worship is the 
celebration in the Christian community of its reality thus 
established. This second theodicy is thus an attempt to give 
an account of negativity as it enters into the rationality, the 
"facts", the "reality", of the believing community as it proceeds 
from God to the world using the interpersonal model of theological 
language to express its beliefs. Let us see, therefore, if a 
description can be given of the Christian "picture" which will 
show the place within it of the severest case of negativity in 
human experience - for if the "picture" can contain the severest 
case it will hold for all lesser cases. First, then, the 
nature of this severest negativity is identified as "affliction". 
Next, it is shown, through a discussion of the shape of 
"Religious Theodicy", how it is that even "affliction" is not
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felt by believers to negate their belief. Thirdly, attention is 
turned to the place of negativity in Christian worship and 
theodicy by considering what is taken to be, for the worshipper, 
the severest "affliction" of all, the suffering of God in 
Christ.
2. Severest Negativity Identified as Affliction
a) Writers on theodicy often isolate some particular 
example or kind of negative experience as the crucial test for
the love of God. Dostoievski set this in the suffering of
34 innocent children, McCloskey points to the sheer extent of
evils, Campbell to continuous and intense pointless physical
O C. O ^7
pain, Roth to the horrors of the Holocaust experience, Hick
38 to the problem of "suffering".
b) Simone Weil, however, suggests that pain or any 
other single category, however intense and prolonged and wide- 
spread, is but one dimension of a more total and more serious 
condition that marks the limits of meaninglessness in man's
experience. To this condition she gives the name "malheur",
39 
which is standardly translated "affliction". She writes:
In the realm of suffering, affliction is something 
apart, specific and irreducible. It is quite a 
different thing from simple suffering. It takes 
possession of the soul and marks it through and 
through with its own particular mark, the mark of 
slavery.40
Affliction, the mark of slavery, she suggests has three 
dimensions - physical, psychological, and social. Pain can 
strike us in any of these dimensions, but when it comes in one 
dimension only it is both easier to overcome and to forget than 
if it involves all three together. "Affliction" enters into
our being in a total way, and is "the great enigma of human
41 life". It can seize the souls of even the innocent and possess
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42 them as their sovereign lord, and leaves its victims mute
(they have no words to express what is happening to them) and 
impotent (they are in no state to help anyone at all). Afflic- 
tion can make God appear absent for a time and for some, who in
43 this condition cease to love, God's absence becomes final.
Each of the dimensions - physical, psychological, social - is 
present, then, in the severe negative experience of "affliction", 
This is not simple suffering, however violent that may be, but 
the condition where one is left permanently scarred in one's 
existence in this world. Weil writes in terms of "an uprooting 
of life, a more or less attenuated equivalent of death", "a 
state of mind ... as acute as that of a condemned man who is 
forced to look for hours at the guillotine", "the event which 
has seized and uprooted a life^andfattacks it, directly or
indirectly, in all its parts", "something specific and impossible
44 to describe in any other terms". A pain, she says, that is
only physical does not scar the soul in this way, it does not 
leave the mark of a slave when it is past - though, on the
other hand, where there is no physical pain there is no afflic-
45 tion of the soul. Nor does purely psychological pain reach
the dimension of affliction, for psychological suffering that is
spared physical pain can be eliminated by a suitable adjustment
46 
of the mind. Nor is there really affliction in the social
dimension alone, and for the same kinds of reason. Social
degradation alone is not affliction, though it is an essential
47 part of it.
c) Now, it is not necessary to follow Weil through 
her particular applications of this idea to see she has made a 
suggestion of great usefulness and validity. Suffering in its
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severest form, that is affliction, is multidimensional and 
comprehends at once the whole way in which people exist in the 
world - the physical, the psychological, the social. Such 
suffering would indeed be a thing apart, and deserves a special
designation, and "affliction" seems particularly appropriate in
48 the light of the biblical uses of that word.
It is at this point that I now wish to push further the 
links between our negative experiences of the world and the 
shape of religious belief, for affliction focusses human 
apprehension of negativity in all its dimensions at once. The 
course of argument now seeks to show how Christian belief 
relates to negativity in general by showing how it relates to 
affliction specifically. How does the worshipper hold together, 
as realities^severest negativity - that is, affliction - and 
God, in his belief?
d) Let us introduce a second idea from Weil. She 
argues that to contemplate the world is to come to realise, "The
essential truth to be known concerning this universe is that it
49 is absolutely devoid of finality". This is a sharper way of
putting the points made earlier that it is not finally possible 
to ground fundamental criteria of evaluation in reasons, and 
that a feature of religious belief is that it locates such 
absolute criteria not in this world but in God. Alien talks 
of Weil's claim by using the word "void" for the position a 
person comes to when he or she realises the lack of finality 
in this world means he or she must refuse to treat the world as 
an object of desire if the relation to God is to be absolute. 
He writes, "... love for God begins not with the desire for 
God, and not with seeking God, but by withholding ourselves from
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all other things". And he also adds, "if we have withheld
ourselves, if we have acted so as to leave the void exposed,
52 then and only then does God have access".
I propose to change the use of Weil's word "devoid" and 
Alien's word "void" to refer not just to the lack of finality in 
this world, but also, in the light of affliction, to the mean- 
inglessness that is a corollary of affliction. For the one 
afflicted the world has become "void". He cannot ask for what 
purpose this affliction occurs, for in its own terms it can for 
him have no meaning.
e) There is one other comment to make. It is not 
being specified what actual instances in life are afflictions, 
apart from talking of Christ's affliction on the Cross. This 
is not a failure of concept, but a recognition that, for the 
believer, actual afflictions are placed in relation to his or 
her understanding of Christ's affliction. The believer's 
afflictions lie within the "picture", whereas Christ's 
affliction is part of what constitutes the believer's "picture," 
as will become clear in subsequent argument. To describe 
Christian belief, it is paramount to understand primarily the 
affliction of Christ. In understanding that, one is in a 
position to see how the believer moves towards the (structurally) 
less significant afflictions that occur elsewhere. But there is 
a methodological reason also within descriptive theodicy for 
not itemising afflictions. For the religious "picture" to have 
absolute status it must be able to accommodate the possibility 
of such a condition as affliction, whatever the actual form 
affliction might take. This is the hardest test for descriptive 
theodicy, for what is in mind is the end point of negativity,
209
whatever that possibly might be. To cite instances of affliction 
would be, methodologically, to limit the test. 
3. The Shape of Religious Theodicy
a) "Affliction" is, then, the severest apprehension 
of negativity in all human modes of existence at once. It is 
also the crucial test for religious theodicy, for it is the 
severest test of coherence in the believer's "picture".
b) But does the way things go not make any difference 
to the believer, even in the case of affliction? In general, 
answers to this testing question have been of two kinds. Some 
have said, "Yes, the way things go in this world is important 
to the believer because it is God's world, and therefore 
empirical data are important, indeed crucial, evidence of the 
nature of the governance of the world by God - and are, of 
course, the basis from which we can infer either his existence, 
or his nature, or his competence, or all three". Within this 
kind of response lies the shape of traditional discussions of 
the problem of evil.
In contrast, and despite some appearances to the contrary, 
the overwhelming response of the Christian community is 
ultimately and intrinsically, "No, it does not matter how things 
go in this world - though he slay me, yet will I trust him". 
It was the isolation of, and emphasis on, this facet of Christian 
belief that was the notable element in Flew's "Theology and 
Falsification". Noting the Christian believer was prepared to 
go to any lengths of qualification of his concepts in order not 
to abandon his belief in a personal God of love, Flew took the 
challenge to the Christian - if you do not really believe that 
it matters how things go, if you persist in believing "God is
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love" no matter what happens, then no circumstance can serve 
as a falsification of your belief, and therefore your statement, 
being compatible with all states of affairs, even contradictory 
ones, can have no meaning. Now the notion of "affliction" has 
just been set out as the severest negativity in human experience. 
If this, then, is not allowed by the believer to be a falsifica- 
tion of "God is love", what can the believer mean by such a 
claim? Flew's challenge can, therefore, be set definitively 
in this context. "Does affliction not make any difference to 
the believing community?"
c) What kinds of response are possible to Flew's 
challenge as philosophers make their input to the activity of
theodicy? Some seek to deny the validity of the falsification
54 principle itself. However, whatever the detailed arguments
on this, one thing remains the case - in a commonsense way it 
does seem an extra-ordinary thing to claim that "God is love", 
whatever happens. Flew has here voiced a central and long- 
avoided difficulty, and it should be faced. Other philosophical
responses have fallen into the cognitivist, non-cognitivist,
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and grammatical categories mentioned earlier. Cognitivist
theists agree that "God is love" asserts a "fact" and have 
sought to show that in some way it is falsifiable in principle, 
and therefore meaningful (and true). Non-cognitivists have 
claimed religious belief is not fact-asserting, and is therefore 
invulnerable to Flew's principle. The grammarians have argued 
the "facts" of religious belief belong to a different rationality 
from "physicality", and that such facts have meaning within 
their own rationality, which, again, is immune to falsiflability 
principles. Now, it has been argued above that in a descriptive
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philosophy one should leave everything where it is and seek to 
elucidate, understand,what is found, and that one should have 
reference to the whole context in which statements are made. 
Doing this leads one to make two observations. First, that Flew 
is indeed right in charging that it does not seem to matter 
ultimately to the Christian community, as a whole, how things go, 
even in cases of affliction. The second, however, is that for 
some believers it does seem to make a difference, for they lose 
their belief. The task, then, is to understand how this can be 
the case. Why does affliction matter to some, but not matter 
ultimately? In responding to this question, some of the 
implications of High's arguments concerning the nature of 
religious understanding need to be explored. Just how is it 
that the believing community says it "can-go-on" in the face of 
affliction? In tackling such issues, one will be investigating 
how it is the believing community resists Flew's further charge 
that it is confused, dishonest,or stubborn in persisting in its 
belief in the face of affliction.
d) My initial response to Flew is to make the point 
which is central to descriptive philosophy, and which is made 
by the grammarians especially, that it does philosophers no 
credit to attribute elementary and obvious blunders to whole 
communities. The moves made by the Christian community, as 
it uses interpersonal language as it stands before God, may not 
make sense on the particular criteria applied to them by the 
"normative" philosophical critic, but that does not mean they 
do not make sense within the framework within which they are 
made. It is a reply to Flew in itself that the power of Christian 
belief and practice for millions of intelligent people who have
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agonised over this question for hundreds of years cannot be 
gainsaid by a few lines of skilful academic logical analysis. 
After all, the essence of Flew's challenge actually predates 
Christianity and has been forcibly repeated regularly in its 
history, but -without apparently disturbing the persistence 
of belief. There must be an aspect of this Flew and his fellow 
arguers have missed, a perspective they have ignored - for the 
believing community, as a whole, faces the contradictions of 
life - more powerful by far than any intellectual contradictions 
- and still persists in believing and practising its faith, 
arguably with as much intellectual and moral rigour and 
integrity as Flew's. Their continuing witness is that they can 
say "happily" "God is love", and the way things go does not 
seem to be able to destroy this belief. It is the case, 
therefore, that affliction does not make any fundamental 
difference to the Christian community as a whole-
But perhaps we should re-phrase the challenge. Ought it 
not make a difference? I think not, for such a question 
implicitly assumes the stance of normative philosophy. In 
contrast, it is of the essence of descriptive philosophy that a 
system of belief, a persisting form of life, be taken as it is, 
in its givenness, and its rationality revealed. The "ought" 
question posed in this way is an external one, and supposes 
external criteria for correctness. What needs to be looked for 
are the internal criteria, the "grammar"of the system. It only 
"ought" to make a difference if the community of belief feels it 
ought to - but this is not the case, as the persistence of the 
community shows.
It may be objected that this approach prevents philosophers
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from commenting adversely on evil communities of belief (e.g. 
Nazism) - which must apparently be taken as they are - and 
also on erroneous beliefs in a community (e.g. belief in witches). 
Both of these objections are misunderstandings. The point is 
that anyone (not just the philosopher) may make religious and 
moral judgements, and it is just such a judgement which rejects 
or accepts Nazism as a "picture" of worthwhile human life - 
there is agreement or refusal to play that game. The philosopher 
is in no better case in that regard. And belief in witches is 
a mistake within a form of life - it is not a form of life, a 
"picture" in itself. Description can perhaps show its incoher- 
ence - but by reference to the internal criteria of the way of 
life in which such a belief is set. Certainly, one can make 
mistakes within "grammar", and one common mistake in belief is 
dealt with below, but to ask whether there ought to be this 
"grammar", this form of life, is a very odd philosophical 
question, as is such a guestion as "Ought there to be a world?", 
or "Ought I to exist?". The proper task for philosophy is to 
set out, with all the clarity that can be achieved, what it 
means for the world to be, for me to be. And, similarly, what 
it means for the believing community to be. Philosophical 
thought, then, may well reveal the nature of mistaken moves, and 
how moves are correctly made, but not whether there ought to be 
moves. Philosophy needs to be practised in relation to a form 
of life in the same way as science is practised in relation to 
the form of the world. Its task is to set out the nature of 
the given, not to decide whether it ought to be. This, of 
course, has consequences for philosophical methodology and makes 
its task descriptive. But as this point has been previously
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argued it is merely repeated here as forcible reiteration.
CT O
Logical analysis cannot exist outside of a system of rationality, 
and therefore the logical task is to clarify the nature of the 
rationality of the system through its own criteria. In the 
case of the Christian community of belief the way things go has 
not led to the quick and immediate demise of belief in a good 
God, nor to a slow and reluctant death by a thousand qualifica- 
tions. That is what needs explanation - but, given the arguments 
in this paragraph, such explanation will be an account of the 
rationality of belief, not an attempt to account for it.
Affliction, then, as the severest manifestation of the 
way things go, is simply not felt by the believing community, 
as it would be by Flew, as being an opposition to, a refutation 
of, their belief. It is incumbent on us, then, to listen 
sensitively to what it is that the believer is saying, and to 
describe it accurately. It has been argued already that to do
this one must sense what weight terms have in a language and
59 
not just their definition, and that this weight is felt in
experience - for the language of belief gains its meaning in 
the total life situation and this meaning is richly nuanced. 
The experience of affliction is "felt" within the unity of 
the community's experience-thought-interpretation, and is 
located in the "grammar" of belief by the role that it plays in 
that belief. As seen when discussing "evil", the term cannot 
without distortion be isolated or removed from that living 
context, and then opposed to it. Thus an advantage becomes 
apparent in thinking as Weil does in terms of dimensions of 
affliction, rather than in terms of precise definitions, when 
stating the problem of evil, for dimensions take us out into
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the life situations that are the location of the word in use in 
the community of belief. The significance of affliction in 
religious belief when approached descriptively is, then, the 
"weight" that it has in the "picture" of the religious community.
But, it may be objected, it seems to have been forgotten 
that it was admitted that there are some for whom affliction is 
precisely an experience that has been found crushing, and who 
have abandoned their belief in its face, and for whom it is 
correct to say that the way things have gone for them has been 
a factor in the loss of belief. For such people it is not 
philosophical analysis, but experience in life and within the 
believing community, which leads to loss of belief. Examination 
of this objection below reveals, however, that the connection 
between the way things go and loss of belief is by no means as 
simple as this way of putting it assumes.
e) Let us take it, then, that Flew's charge of lack 
of meaning in Christian concepts is premature. In that case, 
what kind of meaning can they have?
i) First, let us face the difficult, yet inescapable 
point that there is a necessary distinction to be drawn between 
"surface" and "depth" accounts of belief. It has just been 
suggested that the long-term historical persistence of a 
community of belief which is intellectually rigorous, and which 
aims for moral and spiritual integrity is itself a basic datum 
in the argument. The "surface" of the belief system of such an 
historical community may well, however, be culturally 
articulated, and contain thought forms which belong essentially 
to the contextual culture, that is, precisely, to the non-belief 
elements in that culture, or even to its a-belief elements. If
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this is granted - and apart from a particular and very high view 
of revelation as directly revealed and therefore context-free 
truth, I do not see how it could be denied - then "surface" 
accounts of a community of belief must be recognised and 
described in this light. Accurate philosophical description 
will reveal where it is that the non-belief/a-belief structures 
have penetrated the experience and expression of the community 
in this way, and it is in this context that one needs to under- 
stand the character of "mistakes" in the beliefs of a community. 
Descriptive philosophy will, however, wish to proceed in a 
markedly different way from philosophical analysis. In the 
latter, the procedure identifies "surface" and "depth": "Here 
according to our criteria is a 'mistake' ..... therefore here is 
a blunder". But philosophical description will proceed more 
cautiously and distinguish "surface" from "depth": "Here is a 
'mistake' - what is it that this community is trying to say by
a o
continuing to put it this way"? As Tertullian realised long 
ago, central difficulties in religious language are not to be 
taken woodenly, or at face value, a point powerfully reinforced
£- O
by I.T. Ramsey.
But to clarify what is "depth" and what "surface" in 
expressions of belief a criterion is needed for "depth". My 
contention here is an application of Phillips 1 claim concerning
the significance of worship in Christian belief. The depth
64 grammar of belief is to be found in the "grammar" of worship
exactly where a community of belief finds reality in its persist- 
ing historical experience of worship, exactly there is the true 
nature of that community revealed, and ipso facto, the criteria 
for the interpretation of experience are also to be found there.
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What a community does in the moment of adoring worship constitutes 
what it is. What it does in that constitutive activity is the 
"depth" of what it says. Now, it is inconceivable that a 
community can offer adoring worship, all that is involved in 
the language of praise, and at the same time have reservations 
as to the one adored, for adoring worship consists of the attribu- 
tion of absolute worth to the one adored, or else it is 
blasphemous. And this inconceivability is both logical and 
practical. Everything the community expresses must be in turn 
measured by this criterion of whether it could be held at the 
moment of adoring worship.
Now, if this is the case, the loss of belief experienced 
by individuals may be seen to have a rather different character 
from the description of it with which the objections came. There 
the assumption was made that the way things go in the world can 
for some individuals lead directly to a loss of belief. But in 
the light of present considerations, the situation needs to be 
described rather differently:
ii) Believers are members of a community which in 
adoring worship expresses its unqualified devotion to God, and 
this adoring worship provides the depth criteria for the 
community's interpretation of the way things go. But this 
worship is given because that community has committed itself to 
a testimony, a testimony which marks the beginning for their 
conceptualisation. Believing that testimony marks a new 
discovery which, for that community, becomes the basis of 
reality - it is a fundamental discovery which is constitutive, 
in that it gives that community its epistemological perspective, 
and regulative, in that what can and what cannot be said
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("grammar") flows from it. Expressed differently, there is in 
this totality of experience-thought-interpretation a commitment 
to a particular epistemological "direction" for saying what is 
and is not the case. As this testimony has these functions it 
becomes for that community the bedrock in the cognitive domain. 
It provides both the origins and the framework within which 
experience arises and new experiences are interpreted. There 
is no breaking this richly nuanced totality of experience-thought- 
interpretation which is bound up in a commitment to a particular 
testimony. All that flows from this totality is depth belief.
But, what is meant by talking of an epistemological 
"direction"? Can epistemology have a direction? Perhaps this 
can be clarified by referring to the difficulties Sherry raises 
when seeking to understand what the connections might be between 
Phillips 1 "pictures", why people should want to live with such 
"pictures1^ , and what the ontological status of the entities 
depicted in them is supposed to be. Now, Sherry recognises 
that within the "pictures" there is a direction of implications 
which spells out the meaning of the"pictures":
... the form of life of one who lives with such 
pictures involves many different responses, but 
especially that of worship. This will include 
both fear and love, for these are the appropriate 
responses to the unseen judge who is also infinite 
love. Conversely, the response of worship demands 
an appropriate objectj there is a logical and 
religious requirement that the objects of worship 
be supremely holy and good, for otherwise worship 
would become idolatry. If we could show that 
perfection entails transcendence, we could 
construct a logical chain as follows:
worship  > holiness  *  perfection  ^ transcendence.
One could go quite a way along this path, but I 
think that its limitations are already plain ... 
is there actually anything that is truly 
worshipful?67
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His answer is that there are two routes which might provide the 
substance required. One is natural theology, and he cites 
Malcolm and Aquinas as examples of those who have tried this 
route. The other is that "we might look for features in men's 
experience of the world which lead them into the form of life 
called worshipping transcendent being ... This is surely one of 
those cases when men's responses are dependent on facts about the
c o
world ..." Sherry seems to have in mind here that the 
worshipworthiness of God would be something that was deduced 
from the facts. So, for example, experiences of the mystical 
or the numinous could be instanced as reasons for belief, as 
also might be meditation on the life of Christ - the object 
of the exercise being, Sherry says "to point to some element in 
our experience which we consider to be a manifestation of a 
transcendent being". He concludes:
... the possibility and utility of certain language- 
games and forms of life depend on facts about the 
world.71
However, Sherry is then faced with the difficulty of how
the "facts" in the "pictures" relate to the "facts" in the
72 
world, and he introduces into discussion Meynell's "type-jump",
that jump being instanced in the relationship that holds between 
statements of observation and the laws of physics, and in the 
move from observable human behaviour to transcendent human mind. 
Sherry then says, applying the discussion:
Clearly, therefore, religious doctrines are not 
simply deduced from the facts, although the latter 
may constitute necessary conditions.^3
Disappointingly, after recounting the types of problem 
attaching to this position, Sherry says, regarding why and how 
people do go on to build religion on such facts, "I cannot hope
220
to solve the fundamental yet difficult problems which are 
raised here".
Now, Sherry at times comes close to the heart of the 
matter in this discussion, but takes wrong turnings. Let us 
agree with him in not seeking answers via natural theology, for 
reasons already given. Also, let us agree that Phillips' 
epistemology leaves over the issue as to why people should want 
to use religious pictures. But let us not think that the only 
remaining option is a return to unreformed standard epistemology, 
which either sees an inferential connection between picture- 
facts and "real" facts (Sherry's first suggestions above), or 
an appeal to the rather mysterious "jump" connection he points 
to in Meynell, and which he admits explains very little. Indeed, 
this "jump" theory is itself an admission that standard 
epistemology, unreformed, cannot deliver what it claims to - 
clear facts to be known. What Sherry does not see is that he 
has himself several clues which he could have used to state the 
whole issue differently. Firstly, that for a fact to be a 
necessary condition means simply that. Secondly, that if a 
"fact" is a necessary condition, it has this same status in the 
religious language-game ("picture") for, again from previous 
argument, one cannot separate "real" facts from facts-as-they- 
are-meant-in-language-use. Thirdly, that we stand before such 
facts as givens. Fourthly, that we respond to such givens by 
"picturing" the world in their light - one proceeds from the 
totality of experience-thought-interpretation, that is from the 
"picture", to living in this world. Now Sherry mentions the 
meditation by Christians on the life of Christ. But why do 
Christians meditate on the life of Christ? Because they believe
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him. Why do they believe him? - not for reasons, for that 
kind of calculation is not what is meant by saying one believes 
someone. Such belief is precisely apart from reasons - it is 
what one does when one does not reason about someone, but takes 
him for what he is. But, it might be objected, people do come 
to belief by meditating on the life of Christ. We need to be 
careful here. To know Christ is to worship him. But, as has 
already been said, one cannot offer worship by saying, "0 God, 
I worship you for the following reasons." One becomes a 
worshipper by responding in an affirmation, not by reasoning on 
an hypothesis. Is this affirmatory nature of belief not the 
meaning of the Caeserea Philippi interchange between Christ 
and his disciples, which talks in terms of revelation (and not 
that which comes from flesh and blood)?
"Whom do men say that I am?" "Some say ..." Reasoning
"Who do you say that I am?" "Thou art the Confession/ 
Christ, the Son of the living God ..." Affirmatioi
"On this rock will I build my Church ..." Form of
life77
So, to have a "picture" is to affirm certain facts. Such facts 
are transmitted in the form of life by testimony - that is, by 
witnessing to the facts. But in religion such facts are 
celebrated in worship, where they are given absolute status in 
the community, as it believes God. Meditation on the life of 
Christ by unbelievers has, in contrast, a quite different 
structure, for worship is not involved. But to believe Christ 
is to make a religious judgement that one wishes to live before 
him in a relationship of worship. To move from the position 
of unbelief to that of belief is to move from one "picture" to 
another. To do that is to be captivated by the new "picture",
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and to come under its authority, and to affirm one will live 
before it. In the light of such worship, the believer inter- 
prets the way things go and says what is and what is not the 
case in the world.
Using Sherry's method of typography, this can be laid 
out in terms of epistemological "direction", in the way that he 
laid out logical direction:
necessary condition (Christ):
affirmation (confession)  »  testimony (witness)  *  
celebration (worship)  »  interpretation (response 
to the world).
But this epistemological "direction" underlies all 
knowledge which is based on "believing". In fact of course, 
all these moves are made at once, e.g. again Caeserea Philippi. 
iii) But "surface" expressions of a belief system 
are adapted to, and articulated to, contextual cultural thought- 
forms which precisely do not arise from a commitment to the 
foundation testimony. Their "surface" character is an expression 
of the fact that they are statements of belief which conform 
to "secular" criteria, rather than (or as well as) to the 
"religious" perspective (or, specifically, Christian perspective) 
which flows from the foundation testimony. Now one notable 
feature of these secular criteria of interpretation is that the 
epistemological ordering of reality in the form affirmation -*» 
testimony -* celebration -^interpretation is broken. The secular 
mind claims to look only at the way things go, and to derive 
directly from this empirical observation the criteria of inter- 
pretation for what is observed. As a result of the "facts" thus
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"known", the perceived negativities in experience are taken as 
direct evidence which prevents the offering of worship. Commit- 
ment to God is withheld. And for the believer for whom this 
secular epistemology is captivating, belief is lost.
However, this loss of belief can now be seen not to be 
due to the intrinsic character of the way things go, but to an 
acceptance from the contextual culture of "secular" assumptions 
as to the epistemological "direction" for correct argument and 
inference. It is not the way things go, however severe, that 
brings loss of belief, but the acceptance of an alien epistemo- 
logical "direction" for saying how things go - a direction which 
is secular in that it claims empirical experience can provide 
its own criteria of interpretation. Loss of belief is therefore 
occasioned by the believer confusing the surface-and-contextual 
expressions of belief with what is believed at depth.
Alternatively, the secular mind may itself accept that 
naive secular thought is untenable, and that "facts" are 
generated within an interpretative process; in which case the 
"loss" of belief may be understood as following from the 
acceptance by the one who lapses of a new testimony - a testimony 
that replaces the Christian one. In this case, however, the 
religious epistemological "direction"still holds, for the 
secularist has here adopted a "religious" stance. But this 
case is not then an instance of a loss of belief, but a new 
belief. There is a commitment to a new testimony which becomes 
the constitutive factor in his new reality. For such a man his 
old explanations now become inconceivable. Insofar as this 
position takes on correctness of an absolute kind perhaps the 
element of obedience and worship are also present though
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transmuted.
As to what causes a believer to lose one commitment and 
to gain another, that is, to believe one testimony rather than 
another, that, though interesting, is not germane to this
argument - though a clue might be found in Phillips 1 and
78 
Oilman's discussion of how meaning is found in life. One
learns, it is said, from contact with a man of character - one 
learns from what this man's maturity, courage, humility, 
honesty, kindness is able to inspire in one - and from contem- 
plating what this man meets in his life. That is what knowing 
and learning are like here. In terms of arguments above, one 
feels the weight of a testimony. But be that as it may, what 
is germane is the centrality and cruciality of commitment to a 
testimony as the basis of cognition in religion.
It might, of course, be possible for a whole community 
of belief to lose its commitment. In the light of previous 
discussion one may see this loss of commitment as possibly 
arising from a failure of the community to maintain its practice 
of worship at depth (which would lead first to a distortion and 
then to a loss of its interpretative perspective), or through 
acceptance of a new testimony (which would mark a new 
perspective). Either of these processes could be catastrophic 
or gradualist in nature. But neither could arise directly from 
empirical evidence, from the way things go. The groundwork of 
epistemological possibility argued above prevents that option 
of explanation. "Evidence", including "empirical" evidence, 
is always secondary, epistemologically, never primary. "Facts" 
are theory-laden. And that applies to both believer and the 
one who "loses" belief.
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f) The distinction that has been drawn between 
"surface" and "depth" in relation to the grammar of religious 
belief, together with the notion of epistemological "direction", 
prove to be useful tools in seeking to tackle the question of 
what the relationship is in Christian belief between "affliction 1 
and the God of love. "Affliction", it can now be argued, is 
not a condition to be "explained" in terms of a "surface" 
theodicy, but calls for an attempt to describe the shape of 
Christian belief in a way that follows the moves at depth by 
which that belief proceeds in its epistemological "direction" 
from God to the world, and does so in terms of the language of 
interpersonal theological formulation. It has been argued above 
that within this language the presiding concept is "God". Let 
us now explore some aspects of what believers say in the context 
of what they do and ask what it means at depth to say in this 
language, "All things depend on God" - for in saying all things 
depend on God, the believer is saying that experiences of 
"affliction" also depend on God. How is that possible?
i) The first thing to notice about "All things 
depend on God" is brought to our attention by Phillips, for in
his discussion of this utterance he chooses as the context of
79 discussion the practice of prayer. This context reminds us
immediately that what we have here is not an hypothesis, but a 
fundamental confession, and that, as a confession, it forms 
part of the worship of the community, that is, as has been said, 
part of all that is involved in the language of praise. It is 
part of the believer's submission of his whole nature to God as 
transcendent, the quickening of his conscience by God's holiness 3 
the nourishment of his mind with God's truth, the purifying of
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his imagination by God's beauty, the opening of his heart to 
God's love, the surrender of his will to God's purpose - all
gathered up in adoration as the most selfless emotion of which
RD 
man is capable- It has been shown that "confession  *  worship'
has an important role in religious epistemology, and stands 
structurally between the necessary condition of Christian belief 
and the believer's response to the world. In this utterance, 
therefore, we have a religious utterance of peculiar significance 
for theodicy as descriptive understanding, for the content of 
this confession makes it the second item in the structure of 
Christian belief, allowing only the presiding concept itself to 
take precedence. It is the ground of all further claims to 
religious knowledge. It is the first step taken in the believer* 
movement from God to the world.
ii) But the second thing to notice is also brought 
to our attention by Phillips* reaction to this utterance, and 
it also concerns the distinction between "surface" and "depth" 
grammar. What is it the believer means at depth,Phillips asks, 
when he confesses "All things depend on God"? As, in the context 
of worship, this utterance is not an hypothesis, it is not 
appropriate, Phillips argues, to put to it tests that would be 
appropriate to an hypothesis - that is, it is not appropriate 
to ask, "Is there a being such that ..." - a question which 
operates at the surface level of ordinary-language analysis, 
and makes the existence of God dependent on satisfactory evidence 
and argument. Rather, to approach such a confession as an 
utterance of worship should be to seek to provide an account 
of what God means to believers, that is, to provide a grammar of 
religious belief?
227
to say what is meant by belief in God, one must take 
account of what God means to religious believers; 
one must have some feeling for the game. We must 
ask what worshipping an eternal God means in the 
way of life in which it has its life.81
At this point in his discussion, Phillips turns for help
o o
to an argument of Simone Weil's, the form of that argument 
corresponding to the use we are making of "surface" and "depth" 
understandings of belief. Using Weil, he suggests that to 
formulate the question as to what the believer means in the 
first way above, the way he rejects, is to have a "natural" God 
in mind - that is, a God who is bound to the way things go in 
an explanatory bond. Instead, one should seek to understand 
the "supernatural" God, the God who will be found within the 
second way of taking the question, the eternal God whom the 
believer adoringly worships in confessing "All things depend on 
God". Now it becomes clear at this point that, when one talks 
of an epistemological "direction" that proceeds from God to the 
world, the presiding concept of God involved has the shape of 
the God of whom the confession is made that all things depend 
on him - that is, the presiding concept needs to be understood in 
terms of the "depth", "supernatural" God. The "natural" God 
of the secular epistemological direction, the God in the hypothe- 
sis, lies in the "surface" only of this key utterance of religion 
belief. Loss of belief in the face of affliction may well arise 
if the believer makes the mistake of confusing at the depth level 
of his belief the latter with the former, and deciding rightly 
that such a God cannot properly be worshipped, but then loss of 
belief precisely arises from a confusion, and not from the way 
things go in the world.
iii) But let us explore this a little further.
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Careful attention to what is said in worship has been shown to 
help descriptive understanding of the shape of belief. The 
worship of the community reveals, as nowhere else can, what it 
is that believers do and do not say as they "indwell" the 
language of worship, and make the move "I-can-go-on". Here, 
above all, it must be insisted, one cannot separate man, 
language, and reality, and here is the social matrix which is 
the proper focus for the study of theodical language. It has 
already been argued that it is practically and logically 
inconceivable for the worshipper to hold reservations about the 
God adoringly worshipped. Now Phillips 1 point (from Weil) 
regarding the kind of God appropriate to worship is an aspect 
of this argument, in that such adoring worship cannot contain 
within it any attempt to justify God in the light of the way 
things go, nor relate to him as one (possible) existent among 
existents. Such a God would be merely "natural"; but worship 
requires a "supernatural" God. I am here denying what Roth 
argues when he says,
For a moment such a worship experience sets things 
right between God and an individual, if not the 
world as a whole. But memory can spoil everything.
Even as a person prays a confession in good faith, 
complaints may intrude. ^
The ground of my denial is that "confession" is a form of honest 
belief, not honest doubt. What Roth's believer is doing is to
hold his confusions before God, not his confessions in good
84 faith. But, nevertheless, an argument is made later, together
with Roth, that there is a form of praise that includes protest. 
As will be seen, that is quite a different issue.
iv) There is, then, on the basis of the present 
argument, a clear epistemological ground for making the
229
distinction that Weil and Phillips suggest regarding what is 
meant by the term "God" in classical theism, at depth. The 
"natural" God, the "surface" God, is the result of thinking in 
the secular epistemological direction. The existence and nature 
of the "natural" God, the God of the Philonic tradition, can be 
inferred directly from the way things are (or dis-inferred if 
one argues from evil). There is the beauty, awefulness, goodness 
  explanatory inference drawn? That there is a God. There is 
the evil, ugliness, triviality   explanatory inference drawn? 
That there is no God. The existence and nature of such a God 
is, therefore, contingent, it is a perchance, it is a perhaps, 
dependent on the inference drawn. But the depth God, the super- 
natural God, is not at all located in this way in belief. The 
totality of experience-thought-interpretation, the constitutive 
and regulative commitment to a testimony, the worship which is 
the crucible of cognition and reality for the believer, fixes 
God as unshakeably certain.
v) But (and this is where the argument now
departs radically from Phillips) the historical reference (the 
necessary condition) of the foundation testimony means that the 
believer's "world" is grounded. The departure from Phillips 
here is occasioned by the need in describing Christian belief 
to give an adequate place to a consideration of the historical 
experience of affliction, both in the life of the believer, and 
in relation to the affliction of God in the person of the 
necessary (historical) condition of Christian belief - Christ. 
The basically a-historical assumptions of Phillips 1 language- 
game approach to semantics (to know God is to have the idea of 
God and to know how to use religious language) do not seem to be
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able to bear the weight that a critical remembrance of affliction 
necessitates. Understanding "how-to-go-on" in Christian belief 
needs to be described in terms which enable the theodicist to 
hold in view what is involved in the religious use of language 
by the worshipper of the God on whom all things depend, but the 
worship of that God, in those terms, in Christianity, refers to 
the role that is given to the afflicted Christ as an historical 
figure by the Christian community. The Christian believer, in 
that he is a Christian and not something else, affirms in his 
worship that his beliefs bring together Christ and God. That is 
why Christ is worshipped. For Phillips, however, as has been 
seen, to have eternal life is to know God. But, as John's 
gospel puts it (17:3), eternal life is to "know you, the only 
true God, and Jesus Christ". Some of the complexities of this 
knowledge of God through the historical Christ will be explored
1 4- 86later.
For the moment, attention is given to two other moves 
made in Christian belief, insofar as the confession "All things 
depend on God" is understood through the historical Christ. 
The first is that the range of interpersonal relationship 
language given predominance is that of family, for the community 
speaks in terms of Son and Father. This is the context in which 
the account of Christian theology which Phillips sets out under 
the motif of doing the will of the Father needs to be considered. 
When it is said that "All things depend on God", what is meant, 
then, is that all things depend on God who has the role of 
Father in the belief of the community, and further, that what 
this means is to be understood through the role of the Son - "He
Q "7
who has seen me has seen the Father". At this point the
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second move comes to the forefront, for the Christian community 
has made the eucharistic act central in its understanding of 
the role of the Son in revealing the nature of God the Father. 
But the eucharistic act of worship also serves to place the 
sacrificial suffering (the affliction) of Christ as God and as 
man critically in the experience of the community - for the 
community proceeds in the light of its understanding (through 
the Son) of the "supernatural" God, the Father on whom all 
things depend, to the world in which affliction occurs. "Afflic- 
tion", therefore, is not something which can become for the 
Christian community that which is in need of explanation, for 
it is crucial to the means by which it explains to itself the 
form of life that it is. To be a member of the Christian family, 
to commit oneself to the Christian testimony, to make the 
confession "All things depend on God", is not at all, therefore, 
like the kind of statement that Flew supposes it to be. It is 
an utterance that has to be placed in the religious epistemolo- 
gical "direction", and explored in terms of its "depth grammar", 
if its meaning is to be understood.
g) There is no case, therefore, for expounding any 
interpersonal theodicy which seeks to give an account of afflic- 
tion by reference to a natural or surface God. It is now 
attempted to confirm this judgement in principle by a critique 
of two types of theodicy typically developed in relation to 
such a surface God, and it is claimed that this critique applies 
to all theodicies based on inference from the way things go. 
This critique will take me some way towards showing the nature 
of the mistake made by the person who, like Flew, thinks that 
the way things go presents the basis of a logical dilemma for
232
the believer, or who, alternatively, argues from the experience 
of the way things go to unbelief.
i) In the light of the foregoing, my argument is 
that all theodicies which infer directly to God from the way 
the world goes, in that they use the secular epistemological 
"direction", are mistakenly irreligious. Let us call such 
theodicies, Theodicies of Inference.
The invalidity of inference to God from the way things go 
has been clear since the time of Hume, though there has been 
great resistance to accepting this as so. It is to Phillips' 
credit, however, that he has recognised our inability by any 
process of inference from contingent events to account for the 
certainty, unshakeability, sureness, that is the hallmark of 
belief. This point has now been taken further by showing how 
it is that this absolute character of religious belief is not 
a matter of obstinacy, intractability, or blindness, but is based 
on an insight into the nature of epistemology missed by conven- 
tional accounts which first reduce depth factors in belief to 
surface ones and then argue in the wrong direction. We can now 
see the crucial mistake made by inferential theodicies is that 
they cannot represent matters as the believer knows them to be. 
God cannot, in an adequate Christian theodicy, be located at the 
end of an inferential process or function as an explanation of 
the way things go. Look again at the way people worship, and 
at what the saints have written. That God "possibly" exists; 
that God is "possibly" good; that God stands in need of, or 
could be the subject of, justification; that God lies at the 
end of a process of reasoning; all such notions are foreign 
to, and destructive of, theodicy. These considerations are all
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to the adoring worshipper both logical and practical inconceiv- 
abilities.
But the nature of inferential theodicies lands the 
believer who seeks to use them in a still worse plight for, if 
successful, they would entail the would-be believer in first 
following the inferential trail to its limit, that is, to the 
question of affliction - and then, as Mitchell and Crombie 
realise in their responses to Flew, making an act of trust 
which, by the very nature of the process of inference, must be 
without reason or justification. That is, Mitchell and Crombie 
see the believer making as the crucial move in his rational
o o
belief an act of blind trust. It is clear that some such 
notion as blind trust must be the case in all theodicies of 
inference in that both the contradictoriness of the presenting 
evidence, and also the nature of the supposed relationship 
between belief and reason, makes it follow. The implication of 
all such theodicies is that the believer as believer becomes a 
believer just where the reasoning runs out, where justifications 
cease. However, this understanding of crucial religious belief 
without regard to the movement of thought in the religious 
epistemological "direction" is fatal, if accurate.
But my argument is that this understanding is not 
accurate. The worshipper does not reason in this way; on this 
evidence; in this direction. Nor could he. Nor would he. 
For a further damaging result is entailed in theodicies of 
inference. If successful, such theodicies result in a God whom 
no believer would worship. Phillips is quite damning on this 
point:
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I shall argue that religious believers have cause to 
feel miserable if 'the complete picture' does show 
what Crombie hopes it will show, for then God's evil 
nature will have been demonstrated. Far from having 
suspended judgement on God, Mitchell and Crombie 
have prepared the way for His condemnation.
... according to these philosophers we ought to 
feel reassured, for what we are confronted by is 
not haphazard suffering, but planned suffering, 
and, what is more, suffering planned on an 
infinitely big scale ...
If God is this kind of agent, He cannot justify 
His actions, and His evil nature is revealed.89
In contrast to all attempts to argue to God from the way 
things go, together with their associated theodicies, attempts 
which operate at the "surface" of religious expression, the 
realisation that the "grammar" of theodicy must conform to the 
"grammar" of adoring worship, if it is to describe the depth of 
belief, will, and must, involve a quite different approach to 
understanding the epistemology of belief. No theodicy which 
conflicts with what is possible in worship can survive the 
descriptive procedure. The sharp edge of philosophical descrip- 
tion is revealed, and cuts away volumes of mis-directed effort, 
ii) There is, however, a second type of theodicy 
which is more subtle in presenting itself as expressing "depth" 
belief, and which may be seen as having fictitious "depth 
grammar". Theodicies of this second type will be termed 
Theodicies of Acceptance. My critique of them is made by first 
going further in determining what is meant by "looking" at what 
believers do and what the saints have said, so as to be clear 
about the nature of fictitious depth. Then comment is made on 
the theodicies themselves. Phillips fails to notice, or ignores, 
this necessary sorting out of what is meant by looking. His 
mistake here is that, in discussing what believers mean by 
praying "All things depend on God", he assumes the religious
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dependence referred to is all of a kind. But is this the case?
Now Phillips does distinguish between "superstitious" and "true"
90 belief, and might thus be thought to be making a distinction
between types of dependence. But the effect of his discussion 
is not to identify different kinds of religious dependence, but 
to deny that some "believers" are in fact believers at all, for 
they are merely "superstitious". That is an over-harsh judge- 
ment, and in fact misconceived. They are believers, but believer! 
who are making a mistake in that they understand the depth of 
their worshipful belief in mistaken terms, that is, in terms of
surface (ordinary) language, and in secular epistemological
91 
categories. However, as Phillips rightly argues elsewhere,
one should not confuse the ability of the believer to give an 
account of what he believes, with the ability to believe. Let 
us spell this out. It is not right to think here in quantitative
terms, as Phillips does, of "some" believers who are true
92 believers and "some" who are superstitious, but in terms of
"surface" and "depth", for in this way one is dealing with all 
believers qua believers. It is a question of what all believers 
are saying and doing within the shape of the confession to 
which they are committed, rather than the shape of the explana- 
tion which one-and-another give of that confession, that is, it 
is a matter of proceeding in a philosophically descriptive 
way which will reveal what in their speech and acts is grammati- 
cally deep. It is true that there is a quantitative aspect 
also, in that some believers live nearer the surface, and for 
more of the time, than others. Indeed the "story" in the 
community is told in a language that is "surface" rather than 
"depth", but then we must remember previous argument as to how
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it is that systematically misleading expressions in the language 
of a living community do not necessarily contain contradictions 
in use, and that there is a proper distinction between "form" 
and "function" - that is what it means for the community to 
know the "weight" of words, and to know their role in its way 
of lifer 3 This fact of surface articulation of beliefs is, 
therefore, not relevant to the qualitative discussion of the 
role of those articulations in practice. The weakness of 
Phillips' position is therefore being avoided. It is not an 
issue of some believers being authentic and others not. Given 
the contention that there is a right description of the 
"direction" of religious epistemology, can "depth" belief be 
identified and described? I think to some measure it can. 
There is no need to disenfranchise, then, perhaps the largest 
part of the believing community. But there is a need to be 
quite clear about the difference between fictitious and genuine 
depth.
Occasion has already been taken to reject Crombie's and 
Mitchell's philosophical account of blind trust as a misconcep- 
tion of the depth nature of religious trust and a mis-reading 
of the way believers relate to God's existence and nature. It 
is now argued that Theodicies of Acceptance are the religious 
expression in the believing community of just this kind of 
blind trust which is the end result of the inferential process. 
These theodicies are practical and pietistic counterparts to, 
and match the shape of, Theodicies of Inference. Theodicies 
of Acceptance express the view that religious trust accepts the 
way things go in the world, even if it be affliction, for one 
can find in the way things go some meaning, some purpose, which
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is intended by God. One can infer from the way things go to 
the specific will of God for the believing individual or the 
religious community, and can see in them the intentions, 
activity, and mind of God.
My critique of such Theodicies of Acceptance owes much
94 to the discussion of affliction found in Soelle's Suffering.
In this book she develops Simone Weil's suggestions about 
affliction, an aspect of Weil's thought Phillips strangely 
misses, but which can serve as an important factor in penetrating 
the "depth grammar" of the "supernatural" God. Soelle argues 
that, in the face of the way things go in the experience of 
affliction (in each of its dimensions), believers have shown a 
tendency to suppress responses of resistance (especially in the 
social dimension), and have instead emphasised two alternative 
types of response. The first of these responses is based on 
the view that divine power can be, and is, vindicated through 
human powerlessness - suffering as a result is seen as having a 
religious purpose. The second type of response, corresponding 
to the first, but from the human side, is that it is proper to 
promote, as the true understanding of affliction, the willing- 
ness to suffer. Why God sends affliction is thus taken up 
within a general acceptance that it is sufficient to know he 
causes it and causes it for a purpose. Such Theodicies of 
Acceptance are not, and cannot be, militant and defiant in 
affliction. Suffering, even affliction, is to be accepted, and 
transformed through acceptance.
But is this "acceptance" well-founded in the depth grammar 
of belief? Does the believer have to understand what the will 
of God for him is by inferring it from things that happen? The
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key figures to whom this kind of pietism appeals as models of 
acceptance, e.g. Jesus and Job, stand in fact in contradiction 
to these theodicies, for they did not understand God in the 
light of what happened, but understood the way things were in 
the light of their dependence on God. These Theodicies of 
Acceptance rationalise negativity in the way things go by inferri 
that God is perhaps testing the sufferer; perhaps punishing 
him; perhaps refining him; perhaps allowing an expiation to 
be made. But as Soelle argues, these kinds of inference, under- 
stood as they are by religious piety in the context of God 
"breaking" pride and demonstrating human powerlessness, have at 
their heart an exploitation by God of human dependence. Further, 
the implication is that it is right and proper to rejoice in 
such exploitation. Soelle points out that here is the psychology 
of masochism in the celebration of pain. The blind trust of 
philosophical theodicies of inference has been transferred into 
the kind of religious trust for which neither Jesus nor Job are 
models. Soelle observes:
Affliction strikes even the pious. How can it be 
punishment in that case? The training value of 
suffering is negligible ... Suffering produces 
fruits like curses, imprecations, and prayers for 
vengeance more readily than reform and insight. 
Suffering causes people to experience helplessness 
and fear; indeed intense pain cripples all power to 
resist and frequently leads to despair. It is 
precisely the Old Testament that corrects again and 
again theological theories based on the premise that 
God sends suffering. (She quotes Job 5:6f).
Again one sees, therefore, that not only can the believer 
not follow through this inferential process from events to 
evaluations, but, should he do so, he comes to a God whom he 
would not worship. Worship thus again sets its own criteria 
for belief. It excludes the very principle of inference hidden
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in Theodicies of Acceptance, and also the "natural" God who is 
implied by that principle. Despite the initial appearances of 
such piety to the contrary this kind of dependence is surface 
in nature, and is only fictitiously depth.
To reinforce this conclusion, let us stay with the point 
that the shape of a theodicy can lead to a God other than the 
one a careful looking at"what the saints and believers do and
say"could possibly entail.
96 Soelle's argument that "masochistic" tendencies in
pietistic religion, though wrong, are at least understandable, 
because they bring a kind of help, an existential stance, to 
some people in some circumstances, can perhaps be offered as an 
excuse for believers not readily seeing the implications of 
Theodicies of Acceptance. But over against this masochistic 
tendency there stands the frightening companion piece advanced 
by some theologians, and which is implied by all such theodicies 
- the sadistic God. Submission (or, in present terms, acceptance 
as a source of pleasure is one thing, but the God who acts to 
produce suffering, and cause affliction, and is glorified for 
doing so, is another. Combining Crombie's account of a God 
who plans suffering on a universal scale and Soelle's account of 
Calvin's sovereign God, there is seen at the end of all 
inferential theodicies the justification of, and trust in, a 
God to whom devotion is unthinkable, and adoration a blasphemy. 
Masochistic submission to such a God has no religious worth, 
whatever its practical value. The dialectical bond between 
masochistic piety and sadistic theology is strong and intrinsic. 
The means of testing and training are identical with the means 
of punishment. From this equation it follows that the means of
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testing and training lack morality, for those means are 
indistinguishable from the means of punishment. There is the 
further point that, to be moral, punishment should be proportion 
to the offence. But gladly to accept suffering as extensive 
and intensive as we know it to be, together with its random 
distribution, and to praise the God who sends it, is to praise 
a God who fails, in any noticeable regard, to have a sense of 
justice or proportion. Dostoievski's denunciation of such a
God, in the mouth of Ivan, with regard to the suffering of
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children, is beyond contradiction. But as Dostoievski also
knew, in that Alyosha persists in his belief even whilst agreeing 
with Ivan to rebel against such a God, we do not see in such a 
God the depth grammar of belief.
iii) A description, then, of Theodicies of 
Inference, and the sub-type Theodicies of Acceptance, show 
neither of them to be possible understandings of the God whom 
the believer adoringly worships or of the depth nature of 
religious dependence. The epistemological direction of such 
theodicies is faulty; their account of the nature of religious 
trust is inadequate; their implications for the nature of God 
are inappropriate; and their failure to ground theodicy in 
worship makes them incapable of grasping the depth rationality 
of belief. Flew's attack on such theodicies is right on target. 
The person who finds the way things go cannot support belief in 
such a "surface" God is saying something penetrating.
But to show that, whilst technically correct, what Flew 
is opposing is not the essence of the matter is hardly sufficieni 
Attention now, therefore, turns to attempting to describe the 
shape of the Religious Theodicy which seeks to avoid the errors
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of understanding isolated above. By use of contrast, however, 
it is apparent that some aspects of the shape of such a theodicy 
are already discernable - it will be consistent with the religio 
epistemological "direction"; it will offer an account of trust 
that matches what one sees when one looks at saints and believer 
practising their faith; it will imply a God who can fittingly 
be adored in interpersonal worship? and it will have the same 
shape as the structure of worship.
Let us call such a theodicy a "Theodicy of Dependence".
h) What is meant by religious dependence if it is 
not acceptance of the will of God as inferred from the way 
things go? This question brings us back to Phillips* claim 
that a consideration of what a believer means by "All things 
depend on God" should concern itself with seeking to understand 
what the believer can and cannot say about God, that is, with 
what he means in the things he says and does.
i) Phillips suggests the hallmark of religious
dependence is seen in the act of "thanking God for one's
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existence". Let us interpret this to mean that the speech- 
act of prayer carries the weight of meaning pointed to by the 
summary utterance we have been considering, namely, "All things 
depend on God". This prayer of thanksgiving - thanking God for 
one's existence - marks, thus, the third item in the structure 
of belief, for it determines how the believer relates to the God 
on whom all things depend, even affliction. So far, then, 
adoring worship, in its shape, has the elements (a)coming to 
know in the worship of the Christian community the supernatural 
God spoken of as Father, (b) the confession that all things 
depend on him, and (c) thanksgiving to the God on whom all thing
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depend, and who is Father, for one's existence.
Now, though the speech-act of prayer is less embracing 
than that of worship, nevertheless, as a particular case of 
worship, it shares its general shape. Prayer, as an act of
worship, is performative in nature - that is, the prayer brings
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a state of affairs into being. As an act of worship, it
brings into being the reality, the "world", which arises from 
believing the foundation testimony. With prayer, a "world" 
exists that is absent without it, a relationship exists that 
is absent without it. In this "world" the believer ventures in 
faith. But in contrast to Phillips, of course, this "world" 
is being seen as historically grounded and epistemologically 
directed.
Confirmation that prayer, as an act of worship, has such 
a role in the experience of the believer can be found by contrast 
ing, as Phillips does, the shape of everyday thanksgiving with 
the special shape of thanksgiving found in prayer. What is 
the shape of everyday giving of thanks? First, everyday thanks 
refer to those thanked having done one thing rather than another, 
that this was done rather than that. Second, everyday thanks 
refer to particular cases. We are grateful for something(s), 
and we are so because we make value judgements. It hardly 
needs arguing that such a structure centrally incorporates the 
process of inferential reasoning. Something happens; I make 
a value judgement; I infer to the will and intentions of the 
causing agent; and give him thanks. That prayer can be, and 
often is, of this "natural" and "surface" and "secular" form 
also hardly needs demonstrating and neither does the difficulty 
of offering thanks for affliction to such a God who sends
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particular "things" for which thanks should be given. But this 
shape of reasoning will not fit the act of worship contained in 
the prayer, "All things depend on God", for this prayer is 
confessing that all actual and particular things about which 
various and opposite value judgements are made, some favourable 
some unfavourable, are a cause for thanks to God - including 
even affliction. Everyday-thanks, precisely,does not do this, 
it hasn't this shape at all. The weight of the believer's 
"supernatural" prayer of thanksgiving is felt, rather, by 
actually thanking God for one's existence. In the context of 
this worshipping speech-act, it is clear that thanks to God are 
not felt to be linked to particular events, or value judgements 
on them, in the way thanks to other people seem to be. The 
difference lies in the lack of any inferential element in 
worshipping prayer. There is no specific reference to the way 
things have gone. As Phillips accurately observes:
When the believer thanks God for his creation, it 
seems to be a thanksgiving for his life as a 
whole, for everything, meaning the good and the 
evil within his life, since despite such evil, 
thanking God is still said to be possible. In 
devout religious believers, there seems to be
no question of blaming God, but only of praising 
Him.102
Now, such an account may be thought to suggest believers 
are remarkably insensitive. But this objection is, to say the 
least, not in accord with the principle of charity. Believers 
are manifestly not insensitive to good and bad events, but 
simply do not infer from those individual events, or even from 
the run of events, to God. Giving thanks to God in prayer means 
being able to come to the world with love, to have a love for 
the world, to bring meaning to life, meaning unshakeable by the 
way things go because it is not inferred from it. And that is
244
true of believing prayer in the time of affliction, too.
It might be objected that the believer does not typically 
give thanks only for his existence, his creation, and that 
Phillips' description has, therefore, missed the main problem. 
Typically, it might be urged, the believer gives thanks for his 
creation and preservation, and does not this latter type of thank 
not relate without a shadow of doubt to the way things go? 
Does the believer give thanks even in affliction? Put differentl 
are ontological thanks enough? Is belief not located in 
providential thanks too? But let us notice that Phillips' 
argument can be extended properly to meet this quite apposite 
objection. Returning to the quotation from Phillips, it makes 
no difference at all if it is modified to read: "When the 
believer thanks God for his creation and preservation . . .", 
without changing a single word that follows. Indeed, the passage 
thus emended, makes better sense, and Phillips was at fault for 
not noticing the "everything" has breadth as well as depth. 
The thanks the believer offers are for the whole of life - that 
it is, and what it is. But, it isn't just that Phillips can 
be interpreted in this emended way. Previous arguments provide 
the structure for understanding why the believer must give such 
"whole" and unreserved thanks, without qualification. Ontologica. 
and providential thanks arise simultaneously with, and from, his 
commitment to the Christian testimony and its cognitive domain. 
The epistemological basis of his whole reality, in that it 
proceeds to the way things go from his commitment, means that 
for the believer all things depend on God. In worship he 
expresses his commitment to give thanks for life as a whole, for 
everything.
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There is, however, another objection to be set against 
Phillips 1 claim. He seems to allow to the believer no "blaming 1 
of God, only "praising", "thanking". But in this Phillips is 
not true to his own method of looking at religious practice, 
for believers have frequently "blamed" God in vehement terms, 
both for their existence and for their lot. For example:
I am the man who has seen affliction under the rod
of his wrath;
he has driven and brought me into darkness without
any light;
surely against me he turns his hand again and again
the whole day long.
He has made my flesh and my skin waste away, and
broken my bones;
he has besieged and enveloped me with bitterness and
tribulation;
he has made me dwell in darkness like the dead of
long ago.
He has walled me about so that I cannot escape;
he has put heavy chains on me;
though I call and cry for help, he shuts out my
prayer;
he has blocked my ways with hewn stones, he has made
my paths crooked.
He is to me like a bear lying in wait, like a lion
in hiding;
he led me off my way and tore me to pieces;
he has made me desolate;
he bent his bow and set me as a mark for his arrow.
He drove into my heart the arrows of his quiver ... 
he has filled me with bitterness, he has sated me 
with wormwood.
He has made my teeth grind on gravel, and made me
cower in ashes;
my soul is bereft of peace, I have forgotten what
happiness is; so
I say, 'Gone is my glory, and my expectation from
the LORD 1 .
Lamentations 3:1-18 (RSV)
At a later point, the place in credal language of such 
outbursts will be described in a way that shows their place in
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theodicy, but at this juncture discussion will be confined 
to the point that the believer is clearly capable of blaming 
God. But, it is a blaming that takes place within the security 
of belief - it is, with whatever difficulty, an expression of 
relationship. This being the case, it does not in any sense 
set providence (the way things go) against ontology (that God 
is). Phillips should not have ignored this blaming, for it is 
a part of the structure of worship. He is right, however, 
insofar as the believer draws no inferences from it. Indeed, 
the compiler of Lamentations sees nothing amiss in following 
immediately with:
The steadfast love of the Lord never ceases, his
mercies never come to an end; 
they are new every morning; 
great is thy faithfulness. 
'The LORD is my portion 1 , says my soul, 'therefore
I will hope in him.'
Lamentations 3:22-24 (RSV)
To the mind which thinks in terms of the "natural" God, 
such blaming can only be destructive of belief for, if things 
go in this world in this blameworthy way, they must count 
against God and his goodness, and must (p_ace Crombie and 
Mitchell) count decisively. We dp know what counts against such 
a surface God. To call such a God blameworthy, yet wholly 
loving and wholly good, is not compatible with either intellec- 
tual honesty, moral integrity, or adoring worship.
But the writer in Lamentations, Job, Paul, and the saints, 
exhibit a different "dependence" - a kind which gives thanks in 
all things to a supernatural God. When such believers assert 
the goodness of God, they do not mean that life has been, or 
should be, filled with good things (theodicies of inference), 
nor (theodicies of acceptance) that "properly understood" the
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way things go is good, or for our good. It is rather that their 
belief in God provides them with the genesis (the foundation 
affirmation), and the exodus (the epistemological application), 
of their understanding of reality. For them God is an unshake- 
able reality, not an explanatory answer. From that unshakeable 
reality they view the way things go. To that unshakeable reality 
they direct their praise.
To say "All things depend on God" is, then, within the 
practice of worship, to thank and praise God the Father for 
one's existence, both creation and preservation; it is to 
thank and praise him for life as a whole. Further, as has 
already been seen, such thanksgiving and praise, for the 
Christian, will be offered through the Son, for it is through 
the worship of the Son, within the eucharistic act, that the 
believer understands both the Father, on the one hand, and 
affliction, on the other.
ii) Should the present discussion be taken one 
stage further, and the claim be made that religious dependence at
depth passes beyond the notion of "thanks" to that of "praise"
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alone? For example, Westermann notes that there is no word
"to thank" in Hebrew, and that praise is a stronger, more lively, 
broader concept which includes our "thanks" in it. After 
showing by contrast (in a way reminiscent of Phillips 1 method) 
that praise differs from thanks in that it elevates the one 
being praised; involves looking away from oneself; is marked 
by freedom and spontaneity; has a forum and occurs in a group; 
is joyful; speaks in the second person;(as against: leaving 
the one thanked in his place; expressing my_ thanks; 
there being an element of requirement in thanks; privacy of
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circumstance for particular thanks; openness to be commanded 
to thank; speech in the first person), Westermann says that 
what is involved in praise is unlike thanks in that it is 
neither an attitude nor a feeling of gratitude, but a response. 
However, it would seem better to describe Christian worship in 
terms already set out, that is, that religious "thanks" is 
praise - for Westermann's points are accorrj^dated by regarding 
the use of "thanking" language in the community as the surface 
expression of the depth "praising" worship.
j) I feel it is now safe to claim there is within 
the shape of belief, within its "grammar", when described at 
depth, no reason for thinking affliction can negate that belief. 
The claim that it can is based on a misconception of what it is 
the believing community is doing and saying in worship. It 
fails to feel the weight. Worship is not directed to a "natural" 
God inferred from the secular epistemological "direction" of 
thought. It is "giving thanks" in a way that creates its 
epistemological stance, in a way that recognises God as super- 
natural. Such a God is quite literally for the believer one 
who makes all things possible, for he is the beginning and end 
of the believer's reality. In him, from him, through him, and 
to him, the believer lives, moves, and has his being.
But the shape of a "supernatural" Theodicy of Dependence 
remains so far basic, and in need of further clarification and 
development. To this I now turn.
4. Affliction and the Revelation of the Nature of God 
Let us now turn to the third part of this discussion of 
Religious Theodicy and consider the place in the Christian 
"picture" of the affliction of Christ.
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a) The Christian community has always regarded the 
affliction of Jesus on the Cross as of peculiar revelatory 
significance as to the nature of God. This extremity of 
sacrificial love has been thought to show both the extent and 
the quality of the love of God, which is his nature, and also 
to be a comment on the nature of God's omnipotence - a comment 
regrettably not much heeded in recent discussions of the problem 
of evil, which have centred attention on such issues as freewill 
and omnipotence per se.
b) But the Christian community has also seen in the 
affliction of Jesus on the Cross an example - no, more than 
that, the paradigm case - of man's experience of affliction; 
Christ, believers say, was made a curse for us as one of us. 
It is the Christian claim that in and through this paradigmatic 
affliction Christ showed in the fullest way the nature of 
complete religious dependence (Father, into thy hands I commend 
my spirit), a dependence which takes into itself both imprecation 
(Why have you forsaken me?) and thanking (My God, My God ..., 
and, Today in paradise).
c) Thus, Christian claims concerning the significance 
of the Cross of Christ see the affliction there endured as 
crucial for understanding both the nature of the God worshipped, 
and also the kind of response to that God which it should make 
in its own afflictions. The testimony of the Christian community 
is that in the paradigmatic experience of Christ on the Cross is 
to be found the historical meeting point of "ultimate affliction" 
("ultimate" in that God was in Christ; "affliction"in that all 
the dimensions of negativity were there - the pain, the despair, 
the abandonment - physical, psychological, social); "final
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revelation" (of the nature of God and of the believer's 
appropriate response); and "unshakeable belief" (at the end- 
point of negativity and meaninglessness).
d) In the conceptual world of the Christian believer, 
then, the Cross of Christ represents severest negativity in all 
its dimensions, and as such this affliction epitomises meaning- 
lessness, for the Cross, to the believer, stands contrary to 
all reason - only dialectically and paradoxically can the folly 
to the unbeliever of the word of the Cross serve as the basis
of meaning for the believer. It is to the "foolishness of God",
1 OR 
and to the "weakness of God", that the believer has reference.
The kind of response to this"folly" made by the believer is 
characterised by the negation of the negative, for it is claimed 
that therein lies the shape of the power and the wisdom of God:
the word of the cross is folly to those who are 
perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the 
power of God ... it pleased God through the folly 
of what we preach to save those who believe ...
God chose what is foolish ... what is weak ... 
what is low and despised ... even things that are 
not, to bring to nothing things that are ... He 
[God]J is the source of your life in Christ Jesus, 
whom God made our wisdom, our righteousness and 
sanctification and redemption ...
(1 Cor 1:18-31, R.S.V.)
It can be no easy matter to offer a descriptive understanding of 
the belief of a community which thus locates its constitutive 
basis in an event claimed to reveal the nature of God through 
the exhibition of sheer refractoriness and negativity in the way 
things go. Yet this feature of Christian belief is what 
makes it possible to make the same circumstance both the test 
and the ground of the internal coherence of that belief. Here, 
belief is at its extremity, or, to use earlier terminology, here
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the believer faces the "void", for beyond this point of afflic- 
tion the believer conceptually cannot go - indeed, with the 
notion of epistemological "direction" in mind, it can be seen 
that in proceeding from God to the world, and in making Christ 
the necessary historical condition of its way of life, the 
believer comes to the world with a form of religious under- 
standing that arises from the Cross of Christ. This is not to 
say, however, that this affliction as a human experience was 
unique, for as Soelle argues the truth of the symbol lies 
in its repeatability. But it is to claim that, for the believer, 
no afflicted person need look in vain to the suffering of Christ 
as an expression of dependence on God in the face of affliction. 
The believer does, however, hold this affliction as having a 
unique place in his "picture", for it is the suffering of God 
the Son. 111
But it is apparent that there is in the Christian "picture 1 
a set of closely interlocking factors, for it is the centrality 
of the eucharistic rite in the union of the believing community 
with God which brings out the centrality of the historical cross 
of Christ in the existential experience of the community. But 
the eucharistic rite is no mere historical remembrance, for in
this rite the distinctive understanding in the community of the
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nature of its dependence on God is celebrated. In order to
understand the structure of Christian theodicy, then, it is not 
only needful to understand, as was attempted above, the shape of 
Christian praise of the God on whom all things depend, for,to 
understand that, it is now seen to be needful to understand the 
Cross of Christ from which it arises, and which it reiterates. 
It is, then, within the practice of worship of the crucified
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Christ that the community determines the weight theodical terms 
have in its belief. What the love of God means in the Cross of 
Christ is the role it has throughout Christian expression. What 
omnipotence means in the Cross of Christ, it means throughout 
the Christian "picture".
e) Let us now attempt to describe the significance 
of the Cross in Christian belief, and see if a coherent account 
can be given. (From now on, for brevity, the "Cross of Christ" 
will be termed the "Cross"). The key interpretive elements that 
meet in the Cross are I would argue, a) God and man, b) love 
and omnipotence, and c) dependency and response. Each of these 
elements is necessary to a Christian understanding of the Cross, 
and together they are sufficient for its description. They are 
the stuff and substance of all theories of the atonement. No 
other dimensions are needed to describe the significance of the 
Cross in Christian belief, for all other factors reduce to one 
or other of these elements. Yet each of the elements is struc- 
turally essential. The first element concerns the relationship 
between the infinite and the finite. The second concerns the 
interaction of the infinite and the finite. The third concerns 
the continuing existential awareness of the power of the Cross 
in the believing community, that is, the richly nuanced totality 
of experience-thought-interpretation of the community whose 
reality is grounded in the Cross.
These interpretive elements are, then, taken to be the 
necessary and sufficient dimensions for describing the shape of 
Christian understanding of the Cross. But as my argument is that 
the "grammar" (what can and cannot be said) of Christian theodicy 
coincides with the "grammar" of Christian worship, and also that
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the "grammar" of Christian worship has the same shape as the 
"grammar" of the Cross, it follows that the shape of Christian 
theodicy can also be set out in the terms just introduced, 
insofar as their meaning derives from the Cross. It is difficult 
to overstate the fixedness of the structure of "depth" belief 
here. The Cross, worship, and theodicy, despite their differences 
of realisation, have the same "grammatical" shape. To know what 
can and cannot be said of one, is to know what can and cannot be 
said of the others. They have the same shape because they all 
arise together, and as one, from the historical point where 
Christian belief identifies ultimate affliction, final revelation, 
and unshakeable belief. At that point exactly, what the Christiar 
believes about God and man, about omnipotence and love, about 
dependency and response, are structured in relation to each 
other and hold together.
There is, however, a clear distinction between the first 
two elements and the third, in that the third bears in on the 
believer in a personal manner. The third element is therefore 
treated separately in the next item under the heading "Affliction 
and the Response of the Believer".
f) It is a persuasive feature of the theodicies of 
Farrer and Hick that they are set against a background discussion 
of our first element, namely they discuss what is possible by 
way of the relationship of God and man bearing in mind what is 
possible by way of the relationship between the infinite and the 
finite. Both of these writers set at the base of their 
theodicy the claim that the finite cannot exist in proximity with 
the infinite. Unfortunately, neither of them locates his 
discussion in the context of worship - or makes conceptually
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central to theodicy the Christian claim that uniquely in Christ 
are the infinite and the finite bound together. It is now argued, 
however, that "looking" at believers requires that discussion 
of this element "God and man" must start with reference to the 
Cross, that is, with reference to what is revealed there uniquely 
about this relationship.
i) For Hick, the relationship of God and man is a 
key element in his theodicy, and it is set out in terms of a 
necessary epistemic distance if man is to be free and moral, and 
if man is to be capable of loving God by his own choice. For 
Hick, therefore, the distancing of man and God from each other
is a logical and practical "must" which concerns man's epistemo-
114 logical and existential possibilities. Farrer, however, gives
the point an ontological orientation, in that he argues the being 
of man cannot exist in the presence of the being of God, and 
this argument leads him to take seriously the concept of a chain 
of being in which man exists at an appropriate point - not too 
far distant, but not too close.
ii) The crucial difference between Hick's and
Farrer's understandings is that Hick's distancing of man follows 
from a decision by God calculated to achieve a desired end, 
namely man's freedom, whereas for Farrer the distancing flows 
from what makes finite existence possible at all and is, 
therefore, an aspect of the nature of God's being. For Hick, 
the consequent problem of his basic position is that the way 
things go in the world is, ultimately, positively determined by 
God through an act of his will. This act determines that man 
can, if man chooses, interpret the way things go in such a way 
that he is conscious of God in and through them. Hick cannot
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therefore, I would argue, escape from the strictures made earlier 
on inferential theodicies, although his position is not 
straightforwardly inferential for one cannot infer directly to 
the existence of God or to his purposes - believing is something 
one opts to do. But nevertheless, it appears, God is in need of 
a theodicy in view of the way things do go. This is a most 
interesting and subtle move for it partly recognises the place 
of choice in epistemology, and partly the place of interpretation 
but without running, as Phillips tends to, into fideistic 
problems. But Hick's solution is an uneasy one. Hick in fact 
requires for his theodicy to work that the believer makes two 
options, though Hick can provide no reason for one of these and 
only an arguable reason for the other. First, why should 
anybody opt for the theistic view of the world? Hick might 
answer that one opts because one experiences God's presence. 
That, however, would be for Hick to retreat from "experiencing- 
as" to experience - and that he does not wish to do. But, 
within his epistemological theory, the "as-ness" of the relation- 
ship between God and man rules out in principle there being any
reason for this option - one simply chooses so to do, and in
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choosing becomes open to the theistic "experiencing-as".
Second, why should anyone opt for Hick's epistemological theory? 
Presumably, only because one becomes convinced of its reason- 
ableness as one possible epistemological theory. Both of the 
choices are, therefore, more or less arbitary. Ironically, the 
result is the opposite of the whole thrust of Hick's apparent 
intention, for theodicy is cut loose from history and is tied 
instead to arbitarily based commitment, and possible theorisation 
Precisely, Hick's theodicy sits loose to the relationship
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between God and man which the Christian community finds uniquely 
in the Cross as an historical event. The Cross simply isn't 
needed in the shape of Hick's theory - that shape only needs 
"theism" and an epistemology, the Cross being subsequently fitted 
into this scheme by reference to the general theory. In Hick's 
theodicy, then, the Cross is merely adjectival to the believer's 
understanding of the relationship of God and man.
This non-centrality of the Cross to theodicy is not how 
the Christian believer sees the matter. The relationship between 
the infinite and the finite is, in Christian belief, expressed 
definitively in Christ, and specifically in the Cross. In Christ 
that "infinite distance" collapses, for God is known in 
Christ, and Christ is known in the Cross. God and man, infinite 
and finite, are here met together. As Weil paradoxically puts 
it:
Because no other could do it, he himself went to the 
greatest possible distance, the infinite distance. 
This infinite distance between God and God, this 
supreme tearing apart, this agony beyond all others, 
this marvel of love, is the crucifixion. Nothing 
can be further from God than that which has been 
made accursed. 117
This "gospel", "grace", "reconciliation" stand at the beginning 
of Christian experience in Christ's death, and its centre in the 
celebration of that death in the community, and at its end in the 
viewing of death by the believer in its light. They stand in
contradiction to Hick's whole scheme based as it is on distance
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and slow pilgrimage through the vale of soul-making. Is it
unfair not to be surprised that Hick deletes from the second 
edition of his theodicy the part that discusses those theodicies 
which :
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take seriously, and ... see as crucially relevant 
to the problem of evil, the central fact of the 
Christian religion - the life, death, and resurrec- 
tion of Jesus, responded to in human faith as God's 
decisive act of redemption. 119
iii) Farrer sees the issue somewhat differently. 
In an argument on the relationship of the infinite to the finite 
he explores various possibilities as to how man's being may be 
screened from God's, and thus exist. Could there be a spiritual 
screen? Is it a physical screen? He proceeds by comparing and 
contrasting two stories which symbolise the possibilities, but 
finally abandons the discussion:
We have told two stories, and rubbed them together. 
We could tell many more; but the more we told, 
the greater would be our disgust. There must be 
something radically false about a line of specula- 
tion which reduces the most august of mysteries to 
the triviality of a nursery tale ... Our first __ 
thoughts were best; we cannot swim in such waters.
It is not possible, therefore, to speculate in Hick's fashion,
for:
If we ask the question '0 God, why did you make such 
a world as this?' we do not know the meaning of what 
we ask, because we cannot conceive the conditions, 
or rather, the unconditionedness, of the creative 
choice. All we can do is make up our minds whether 
or no we are grateful for the creative acts which _ 
have made us what we are, and put us where we are.
We can, therefore, it seems, infer nothing in this area. We can 
choose to give thanks if we wish, Farrer says, but such a 
choice is blind, for explanatory stories can offer no help, 
explanatory theories can have no substance. There is in this 
position a strange mixture of the types of theodicy found in 
Crombie-Mitchel1, Phillips, and Hick. Choice is paramount 
(Hick), the trust shown is blind (Crombie-Mitchell), the 
believer's response is shown in his giving thanks for all there 
is (Phillips). But there is also a fundamental rejection of
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those theodicies. There can be no inference (pace Crombie-
Mitchell), the notion of physical screens is suspect (pace
122 Hick), and the nature of God as a real existent is crucial
(p_ace Phillips).
iv) Despite the "whistling in the wind" Farrer
feels driven to here, a position not at all in accord with what 
one sees when one looks at believers, there are aspects of 
Farrer's analysis which are worth pursuing. First, let us take 
up Farrer's interest as to whether God's creative activity begins
closest to God, and proceeds outwards (the great chain of
123 being), or begins at the furthest remove and proceeds inwards
and upwards. There is here an important consideration. 
Reflecting on this question, which clearly baffled Farrer, has 
led me, for reasons about to be set out, to reject both of these 
possibilities in favour of a third. This third approach 
involves understanding the nature of God's creative activity very 
differently from the way Farrer does, and again gives prior 
attention to the nature of God's activity towards man as 
experienced in the Cross of Christ. It is there that what is 
possible in the relation between the infinite and the finite is 
determined for the Christian community. Second, let us take up 
Farrer's rejection of explanatory stories and explanatory 
theories as to why things go as they do, and his deduction from 
this that the believer must retreat into wishful belief and 
gratefulness. Now, attention to the basic Christian testimony
to the affliction of Christ is certainly attention to a story -
124 but not to a fictitious and mythical story. The story of
the Cross represents in Christian belief the historical vanishing 
point of all human attempts to explain, all speculative theories,
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for the Cross can have in the believer's world neither meaning 
nor justification, for it is a folly. The story of the Cross is, 
rather, for the Christian a declaration, a revelation to man of 
the nature of God, and, as such, it is a statement of the 
nature of both the omnipotence and love of God. There is the 
possibility of believing the Christian community when it affirms 
in its story that Christ is the witness by God to himself, of 
believing the testimony of those who have found in the Cross 
the bedrock of their reality; or the possibility of rejecting 
it. To respond to the testimony is to enter into the totality 
of experience-thought-interpretation expressed in the worship 
of the crucified Christ as he is known in that story, that 
story determining for the Christian the relationship of God and 
man, the relationship of the infinite to the finite. God was 
in Christ. And in the worship of Christ God is still present. 
But the God present in Christ is the God who was in Christ in 
his affliction. With that "picture" (story) the Christian 
comes to the way things go in the world. He comes from an 
"afflicted God" to an afflicted world with the unshakeable 
certainty that as the resurrection was the outcome in the 
foundation "story" of the affliction of Christ so the resurrectioi 
is for him the sign (sacrament) of his own call to create meaning 
out of meaninglessness. Within the continuing experience of 
the community of this same Christ celebrated in the Eucharist 
and at Easter, ultimate affliction, final revelation, and unshake- 
able certainty are locked together in the heart of Christian 
belief.
v) But, it may be protested, what sense can there 
be to talk of God being in Christ? Is this some claim of one
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entity being "in" another - with all the conseguent problems 
that have plagued Christian theology? Let us here again ask what 
role such claims play in Christian belief. My reply is that the 
role incarnational talk plays is that the community affirms it 
will live before this man as before God, and will worship before 
this one as before God, and will walk with Christ as with God. 
For Christians to talk of Christ is, therefore, the same in 
meaning as to talk of God. But, of course, they also wish to 
talk still of walking with God, and of having the spirit of God. 
What it is to talk of one of these rather than another is learned 
in the form of life. They are different ways in which the 
reality of God is experienced. But to understand talk of Christ 
in this way may be thought to be reductionist. That is to mis- 
understand. It is not being said Christians relate to Christ
as though he were God, but that there is no difference for
125 Christians between what God is and what Christ is. But to
understand that is to believe the testimony of Christians to 
Christ. It might also be asked whether the first Christians 
came to give Christ the same role as God in their beliefs for 
any reasons, thus admitting inference to God by the front door. 
It seems not. We have already instanced the Caeserea Philippi 
incident in this regard. Let us now note the "Doubting Thomas" 
incident which rebukes all those who would believe for reasons 
and encourages those who would confess before Christ, "My Lord 
and My God". 126 It might be objected that on this understanding 
of the shape of Christology anything might stand as a candidate, 
for one could give anything the role of God and stand before it 
as before God. This is absurd. Let us refer back to the 
discussion of the historical and epistemological grounding of
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religious beliefs. Certain facts are necessary conditions for
saying what is the case, even though what is the case is not
127 deduced from them. What Christ was as a person must be not
incompatible with what God is. But the disciples lived along 
with the man Jesus. It is not that they lived along with God, 
nor that God was hidden in the man, nor that Jesus was also God, 
but that they came to see that for them to respond to what 
Jesus was, was the same as responding to what for them God was. 
He came to have the same role in their "picture". There is no
1 OQ
question, then, of their "finding out" Jesus was God, but of 
their reacting appropriately to the person of Jesus. Their 
testimony as a community was that the appropriate reaction was 
to view Jesus in the light of the "eternal", and not just the 
"world historical". That "leap" is what is meant by "having 
faith". 129
But, it may be variously objected, what was the basis of 
Jesus' certainty of God, and what was the nature of his self- 
consciousness, and wherein lay the basis of the disciples coming 
to see that to respond to him in that way was "appropriate"? 
Such questions again show the pressure on us to ask the questions 
of the non-worshipper and to think in terms of an objective/ 
subjective dichotomy. To get to know that to respond to what 
Jesus was, is the same as to respond to what God is, one must 
make the two-fold act already detailed of coming to see oneself 
as a person before God, and coming to use Christian language to 
say what it means to stand before God. The Christian testimony 
is that to see oneself as standing before Jesus is the same act 
as seeing oneself as standing before God. The basis of 
"appropriate" response involved here is that of "recognition" -
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"the world did not recognise him" (John 1:10), but those who 
did, those who "received him", those who "believed", those who 
were "born of God", saw his "glory, the glory of the one and 
only Son, who came from the Father" (John 1:10-14 NIV). It is 
not possible, therefore, to separate discussion of the person 
of Jesus Christ (objectivity) from the response that the believer 
makes to Christ (subjectivity). To know him as worthy of worship 
is to join those who "recognise" him as worthy of worship, that 
is, to join those who draw the lines in a certain way. The 
question of who Jesus is, is thus "indwelt" by men and women in 
that they are believers or non-believers. The question of the 
nature of Jesus' certainty of God does not therefore arise for 
the believer, for neither the first disciples, nor those who 
have believed them, are responding to what Jesus believed about 
himself or to the empirical condition of his psyche. They are 
responding to what Jesus was as he lived along with them. To 
speak of Jesus' certainty of God is thus to speak of the way he 
lived, for the way he lived was such that the appropriate 
response was held by the first disciples to be to give him the 
same role in their "picture" as they gave to God. Understanding, 
here, is "knowing-how-to-go-on" in "recognising" Jesus as God 
the Son. To the impatient, "Well, was he in fact God or not?", 
the only reply can be that some do so "recognise" him, and some 
do not.
g) Let us now consider "love and omnipotence". The 
Christian not only holds that the love of God is seen in Christ 
on the Cross, but that God created through love and for love. 
There has also been a common assumption that "love" is a positive 
thing which acts positively. This assumption underlies the
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"natural" view of love and accorrtodates "supernatural" love to 
everyday love. It is also the view of love which belongs to 
Theodicies of Inference, theodicies which have been shown to be 
inconsistent with the shape of the depth belief seen by describing 
how believers actually adoringly worship. This positive type of 
love does things, it changes the way things go. It is inter- 
ventionist and has ends. Applied to God, it results in a 
"natural" God. Directed by God to man, it makes man's status 
and autonomy problematic, for who can resist the positive love 
of God? But what other account of love can there be? Here 
again, Simone Weil provides a clue. She suggests "supernatural" 
love can only be thought of properly in terms of an ability to 
withdraw, to refrain, to permit, to let be. In the case of God 
his infinity makes this the only logical and actual possibility. 
Weil writes:
On God's part creation is not an act of self-expansion 
but of restraint and renunciation. God and all his 
creatures are less than God alone. God accepted 
this diminution. He emptied a part of his being from 
himself. 130
And of course, Weil is but releasing the meaning which Christian 
believers find in Philippians 2:5-11, where Christ is seen as 
expressing this loving activity of God by a process of emptying, 
a process which finds its culmination in his affliction on the 
Cross.
There is in Weil's suggestion a possible basis for setting 
out a Theodicy of Dependence structured by such an understanding 
of the nature of God's love, and which the role the Cross plays 
in the life of the believing community witnesses to as in fact 
being the case. But structuring Religious Theodicy on this 
basis has implications for describing the Christian understanding
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of the nature and status of man in his created setting. If the 
love of God, in Christian belief, is understood in terms of God 
negating his divinity, it follows that, in proceeding from God 
to the world, Christian belief can be described as having the 
following shape at depth:
i) Firstly, creation will not positively reveal 
the nature of God, or his existence, for creation is the realm 
from which, in the exercise of renouncing love, God has "with- 
drawn". But what, it might be objected, is the sense of "with- 
drawn" here? Clearly, not a sense that refers, at "depth", to 
God moving in time and space - though at the "surface" such 
language may be pressed into service. Let us refer again, as a 
clue, to the "withdrawing" that is involved in personal relation- 
ships which are loving, and to the mutual renunciations involved
131 in bringing children "to be" in a family. But let us not
suppose that the notion of divine creativity can in any case 
be comprehended. Language is here at its limits and beyond. 
The point is that the "direction" of divine creativity is 
represented by such a word as "withdraw", not the nature of its 
operation. On the latter, our finitude forever draws a veil. 
It might be objected in reply that in that case the notion of 
creation as that from which God has "withdrawn" is not so much 
incomprehensible as mere rhetoric. And if not rhetoric, then 
that a radical dualism is implied. In reply, let us ask what 
is meant by "comprehension" in this situation. The community's 
meanings, it has been argued, are to be ascertained by asking 
what role words have in its "picture". The point here, then, 
is what role the "cosmological" scheme plays in the form of 
life in which it is asserted. Now, the assertion by the
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worshipping community that all things depend on God has been seen 
to be a confession. In that light we may see that the role of 
any cosmological scheme in religious belief is not that of 
providing a scientific hypothesis, but of maintaining a consist- 
ency between what the worshipper knows of the nature of God 
revealed in redemption and the nature of God in creation, for 
there can be no difference in these if coherence in Christian 
belief is to be granted. But the Athanasian controversy settled 
for classical theism that the shape of soteriology takes 
precedence over the shape of all other statements of Christian 
belief, for the test is that the God who saves must be sufficient 
for the salvation claimed. It is proper then, it seems, to move 
from the sacrificial and kenotic love experienced in Christ, to 
the sacrificial and kenotic nature of'the God whose creative 
and redemptive nature can have but one shape for the worshipper.
Thus the "supernatural" God at depth has the suggested relation
1 32 to creation. But what, then, of the charge of an ultimate
dualism? There is no such implication. Creation is, and must 
be, in the Christian form of life, placed in relation to the 
ultimacy of God. Such is the case here; that creation is, is 
dependent on the nature of God as "supernatural" love.
It is this kind of understanding of God's love which 
would provide the basis for Hick's and Bonhoeffer's claim that 
man lives in this world etsi deus non daretur. Hick's technical 
explanations with regard to a required epistemic distance are 
not needed, however, for the point is deeper than this. God's 
absence from the world is a manifestation of the operation of 
"supernatural" love - though it is also the case that the love 
whose essence it is to withdraw can still be present to the
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world, even if it is not in the world. -10 Perhaps the meta- 
phorical biblical language of God coming to the world, sending 
his Son to the world, revealing himself, etc., is not mere 
metaphor in religious language after all? The "supernatural" 
God comes to the world, insofar as believers live before him, 
and make his love, sacrificial love, known to the world. In the 
same way he speaks to the world. Crucially and paradigmati- 
cally for believers, this coming and speaking was in Christ. 
That is what is meant by believers saying Christ is the word 
(logos) of God (John 1:1), and that God speaks in these last
days by a Son (Heb. 1:2). This speaking by the God who is not
134 
a language user takes the form of what it is that Christ does;
The words that I say to you I do not speak on my 
own authority; but the Father who dwells in me 
does his works. Believe me that I am in the 
Father and the Father in me; or else believe me 
for the sake of the works themselves.
(John 14:10-11, RSV)
And the promise of Christ is that belief in him allows the 
community to continue and enhance God's speaking - through its 
participation in the activity of God (John 14:12-14), which is
God's indwelling in the Spirit (John 14:15-17). But the
135 trinitarian and responsive points are developed later.
ii) Secondly, man, in his awareness of his own
existence, cannot find the true meaning of that existence within 
the world. That is what is meant by finitude. Indeed, as God 
is not known in power but in folly, it is only at the point 
where man feels the meaninglessness of the world-in-itself with 
intensity, and where he ceases to assert himself and his values, 
that man comes to the place where God can be known in the ful-
T o a
ness of his sacrificial love. But it has also been argued
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that for the Christian believer, as he gets to know God, the 
affliction of Christ is the central element in his conceptual 
"world", and that, paradoxically, this "world" thus exists from 
the "void" experienced by Christ. This event of the Cross 
provides for the religious believer, therefore, the possibility 
of coming in his self-understanding to the end-point from which 
he comes back to the way things go with absolute meaning 
grounded in the nature of God as revealed in Christ's affliction. 
The refractoriness, negativity, meaninglessness of the world 
are thus viewed by the believer from within a "picture" that 
sets affliction inevitably and inescapably in God's "supernatural" 
love. The believer's self-understanding is thus seen to be 
placed in Christian belief in the nature of God's love as that 
which negates itself. And it can also be seen that the believer 
is called to respond to the world in like fashion (Ro. 12:1). 
The self-sacrificial mind that was in Christ is to be in the 
believer who desires to conform his life to that of the one 
worshipped (Phil. 2:5).
iii) The created world will, then, be self-contained 
and bound by its own nature. Everything in it will operate 
from compulsion. In it everything will seek to exercise its 
own inherent nature, the limits to this being only those of
external or self-limitation. This is what Farrer calls
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"physicality" and Weil more generally terms "gravity". And
therein are contained the inevitable results of the operation of 
"supernatural" love. Only by renunciation and constraint, by 
non-intervention in a positive sense in the physical world, 
can this love of God be shown. The world as we know it, the way 
things go, is not simply an elaborate and planned stage for man's
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moral development. Nor is it the "best possible "world". It is 
the nature and shape of finite existence when God in his love 
"withdraws", and lets it be. Seen in this way, discussion of 
"possible worlds" and "counter-factual worlds" by recent
-i OO
theodicists can be seen to be a failure to accept reality
with seriousness. It is not, as Hick and Smart have argued,
139 that positing such worlds is in detail unhelpful. It is that
they are in principle inconceivable. The world as it is is 
reality that derives from the operation of the deifugal (Weil) 
nature of God's love. It is the only possible world. But, not 
withstanding this point, it is nevertheless the Christian claim 
that the ultimate expression of deifugal love is that God 
should come to his own in that world, and be rejected by that 
world in affliction on the Cross. In that event, it is claimed, 
is found the exact measure of the extent of God's renunciation 
of himself, that is, the exact measure of his love. From the 
human point of view, then, God is most fully revealed in his 
nature at the point of ultimate renunciation. This is what is
meant by holding suffering absolutely before God - perhaps
140 that is what the phrase "death of God" points to?
iv) The possible meanings of the word "omnipotence" 
are also clarified. The possibility of all things depends on 
the omnipotent exercise by the "supernatural" God of his love. 
Omnipotence is thus seen to be God's total ability to renounce 
himself, to empty himself, to restrain himself - for only 
omnipotence could make the infinite-divine less. But this omni- 
potence is thereby seen to be identical with the nature of God's 
love. Omnipotence is, therefore, the love of God in its action - 
renunciation. There can, then, be no clash in logic or actuality
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between love and omnipotence. Omniscience similarly refers to 
God's flawless knowledge of his nature so understood. This kind 
of understanding of course has nothing to do with mistakes made 
in relation to the "surface" grammar of belief, and which derive 
from reasoning in the secular epistemological "direction". 
"Natural" omnipotence is both logically inconceivable and 
actually impossible. The "depth" grammar of omnipotence relates, 
however, to the "supernatural" God. When this omnipotent-love
is experienced by the worshipping community of believers, then
141 the community expresses it in terms of God's almightiness
for God is felt to transcend all natural meanings and ways, for 
he does not seek to act as nature and man act, namely by assert- 
ing himself. The love of God is sacrificial; its nature is to 
deny itself. God is under no compulsion, however, for his 
actions are those of grace. And his grace is all-sufficient 
because he knows in all circumstances what sacrificial love 
entails.
v) Fifthly, the difference between man and nature 
is, however, that the sacrificial and renouncing love of God is 
a possible mode of existence for man. Here we can bring together 
points already developed. Man can choose to live on the basis 
of natural positive love, or by "supernatural" love characterised 
by renunciation, humility, self-negation. This choice is the 
challenge the Christian community has always seen in the event 
of the Cross, and which is the essence of the testimony to Christ 
to which the believer is committed. This testimony to "super- 
natural" love not only, therefore, marks the genesis of the 
different epistemology used by the Christian for saying how 
things go, but also provides the essential characteristics of
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the religious dependence that brings man into communion with God. 
The nature and operation of God's omniscient love-omnipotence 
are grounded in negation - of the divine self. Religious 
dependence expresses this same kind of love. What the Christian 
believer commits himself to is the testimony that at the point 
of ultimate affliction there is also to be found final revelation 
of both God's true nature and his own. This experience is the 
location and anchor of his unshakeable belief. The historical 
reality of the Cross stands, the believer claims, as a valid 
and authentic understanding of the world, and man, and God. In 
relation to this revelation the believer comes into being; 
consequently, here also arises the "grammar" of belief, and 
within it, the character of his response. "God", "man", 
"omnipotence", "love", "dependence", "action" - they are 
severally and together the basic structure of depth belief, 
worship, and theodicy.
h) Now, it might be objected that this Theodicy of 
Dependence amounts when all is said and done to an "explanation", 
and that the attempt at a descriptive and non-justificatory 
theodicy has broken down. But such an objection is not cogent. 
Firstly, descriptive understanding, in showing the moves a 
believer makes as he proceeds from God to the world will, of 
course, by the use of its methodology, finally arrive with the 
believer at the world that is, and where it is located by the 
structure of belief. But that journey of understanding is quite 
different from the theodicist seeking to show that evil in the 
world serves some ultimate and justified purpose. But, secondly, 
the description has shown that what is in mind in the Christian 
"picture" is also non-justificatory. Both God and man are faced
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with responding to the world that is, with all its negativity, 
in its givenness, as it arises from the eternal creativity of 
the divine nature. In both cases - God's and man's - this 
response is held by the believing community to be the occasion 
for further demonstrations of that sacrificial love which is 
the nature of the supernatural God. Both God and man thus meet 
the world that is in responsive love. There is no question, 
then, of justification in either a strong or weak sense but 
only of response. Purpose and meaning, in the Christian "picture" 
must be brought to the world in the exercise of love. However, 
thirdly, as noted in the Introduction, protagonists may press 
into use for their apologetic purposes whatever is at hand. But 
then it is a matter of religious judgement whether one finds the 
Christian "picture" advocated by such apologists captivating. 
Descriptive theodicy is only concerned with coherence, not 
"plausibility".
It might be further objected that such a theodicy differs 
hardly at all from Mitchell's notion of blind trust. Such a 
charge would, however, be a misconception of the whole description 
that has been made of the nature of religious belief. In reply 
let us concentrate on the role of "witness" in the life of the 
community - firstly, the "witness" of the Cross; secondly, the 
"witness" of the community to the Cross.
i) The Cross has been interpreted in terms of
severest affliction which has been claimed to be the end-point 
of meaninglessness and negativity. It is the point at which 
all explanatory theories and stories are seen to fail both in
fact and in logic. It is in the NT called the foolishness of
14? 143 144 God. It is without reason, and is a "scandal". It is,
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for the believer, the final statement of the refractoriness of 
the way things go. But the Christian testimony has also been 
seen to be that the Cross thereby serves as a twofold "witness" 
- to the limits of meaning and explanation within this world, 
and also to the nature of the love of God. This "witness" of 
the Cross cannot be rationalised in terms of anything in this 
world. Nor could it be predicted. It is not derivable from 
anything that occurred in that historical event of crucifixion,
nor is it an explanation of that event. It is in the language
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of Christian hymnody, a cause for amazement. It is entirely
appropriate, therefore, to use the word "witness" for this 
happening. A witness has two functions, as Diogenes Alien 
argues: a) it indicates or reveals a path to be followed, a 
path which goes in the direction of another reality, and b) it
makes it incumbent on a person to act - either to follow or not
146 follow the path indicated. The Cross, as God's "witness" to
the nature of his own love, is therefore both a revelation and a 
call to act.
ii) But how is the claim of such a "witness" to 
be authenticated and tested? Not at all by, or at the end of, 
theoretical discussion. The test, the authentication, is the 
practical one of doing, or not doing, of responding, or not 
responding, of believing the "witness", or not. A community of 
belief such as Christianity is not thus a collection of people 
who have come to an agreement about the coherence of a certain 
set of ideas or who are blindly trusting. It is the community 
of those who have accepted the testimony, socially communicated 
from generation to generation, that the revelation of love 
experienced in the Cross has power to create a reality, the shape
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of which conforms to the nature of the One revealed. The 
believer, in believing that testimony, finds power there. With 
the experience of forgiveness and reconciliation that arises 
from the redemptive power of renouncing love, the believer finds 
both an epistemological and a psychological certainty based on 
the revelation of that love in the Cross. It is a power that 
returns the believer to the way things go in the world with new 
understandings, new interpretations, new courses of action. His 
"meanings" are brought to the world; the structures of his
thought are determined by those of the Cross. To the believer
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all things are thus made new; he is a "new creation". The
believing community is itself, therefore, the "witness" to the 
"picture" that is constituted by the Cross. The kind of truth 
which is entailed is strictly of this kind. It is not infer- 
ential, or explanatory, or a last option of unseeing trust. It 
is motivating-belief which, within the experiencing and practising 
community of belief, is claimed to meet the criteria determined 
above - i.e. criteria which can be held at the moment of 
adoring worship. That is why the community persists. The 
rationality is one that has to be practised to be understood, that 
is, the meaning of the concepts is the role they play in life. 
But to practise this rationality, to live before the God revealed 
in the Cross, is also to test it, and, perhaps, to authenticate 
it. For example, Paul writes:
If God is for us, who is against us? He who did not 
spare his own Son but gave him up for us all, will 
he not also give us all things with him? .... Who 
shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall 
tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, 
or nakedness, or peril, or sword? ... I am sure that 
neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principali- 
ties, nor things present, nor things to come, nor 
powers, norheight, nor depth, nor anything else in 
all creation, will be able to separate us from the
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love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord.
(Romans 8:31-39, R.S.V.)
My argument is that, within the Christian form of life, 
this response is intended to be neither hyperbole, nor religious 
fervour, nor blind trust, nor a blunder. It is intended as an 
accurate expression of the rationality which arises from seeing 
the way things go in the epistemological "direction" which 
proceeds from God to the world. The Cross of Christ is seen by 
the believer as the final and paradigm case of affliction which 
gives meaning to all lesser cases. Severest affliction, ultimate 
revelation, and unshakeable belief are the essence of the "depth 
grammar" of Christian theodicy.
There remains one further task of description, for when 
the question of epistemological "direction" was explored it was 
suggested that the outcome is to be found in the believer's 
interpretation of the way things go, and that this outcome is 
evidenced by the nature of his response to the world. What does 
it mean for the believer to respond in the world to his belief 
that all things depend on the God known in Christ?
D. Affliction and the Response of the Believer
1. We are now in a position to return to the matter of 
the differing evaluations that underlie the unbeliever's and the 
believer's problems of evil. With what evaluations does the 
believer as worshipper respond to the negativity which for him 
is a reality as well as God being a reality?
Certain things have become clear in principle. Though 
both God and negativity are realities for the believer, he or
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she views one in the light of worship of the other, and thus a 
simple dualism is ruled out. The believer comes from God to 
the world, he takes a religious view of negativity. Also, the 
Christian, in the ways described above, does not set even 
affliction over against God, for his "picture" places affliction 
centrally in his understanding of the "supernatural" God as 
known in Christ, that is, within the scheme he uses when making 
evaluations. The way this understanding works out in practice 
is well illustrated in Temple's comments that the Christian 
mind takes a different view of the significance of pain. The 
evil of sin, Temple says, outweighs the evil of pain, and the 
suffering of the guilty outweighs that of the innocent. Why?
Because (and here let us refer back to the argument that for the
148 believer "sin" is the fundamental evil) sin is the "essential
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evil". That, quite clearly, is the judgement of an adoring
worshipper.
2. But it was also noted that the believer's evaluations 
have an absolute character, and thus far the discussion of this 
feature of belief has been in terms of, on the one hand, God as 
an unshakeable reality in the "picture" of the believer, and 
on the other, of the way interpersonal language is used absolutely 
Reference, however, to H.H. Farmer's fine discussion of the 
experience of worship in his Revelation and Religion, shows 
that the experience of the believer also needs to be described 
in terms of absoluteness, for the experience of God as known in 
worship is characterised by both "absolute demand" and "final 
succour". It is the aspect of absolute demand which gives 
substance to the religious judgements of Temple mentioned above, 
for "sin" is the failure to respond appropriately to absolute
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demand, and, therefore, has a unique status in the evaluative 
system of the believer. But final succour seems to be the 
experiential element of which the believer is in need as he 
faces his life as an actuality in a frequently hostile world. 
Now final succour is only possible if there are no circumstances 
which lie beyond the view the believer can take of evil from 
within his "picture". But as we have seen that that "picture" is 
built on the basis that the severest negativity is affliction, 
and that the ultimate affliction is that of God in Christ, it 
follows that, as a worshipper of the God known in Christ, the 
believer can draw final succour from that God, for
In bringing many sons to glory, it was fitting that 
God, for whom and through whom everything exists, 
should make the author of their salvation perfect 
through suffering.
(Heb. 2:10 N.I.V.)
But the believer claims something further in relation to 
final succour and absolute demand, and it is that in God's 
forgiveness of sin he or she knows in experience the absolute 
goodness and the absolute power and the absolute love of God 
through Christ. Knowing this kind of forgiveness in life as a 
claimed experience of the nature of the "supernatural" God, the 
believer cannot then oppose the fact of evil against it - for as 
a forgiven sinner, as one who is alive to God in the world, as 
one who holds the world before God, his duty is to act in accord 
with the absolute demand to express the love of God, the 
sacrificial love of the supernatural God, and in so doing to 
find final succour, the strength of that love, with him. The 
way things go in the world is thus the occasion for being alive 
to God in the world, and not the occasion for the believer to 
doubt the existence of God.
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Now I would like to take exception at this point to 
Winch's account of what it is to live as a believer. He 
suggests that five responses are involved. There is, he says, 
an internal relation between an all-powerful and all-good God, 
and (i ) owing that God absolute obedience, (ii) not asking 
whether his love can fail (or, if one does ask, realising that 
the doubt does not relate to his power, but to thinking at all 
in such terms), (iii) not thinking that lapses of obedience will 
go unnoticed (omniscience) or his vengeance unvisited (for, if 
we are thinking in these terms at all, we are judging ourselves 
against a certain conception of the power of love), (iv) the 
kind of obedience (its extent) due to human authorities, and 
(v) taking up "an entirely different point of view" when 
approaching moral guestions. What is wrong here is the spirit of 
the account. Winch's Christian seems to know nothing of the 
forgiveness of God in terms of grace. The model of God is one 
of positive power, and the model of the believer is of someone 
who is subservient. The outline is that of an authoritarian, 
albeit benevolent, dictatorship. Perhaps the cause of this 
failure to appreciate that the Christian model of God is that of 
a gracious and indwelling God is that Winch has approached the 
all-good, all-powerful God of the interpersonal theological model 
analytically, whereas the believer builds on a claimed experience. 
Let us note some words of H.R. Mackintosh here;
insists that God's judgement of forgiveness 
is not analytic but synthetic. These formidable 
terms suggest a point of real importance . . . the 
God who by His holiness shatters our claim to live 
before Him nevertheless by His love gives us a new 
life. And by the phrase 'a synthetic judgement 1 
this fundamental point is emphasised, that the 
forgiving grace of God does not presuppose our 
worth but calls it into being. 152
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The question arises, therefore, as to what the role is in the 
Christian "picture" of this experience of forgiveness of sin. 
I suggest the role played is that of bringing the believer to 
the position where he can say, "All things depend on God", as 
an utterance of worship, and not as a statement of inference 
from the way things go in this world. It is the means by which 
the believer passes over ("repents") from the world-historical 
view, to participation in the eternal. It is the act by which 
the believer moves into the community of those for whom the 
previously described rationality of worship constitutes "grammar". 
Mackintosh puts it more pietistically but to good effect: "Get
into the company of Jesus and into the atmosphere of compassionate
153 love He bears with Him, and let this tell upon you". But what
does this amount to other than to engage in the form of life of 
the Christian community? To know one is forgiven, to know in 
experience the all-sufficiency of the love and power of God, is 
to act in life before God as one who is absolutely forgiven, and 
upon whom there comes the absolute demand to do the duty of a 
member of the family of God (to praise God), and the absolute 
privilege of knowing the final succour that thereby arises.
3. Mention was made just now of the "indwelling" of the 
believer by God, and this indwelling concerns the claim of 
believers that God, through the Holy Spirit, lives in them as they 
live in the world. The Christian response to the way things go 
in the world, therefore, has reference to a full trinitarian 
conception of God. Now, Farmer's description of Christian worship 
has just such reference to its shape being trinitarian, but on 
this point two other writers can take us further in describing 
the connection between negativity, the Christian's response to
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it, and the Christian's worship cast in trinitarian terms.
A major weakness of conventional theodicy is that it does 
not deal with trinitarian Christianity, but with a philosopher's 
version of monarchical Christianity. It is "God" and "evil". 
It has already been shown that theodicy which relates to 
theology in the interpersonal language model must of necessity 
be christological. But Christology is set in classical theism 
within the worship of God experienced as Trinity. Is it possible 
to spell out the significance of this for Religious Theodicy?
Moltmann has made a central issue the need to understand 
the Cross itself in trinitarian and interpersonal terms. He 
writes:
If we use the simple concept of God we are more and 
more inclined to reserve it for the Father who 
abandons Jesus and lets him die, but not to use it 
for the Son, who is abandoned ... But this 'empties 
the cross' of deity.
If, however, we begin by leaving the simple 
concept of God aside, we have to speak of the persons 
in their special relationship in this event. The 
Father is the one who abandons. He abandons Jesus 
to the abyss of being forsaken ... The Spirit is the 
Spirit of surrender of the Father and the Son. He 
is creative love proceeding out of the Father's 
pain and the Son's self-surrender ...
We have interpreted the cross in a trinitarian 
manner as an event occurring in the relationship 
between persons, in which these persons are 
constituted in their relationship to each other and 
so constitute themselves. And so we have seen the 
cross not as the suffering of only one person of 
the Trinity in human form ... a complete apprehension 
of the cross of Christ makes it necessary to think in 
trinitarian terms.154
Now my interest here is not Moltmann's particular understanding 
of the Cross and the Trinity, but his emphasis on the connection 
between them being necessitated by an attempt to understand 
interpersonal aspects of Christian theology. Secondly, and to 
develop this point, let us refer to Elizabeth Moberly's
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Suffering, Innocent and Guilty, where she draws attention to 
the connections in Christian thought between trinitarian language 
used of God, and the shape of human experience in society based 
on interdependence:
... the phenomenon of interdependence is receiving 
increasing attention, £but~J its ultimate basis is 
not always recognised. Here we might find the so- 
called 'social doctrine of the Trinity' helpful. 
Interdependence, we have asserted, is the basic 
structure of personal existence. If we take this 
statement seriously we cannot limit its application 
to human personal existence, but should look also 
to the life of the personal God in whom we as 
Christians believe ... we see that the pattern of 
human life is to be one of reciprocity, self- 
emptying, and mutuality - the kenotic life we 
were created for and are called to, in the image 
of the trinitarian God.155
This argument of Moberly's, that the basic structure of 
human existence is interdependence, and that it is possible to 
see the "kenotic" nature of that existence as finding its 
pattern in the image of the trinitarian God, enables me to bring 
together here the shape of the believer's understanding of the 
Cross, Moltmann's suggestion that this has a trinitarian 
dimension, the understanding of God's being as self-emptying 
sacrificial love, and the believer's response in the world, in 
a way that makes for a simple and unified description of the 
shape of Christian belief and action. But, it may immediately 
be protested, is not kenotic theory a failed attempt in theology, 
why try to resurrect it now? Geddes MacGregor, in He Who Lets 
Us Be, has recently and independently reconsidered kenotic 
Christology in the light of Weil's suggestion used above as to 
the nature of God. He argues convincingly that the failure 
earlier in the century of kenotic Christology came about not 
because the notion of kenosis was faulty, but because it was 
applied to Christology alone and was not pushed back into a new
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understanding of the meaning of the Trinity in Christian belief. 
Kenotic Christology, to make sense, needs a kenotic understanding 
of the Trinity as self-emptying and sacrificial love. What Weil, 
Moberly, MacGregor, and I are arguing is that the kenotic motif 
needs to be seen to be operating at all levels of theological 
and existential formulation of the shape of interpersonal 
existence if the coherence of Christian belief is to be seen. 
It is this unity of the structure of being as kenotic which 
provides the interpretive key to the inter-relationships of 
personal being, and which is the basis for legitimate worship of 
God in the believing community - worship here not being the 
subservience of mortal beings to divine power, but the celebra- 
tion by adoring worshippers of God understood as the eternal 
source of self-emptying love, whom to know is life eternal. 
This way of understanding the relationship of the believer to 
Christology, and Christology to Trinity, seems to me to be 
preferable to that of Moltmann who, in his enthusiasm for his 
idea, identifies the Trinity and the event of the Cross - "The 
material principle of the doctrine of the Trinity is 'the cross, 1
and the formal principle of the theology of the cross is the
157 doctrine of the Trinity". When John's gospel says, "What
God was, the Word was", (John 1:1, NEB) and the Johannine 
epistle affirms "God is love" (1 John 4:16), and also that 
"This is how we know what love is : Jesus Christ laid down his 
life for us" (1 John 3:16 NIV), then the cross of Christ and 
the revealing of the nature of God as sacrificial love found 
there, enter into the believer's experience within the kenotic 
structure of being. The self-emptying God, the self-emptying 
Christ, and the self-emptying believer are, as Moberly argues,
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to be understood in terms of each other. The connection Moberly 
draws (as a believer) between the life of the believer and the 
life of God is thus internal, and structures one fixedly with 
the other. The "fundamental, ontological solidarity of human
-i CT O
society" lies in Christian belief, expressed in terms of 
interpersonal theology, in the fundamental ontological solidarity 
of the Trinity.
4. But what kind of act is it that those who have 
experienced the goodness and power of God in forgiveness should 
engage in? Is it sufficient to live in the world as those who 
know God's forgiveness, and as those who thank and praise God 
in all things? Has the Christian believer no criticisms to make?
Now Roth asks the question, "Does forgiveness justify God
159 fully?" His answer is clearly, "No", for in A Consuming
Fire he develops a "protest theodicy" which argues that the
Holocaust smoke "casts a pall over the empty tomb", and thus
prevents the resurrection motif from being the occasion in this
world "to sing only with joy and thanksgiving Easter hymns that
1 C. O
spite the sting of death and the grave's victory". Whatever 
the test and the ground of theodicy in the ways described above, 
Roth would argue it remains a prime responsive act of the 
Christian to the way things are in this world that he protests 
to God - "a spirit of Christian rebelliousness constitutes one 
vital form of praise rendered to the God who gives us life
-i r- o
that can and therefore must be good". Now Roth's book 
constitutes his own Christian rebellion, but it is cast in the 
form of a response to a "natural" God. Is it possible to 
describe the way protest functions at depth in relation to the 
"supernatural" God?
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To explore this question let us turn to the description
offered by Brueggemann of the role of lament in the psalter. In
164 his paper, "The Formfulness of Grief" he claims:
The lament psalms offer important resources for 
Christian faith and ministry even though they have 
been largely purged from the life of the Church 
and its liturgical
Developing an argument (similar to the approach in this 
thesis) in terms of "form" and "function", he sees lament 
working thus in all that is involved in the language of praise:
The purpose of the lament is the creation and 
restoration of the member of the community by the 
action of the group. The function is rehabilitation/ 
restoration and the form serves that function.
In considering the interaction of form and 
function, we are helped by the sociologists who 
see regularised language as the way a community 
created and maintains a life-world. 166 Such 
regularised speech activity serves both to enhance 
the experience so that dimensions of it are not 
lost and to limit the experience so that some 
dimensions are denied their legitimacy. This 
suggests, applied to the lament form, that its 
regularised use intends to enable and require 
'sufferers' in the community to experience their 
suffering in a legitimate life-world. It is this 
form which enhances experience and brings it to 
articulation and also limits the experience of 
suffering so that it can be received and coped with 
according to the perspectives, perceptions, and 
resources of the community. Thus the function of 
the form is definitional . It tells the experiencer 
the shape of the experience which it is legitimate 
to experience. 1^7
A lament, therefore, is not a complaint - that would belong to 
theodicies of inference - for complaints expect something. But 
exactly here, Brueggemann makes the mistake of seeing Israel as 
complaining, and he thinks rightly so, because a complaint is a 
basis for action whereas a lament bemoans a tragedy which cannot 
be reversed, and is used by the apathetic who do not believe in 
a future. Complaint, he argues however, is active and hopes 
for an intrusion which will fulfil the petition. But this
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discussion confuses religious language expressed in the terms of 
surface articulations using the language of causality from 
contextual culture, and the depth of that belief rightly caught 
in the lament form. What the lament does is to recognise that 
this is a frequently hostile world, and to lay this fact before 
the God of absolute demand and final succour. In so doing the 
believer allows the form to function in his life as the judgement 
of God on the assertiveness that has caused the hostile state 
of affairs to arise in nature or between persons. When laid 
before God and directed at God it becomes the cause for action 
on the believer's part because it becomes apparent to the 
believer that it is absolutely not of the will of God. One can
thus understand the finding by Westermann in The Praise of God
169 in the Psalms that "I found to my astonishment that there are
no Psalms which do not progress beyond petition and lament!" 
Doxology is the expression in religious belief of the absolute- 
ness of God's person, which is entirely faultless, and which 
directs the believer back to the world as the sphere in which he 
lives as a person aware that he is a "sinner", but a "forgiven
sinner" who can joyfully walk in God's love as he knows the
170 Spirit in his life.
5. At this point, a wider connection arises regarding 
Moberly's linking, through the doctrine of the Trinity, 
religious belief and the shape of society, and it is possible to 
describe what might be meant by seeing an internal connection 
between the Trinity as social and human experience as social. 
Soelle argues1 1 that the language of lament enables the 
sufferer to pass from solitariness and muteness in suffering, 
through the language of lament, to affirmative action in society.
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She in fact attaches her account to social class interpretations, 
but this is application rather than description - the latter 
can stand alone, and is useful in giving flesh to Moberly's 
claim. Soelle charts her description of the progress of this 
response to suffering thus:




speechless aware, able to speak 
moaning psalmic language 





the pressure of the pressure of
suffering turns one suffering sensitizes
in on himself
autonomy of thinking, autonomy of experi-
speaking, and acting ence (can be inte-
lost grated)



















the pressure of 
suffering produces 
solidarity 
autonomy of action 
that produces change
objectives can be 
organised 
active behavior 
helping to shape the 
situation
acceptance and 
conquest of powerless 
ness in changed 
structures
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Now the details of Soelle's description do not matter, 
but rather the connections that are apparent between 1ament and 
action. The believer's evaluations of the proper nature of 
society flow from his beliefs regarding the "supernatural" God 
as social Trinity and as revealed in the Cross. Within Theodicy 
of Dependence, therefore, can be found a description of the
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believer's motivation to act to oppose suffering at all levels 
in society; all suffering, that is, except that which is the 
expression of the "supernatural" love of God in action.
But in what ways will the acts of a worshipper of an 
all-good, all-loving God differ from those of an unbeliever?
Now, the difference might not be in the values they in 
fact hold, but in the way the values are held. However, one is 
not looking here for coincidences of what might be the case, 
but for what must be the case in terms of the "grammar" of a 
form of life. Now, in this regard, the way beliefs are held 
matters. The unbeliever must, it seems to me, lack an absolute 
reference for personal understanding, and this will lead him 
inevitably to treat all people as equal - their needs, their 
interests, their status, and so on. The moral person, in the
eyes of the unbeliever, will be rational, autonomous, and equal
173 
with all other moral persons. But what then would be the
cause of altruism? - that is, of self-emptying, sacrificial 
action. The arguments for this type of action do not appear to 
me to lie within what it is to be a person-in-relationship for, 
in a sense,altruism holds back on one's own proper place in the 
moral order without reason, if the moral order is genuinely in 
its own terms the expression of what it is to be a person. 
Altruism is, therefore, a problem for the unbeliever.
But, if one moves beyond altruism as a problem in unbelief 
to renunciation and sacrificial love as attributed by believers 
to God, and then brought back into the way persons should act 
in this world, one can see that altruism is internal to belief 
- believers cannot hold themselves as equal to other persons, 
but must always prefer others to themselves. This preferring
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of others is not, as sometimes mistakenly found in piety, to
demean oneself, but is to hold oneself before others as of no
174 
account, as God revealed himself to be of no account in the
Cross. This altruism is something Christians affirm. I can see 
no grounds for describing it as "reasonable" - but that is a 
religious judgement, not a philosophical description.
When one turns to the question of how the believer regards 
the created world differently from the unbeliever, then I think 
the difference is one of religious awe. Contemplation that the 
world is does not function as a cosmological argument, but 
as a religious act, for the world as a whole is held before God, 
for all things depend on God. This religious awe is to see one's 
responsibility before God,it is to bring God to the world, and to 
tremble. Is it by accident that "amazement" and "fear" are the 
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Paterson, "Evil, Omniscience and Omnipotence"; Gruner, 
"The Elimination of the Argument from Evil". On the 
Issue of whether evil is "evidence", see e.g. Par- 
getter, "Evil as Evidence Against the Existence of 
God", (knd the reply in Martin, "Is Evil Evidence 
Against the Existence of God?"); Moore, "Evidence, 
Evil and Religious Belief"; Wolfe, "Hume on Evil". 
On logical aspects of a Best Possible World, see e.g. 
Adams, "Must God Create the Best?"; Howe, "Leibniz 
on Evil"; McHarry, "A Theodicy", (and the reply in 
Perkins,"McHarry 1 s Theodicy: A Reply"); Reichenbach, 
"Must God Create the Best Possible World?" (with 
discussion in Basinger, "Must God Create the Best 
Possible World? A Response; Reichenbach, "Basinger 
on Reichenbach and the Best Possible World"). On 
logical aspects of the Free-will Defence, see ,^_g_.? 
Flew, "Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom"; Mackie, 
op- cit.; Smart, "Omnipotence, Evil and Supermen"; 
Flew, "Are Ninian Smart's Temptations Irresistable?"; 
Pike, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action"; 
Davis, "A Defence of the Freewill Defence"; PLANTINGA 
(GFE); Flew, "The Free Will Defence"; McGuiness and 
Tomberlin, "God, Evil, and the Free Will Defense"; 
Swinburne, "The Problem of Evil"; Davis, "Free Will 
and Evil". For a major response to Plantinga on 
"possible world" approaches, see Pike, "Plantinga on 
Free Will and Evil". On the issue of omnipotence, 
also see e.g., GEACH ch. 1-2 (with discussion in 
Harrison, "Geach on God's Alleged Inability to Do 
Evil"; Geach, "Can God Fail to Keep Promises?"; 
Harrison, "Geach on Harrison on Geach on God".); 
Gellman, "The Paradox of Omnipotence, and Perfection"; 
SWINBURNE (CT); Khamara, "In Defence of Omnipotence"; 
Rosenkrantz and Hoffman, "What an Omnipotent Agent 
Can Do"; Ramsey, "The Paradox of Omnipotence". For 
Schlesinger's logical arguments on the "maximum 
degree of desirability of state", see Schlesinger, 
"The Problem of Evil" and "On the Possibility", with 
responses in La Para, "Suffering, Happiness, and Evil"; 
Rosenberg, "The Problem of Evil Revisited"; Shea, 
"God, Evil, and Professor Schlesinger"; and 
Khatchadourian, "God, Happiness and Evil". For reply, 
see SCHLESINGER. See below for discussion, section 2A-B,
12. Less pessimistic than fn. 10. Man as imago dei has the
rational basis for the theodical task, but experience 
shows it insufficient - but this will change in the 
eschaton. For aspects of this see Hick, "Theology 
and Verification", and HICK (EGL:b), pp. 333-41.
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13. Man's rationality is given high status and wide scope. See, 
e.g. LEIBNIZ; also PLANTINGA (COM), (NN), (GFE). 
There is a strong leaning to this position in all 
actual theodicies e.g. FARRER (LA); HICK (EGL); 
TENNANT; GRIFFIN.
14. To be distinguished from fn. 10. The point at issue is not 
some "defect" in man but man's proper attitude to God, 
be man defective or not. Kane, "The Concept of 
Divine Goodness" uses the terms "Unintelligibility 
Thesis" and "Impropriety Thesis" for the position in 
fn. 10. I suggest for here, "Impiety Thesis".
15. For some, theodicy is a matter of "practice", not "theory". 
God has justified himself, in fact, in the cross of 
Christ. See, e.g., PITTENGER (GD), p. 52; 
D. Jenkins, The Glory of Man (London: S.C.M. Press 
Ltd., 1967), pp.89 and 107; WHALE, pp. 14-5; 
E.B. Castle, Approach to Quakerism (London: Bannisdale 
Press, 1961), pp. 98-106; Fulton, "Theodicy" - he 
also quotes P.T. Forsyth, The Justification of God; 
E.L. Mascall, He Who Is (London: Darton, Longman and 
Todd, Ltd., 1966), pp. 183 ff.; HEBBLETHWAITE, p. 56 
- on Judaism but excepting Maimonides); D.L. Edwards, 
What is Real in Christianity? (London: Fontana, 
1972), p. 138; Collins, "C.A. Campbell and the 
Problem of Suffering", pp. 315-16.
16. For surveys see for example, URMSON, and WARNOCK.
17. See AHERN. Cf. also KENNY. For comment, see below pp. 
51-2.
18. For discussion, see pp. 13-22 below. On philosophy as
system-building, see K. Wilson, Making Sense of It 
(London: Epworth Press, 1973), pp. 15-9.
19. See HICK (EGL). For comment, see below, pp. 15-8, 57-8, 
and 254-56.
20. See FARRER (LA). For comment, see below, pp. 27 and 257-58.
21. Cf. KEIGHTLEY (WGG), p. 21, "for the later Wittgenstein
language is seen as a formative element in the social 
life of man which must be described in all its great 
variety". He cites WITTGENSTEIN at P.I., 124, 
"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual 
use of language; it can in the end only describe it", 
and P.I., 109, "We must do away with all explanation, 
and description alone must take its place." Cf. 
WARNOCK, ch. 9, esp. p. 86.
22. PHILLIPS (CP). See also Phillips, "The Problem of Evil".
23. HICK (EGL:a), Preface, p. X. Cf. PETIT, pp. 7-8.
24. The excellent selection of readings collected in PIKE shows 
this well - despite its sub-title "Readings in the 
Theological Problem of Evil". Cf. HEIMBECK, pp. 
15-9 which sees TENNANT, and FLEW and MACINTYRE as 
exemplars of broader and narrower philosophical 
approaches to theology - namely, system and analysis.
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He sees this affecting method, scope, and intention. 
See also H.A. Hodges, "What Is To Become of 
Philosophical Theology?" in H.D. Lewis, Contemporary 
British Philosophy, Third Series (London and New York: 
George Alien & Unwin, 1956), pp. 212-17.
25. Cf. SHERRY, p. 65 similarly regarding ethics in the writings 
of Moore and Ross being concentrated on e.g. "good", 
"ought" and "right". Similarly, political philosophy 
being narrowed to "justice" and "natural rights".
26. For this see SCHILLEBEECKX, Part 1, ch. 1.
27. HICK (EGL:a), p. 282.
28. This is argued fully in section 2D below.
29. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 9. Indeed, pp. 5-10.
30. For the fulness of theology in mind here, see below, pp. 
162-69.
31. Though where systematic theology is in the ascendent, claims 
otherwise might be made.
32. See below, pp. 142-75.
33. See LEIBNIZ.
34. Ibid., p. 73.
35. Ibid., p. 123.
36. For "internal" epistemology, see below, pp. 217-24. For
Bayle's epistemology, which opposes faith and reason, 
see P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(London: Collier-Macmillan," 1967), Vol. I, 259-61. 
GRIFFIN, pp. 135-36 compares Calvin to Bayle.
37. A. Flew, An Introduction to Western Philosophy (London:
Thames and Hudson, 1971), p. 291 defines philosophical 
rationalism as maintaining there are self-evident 
and non-tautological truths from which we can deduce 
substantial conclusions about the way things have 
been, are, and will be-
38. In editorial comment in LEIBNIZ, pp. 11-2.
39. See HICK (FK). For comment see BR&KENHIELM, pp. 69-109.
40. Ibid., section II. See also Hick, "Religious Faith as 
Experiencing-As".
41. HICK (FK), p. vi.
42. Ibid., p. 144.
43. All quotes from HICK (EGLrb), pp. 281-82. For a defence of 
Hick's thesis, see B. Miller, "The No-Evidence 
Defence", International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion, III (1972): 44-50. Miller cites a 
previous literature. For a general attack on Hick's 
theodicy, see Kane, "The Failure of Soul-Making 
Theodicy". Hick replies in HICK (EGLrb), pp. 376-84. 
Cf. Kane, "Soul-making Theodicy and Eschatology" and 
Hick's reply in HICK (DEL), ch. 13. For further 
debate, see below, section 2, fn. 223.
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44. HICK (GUF), p. 54. Cf. ibid., pp. 68-9 and BROWN (RR), 
p. 125.
45. HICK (EGL:a), pp. 301-11.
46. Ibid., pp. 311-13.
47. Ibid., pp. 312-13.
48. For this notion see RAMSEY (RL), pp. 59-60. Cf. also p. 37.
49. See below, pp. 27-33 and 175-80.
50. See above, p. 4.
51. For a critique of finite theism, see OWEN, pp. 49-58 and
HICK (EGL:b), pp. 27-9. For "internal" limitation in 
God, and its implications for theodicy see Hick's 
discussion (ibid., pp. 30-3) of E.S. Brightmanjand 
also ROSS. For a recent exposition, see SCHILLING, 
pp. 240-45. Also GRIFFIN, pp. 243-50.
52. The broad term quasi-theism is taken from MADDEN & HARE, 
ch. 6. They list Brightman, Whitehead, Hartshorne 
and Royce. Also on p. 11 they see aspects of it 
in Earth and Tillich. See, e.g., COBB; HARTSHORNE; 
OGDEN; TILLICH.
53. For recent expositions of Whitehead (via Hartshorne), see 
PITTENGER (PG) with its bibliography on pp. 39-42, 
and GARRISON, CH. Ill - with bibliography at pp. 218- 
23. For "panentheism", see the latter, pp. 44-50.
54. E.g. ROBINSON. He uses "co-inherence" as an alternative, 
p. 84.
55. The fullest of these is GRIFFIN. See also Griffin, "Creation 
out of Chaos"; GARRISON, pp. 50-4; PITTENGER (PG), 
ch. 7. For a sympathetic critique of process theodicy, 
see Frankenberry, "Some Problems in Process Theodicy". 
See also the critiques of Griffin's position in 
DAVIS, pp. 119-28.
56. See KAUFMAN, ch. 4. "Two Models of Transcendence". AYER, 
pp. 45-7 maintains transcendence is unintelligible, 
but see reply in PHILLIPS (CP), p. 39. Cf. KEE for 
transcendence in secular terms. On "models", see 
BARBOUR; RAMSEY (MM); and King, "Models of God's 
Transcendence". For a critique of Kaufman, see 
Jones, "Gordon Kaufman's Perspectival Language".
57. See below, section 4.
58. See above, pp. 11-2.
59. E.g. McCLOSKEY, ch. II. Cf. Puccetti, "The Loving God". 
Also both SONTAG (GE) and ROTH throughout.
60. Thus, from the theistic side, HICK (EGL:b), p. 11 quotes 
H.E. Fosdick that for the theist the mystery of 
evil is very difficult, but for the atheist the 
problem of goodness is impossible. He also cites 
TSANOFF, p. 5; and G. MacGregor, An Introduction to 
Religious Philosophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1959), p. 253. I would add MADDEN & HARE, pp. 32-4
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on isomorphism of good and evil. Contrast FARRER (LA), 
pp. 8-9 which argues from evil to God. Cf. also 
Cahn, "Cacodaemony", and the reply in King-Farlow, 
"Cacodaemony and Devilish Isomorphism". D.L. Edwards 
(op. cit. fn. 15), p. 130 makes it an issue of 
inescapable choice as to whether good or evil is the 
problem. Cf. also Clark, "God, Good, and Evil".
61. See COWBURN. For a reductio ad absurdum of Leibnizian 
optimism, see BARTH~ III/l, pp. 388-414. HICK 
(EGLtb) ch. VII offers a good review of 18th century 
optimism. Cf. also Jolivet, "Evil"; Sutherland, 
"Optimism and Pessimism". The most quoted example 
of theodical optimism is Pope's Essay on Man. For the 
ultimate basis of epistemology in ambiguous situations, 
see JEFFNER, pp. 128-29 on the non-justifiable but 
inescapable choice between "metaphysical pessimism 
and optimism".
62. For Hick, see above pp. 16-8; for Hume, below p. 48.
63. On the "privative" view of evil, see the review of the
debate in Kane, "Evil and Privation", and the reply 
in Anglin and Goetz, "Evil is Privation".
64. Cf. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 265.
65. Cf. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 14. See also Malcolm, "Is it a
Religious Belief" on affective aspects of religious 
belief.
66. See ZUURDEEG, p. 58 for "convictional language". Cf.
McCLENDON and SMITH, pp. 29-35 and 79 ff. HORDERN 
is much influenced by Zuurdeeg.
67. On the distinction of convictional and indicative language, 
see ZUURDEEG, pp. 56-7.
68. Borrowing a term from EVANS. Evans argues that "Jones" 
utterance "God is my creator" involves a certain 
attitude and a certain commitment to a way of life 
and that to separate them is to deny the "logic" of 
biblical language. Cf. the notion of "tonitions" 
in Wisdom, "God and Evil".
69. See MADDEN and HARE. For comment, see Ruiz, "God and the 
Problem of Evil".
70. See e.g. FLEW (GP), (PA), and Flew, "Theology and Falsifica- 
tion". On Flew as non-neutral, cf. TILLEY, p. 104.
71. See Puccetti, "The Loving God".
72. See AUGUSTINE (CG),p. xxxv. The full title is "Concerning 
the City of God, Against the Pagans".
73. See VOLTAIRE. For the complex relationships between 
Candide and Leibniz 1 Theodicy, see W.H. Barber, 
Voltaire, Candide (London: Edward Arnold, 1960), 
pp. 4i-57. L.G. Crocker's edition of Candide ou 
L'Optimisme (London: Hodder and Stoughton), pp.10-5 thin 
the attack is on "Leibnizianism" generally, not on 
Theodicy.
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74. See fn. 61 above.
75. See TSANOFF. For comment, see SCHILLING, pp. 155-56. 
Cowburn instances A.-D. Sertillanges, O.P., 
Le Probleme du Mal (Paris: Aubier, 1948), p. 11 for 
optimistic hope in historical review.
76. Cf. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 72, "Hick is not content with
conceptual analysis. He wants philosophy to promote, 
praise, blame, and advocate."
77. See GRIFFIN. For comment, see pp. 52-3 below.
78. For discussion of philosophy as ideologically neutral, see 
WARNOCK, pp. 114-18. MITCHELL (JRB), however, sees 
philosophy operating at two levels a) deductive 
reasoning within a system of thought; and b) 
comparison of rival internally consistent systems 
of thought. And K. Wilson (op. cit. fn. 18, pp. 
11-2)sees philosophy having three functions: 
analysis of logical structure, recommendation of 
changes in the fundamental conceptual structure, 
and system-building.
79. KEIGHTLEY (WGG), pp. 67 ff. See also the general argument 
in SHERRY, pp. 33-45. For discussion see below, 
pp. 149-52.
80. See JOURNET. For comment, see pp. 70-1 below.
81. See FARRER. (LA). Cf. Hebblethwaite, "Austin Farrer 1 sConcept"
82. See MARITAIN (TPE). Also (GPE).
83. These words are used in a general rather than a technical
sense, though the two obviously relate. Wittgenstein 
distinguishes reference (Bedeutunq) from sense (Sinn) 
in Tractatus. See HUDSON (WRB), pp. 23-5 for comment.
84. See, e.g., HICK (GUF), pp. 1-36. Cf. I.T. Ramsey, Models 
for Divine Activity (London: S.C.M. Press, Ltd., 
1973), p. 58. However, the division of cognitivists/ 
non-cognitivists in HEIMBECK, pp. 21-3 is not in mind, 
as that is really the distinction between non- 
reductionists and metatheological sceptics. (He 
lists, for example, D.Z. Phillips and J. Wisdom as 
cognitivists).
85. See BRAITHWAITE.
86. PHILLIPS (RWE), ch. 9 writes on Braithwaite under the
chapter title "Unconscious Reductionism"; but H.D. 
Lewis, Philosophy of Religion (London: The English 
Universities Press Ltd., 1965), pp. 91-7 terms it 
"attenuation", by which he means "emaciating it and 
reducing the substance of it" (p. 97).
87. PHILLIPS (RWE), pp. 147-48, (cf. p. 151) - Phillips here 
denies his position is reductionist.
88. HICK (GUF), p. vii. Cf. the title of ch. 2, "Religion as Fact 
asserting".
89. Hick "Theology and Verification".
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90. HICK (GUF), pp. 22-24.
91. Ibid., pp. 24-5.
92. Ibid., pp. 25-8 for Hick's account of the differences. Cf. 
Nielsen,"Wittgensteinian Fideism" for his eight "dark 
sayings" of this position. For Phillips 1 account, 














PHILLIPS (RWE), p. 147.
Ibid., p. 149.
PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 63.
HICK (GUF), ch.i, "Theology's Central Problem".




Ibid., pp. 122-28, 134-39.
Ibid. , p. 134.
Ibid., pp. 129-33. Swinburne complains, "I do not find 
enough argument in Phillips* paper ..." (p. 129)
For what it means to say "pictures" do not contradict 
other, see PHILLIPS (RWE), pp. 165-67.




sociology of knowledge and religion, see BERGER, 
pp. 49-65. For development of the latter point see 
below, pp. 122-29 and 176-80.
106. For issues raised in this paragraph, see the helpful ch. 5 
in SHERRY, esp. the notion of spirituality as having 
to do with both a way of life in which people attempt 
to acquire holiness and an awareness of the presence 
of God through prayer, meditation and other spiritual 
practices (p. 110), and the transformation of the 
whole personality (p. 112). For discussion, see 
below, section 4C.
107. See HICK (GUF), pp. 29-33. He argues philosophy is not for 
or against religion, but is for and against the 
belief-worthiness of religious claims. But see 
Hardy (op. cit. fn. 5)on truth and truth claims in 
religion - "Truth, in whatever sphere it appears, 
cannot be given a concrete definition; it is rather 
what people at work in these spheres are striving 
together to delineate" (p. 115).
108. See also below, p. 85 and cf. esp. HAIKOLA, pp. 129-47. 
Also see Kellenberger, "Three Models of Faith". 
On the rebellious belief of devils, see SMITH, p. 73. 
Also see PHILLIPS, (CP), p. 28.
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Section Two
1. In PIKE,pp. 85-102. On the relationship between Hume and
"Philo", see the review of debate in GASKIN, pp. 159- 
66. For discussion of Gaskin on Hume, see below, 
pp. 47-9. For some responses to Pike's article, 
see articles cited in fn. 68 below.
2. PIKE, p. 86.
3. For Aiken, Flew, Mackie, and McCloskey, see bibliography.
Pike cites for C.J. Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny 
of Religion (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1953), 
ch. 16; for J.S. Mill, Theism (New York: The Liberal 
Arts Press, 1957), p. 40; for J.E. McTaggart, Some 
Dogmas of Religion (London: Edward Arnold, Ltd., 
1906), pp. 212 ff. HICK (EGL:b)pp. 365-86, in his 
survey of theodicy (1966-77) speaks of Pike (together 
with Plantinga) as "having done definitive work on 
the logical issue" (p. 370). For Pike's recent 
detailed response to and development of Plantinga, see 
his "Plantinga on Free Will and Evil".
4. PIKE, p. 87.
5. AHERN, p. 3.
6. Ahern's translation, ibid., p. 2, but with changed typography. 
For Latin text in Patrologia Latina, VII, 121, see 
ibid., p. 11 where Ahern in his fn. 2 notes 
differences of translation compared with HICK (EGL).
7. Later discussion distinguished the active from the passive 
will of God. For a brief discussion see COWBURN, 
pp. 32-4. For the notion of "permission" see Kern 
and Splett, "Theodicy", and cf. the title of 
MARITAIN (GPE). On what God is "able" to do see 
GEACH, ch. 1-2, and SWINBURNE (CT), ch. 9 and pp. 288 f
8. Note AHERN, p. 11, fn. 3, that though this is commonly
attributed to Augustine (e.g., in J.W. Steen, "The 
Problem of Evil: Ethical Considerations", Canadian 
Journal of Theology, Vol. XI, No. 4 (1965)),only the 
substance of it is in Augustine, at Confessions, Bk. 
7, ch. 5.
9. See below, pp. 57-8 and 64-8.
10. For exposition and critique of "Augustinian" theodicies, see 
HICK (EGL:b), pp. 169-98. Cf. also pp. 236-40. For 
an excellent summary of Augustine's writing on "evil", 
see Kern and Splett, "Theodicy".
11. Summa Theologiae, 1, Q.2, A.3 as quoted in AHERN, p. 3.
12. See SILLEM.
13. Ibid., p. 43.
14. Ibid., p. 44.
15. Ibid.
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16. Ibid., pp. 44-5. For modern interpreters of Aquinas'
handling of the problem of evil, see esp. MARITAIN 
(TPE) (GPE)j JOURNETj CONNELLAN; COPLESTON; 
Burrell, "A Psychological Objection". For comment 
on the Thomist tradition, see GRIFFIN, ch. 7; 
McCLOSKEY; and HICK (EGL:a), pp. 99-120. Sillem (p. 45 
quotes V. White O.P., God the Unknown (London: 
Harvill Press, 1956), p. 44, in support of his 
position. He rejects as false the view that in 
Thomas reason and faith are juxtaposed and cites thus 
J. Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (London: O.U.P., 
1939), p. 127.
17. See McCLOSKEY. For discussion of McCloskey's thought, see 
Reichenbach, B., "Natural Evils and Natural Laws".
18. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
19. Ibid., p. 42.
20. On "Manichaeism" see J. Hastings (ed.) Encyclopaedia of
Religion and Ethics. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1921), 
vol. 8, pp. 394-402.
21. PHILLIPS (FPE), ch. XIII.
22. Ibid., p. 263. For a similar use of "role" as important 
in this regard, see SHERRY, p. 137.
23. See below, pp. 75-6 and 112-16.
24. See above, pp . 21-2.
25. For discussion of religious belief and "absolute", see below, 
pp. 161-69.
26. Taken from Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,
section X, as in PIKE, pp. 22-3, with changed typograph
27. AHERN, p. ix. Epicurus' "invidus" is here "malevolent".
28. See GASKIN.
29. Ibid., p. 168.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 166. In addition to Gaskin's discussion cited 
fn. 1 above, see N. Capaldi, "Hume's Philosophy of 
Religion: God Without Ethics." International Journal 
for The Philosophy of Religion, I (1970): 233-40; 
B.L. Clarke, "The Modern Atheistic Tradition", same 
Journal, V, (1974): 209-24; D.W. Harward, "Hume's 
Dialogues Revisited", International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, VI, (1975): 137-53. Cf. also 
H.D. Aiken, in HUME," p. ix-he thinks Hume destroyed 
rational religion in order to restore faith as the 
only and sufficient bulwark of the religious life.
32. GASKIN, pp. 166-67.
33. GASKIN, p. 166 here cites the Kemp Smith, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 
1947), p. 142.
34. Ibid.



























Ibid., p. 58. Contrast to Hume, SONTAG (GE) (GW) "which make 
evil and atheism the starting point for thought in 
theodicy.
Dialogues X, in PIKE, p. 26. Here pace, Wolfe "Hume on Evil 1 
who argues that Hume saw evil as strong evidence 
against God, but not amounting to proof. Moore, 
"Evidence, Evil and Religious Belief" argues rather 
that evidence is not applicable to whether God exists 
as we do not know what kind of universe would 
constitute evidence for the God of theism. See also, 
Pargetter, "Evil as Evidence Against the Existence of 
God" and the reply in Martin, "Is Evil Evidence Against 
the Existence of God?" On Christian response to 
ambiguity, see Ruiz, "God and the Problem of Evil: 
A Critical Review", p. 601.
GASKIN, p. 167.
See GORMAN, p. 16.
See Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence", (p. 47 in PIKE).
Ibid.
See AHERN. Cf. Ramberan, "Evil and Theism" for a similar 




, p. 35. For the notion of "proportionate good", see 
ibid., p. 31. Cf. Yandell, "The Greater Good Defense", 
p. 4 - Every evil is logically necessary to some good 
which either counterbalances or overbalances it, and 
some evil is overbalanced by the good to which it is 
logically necessary. For criticism of Yandell, see 
Kane, "Theism and Evil", and for the reply, see 
Yandell, "Theism and Evil: A Reply".
Ibid., p. 36.
Thus, AHERN, p. 37 instances R.D. Bradley: "A being which 
is responsible for evil through not preventing it 
when it could is not wholly good", and "If a being 
is willing that evil exists, then it is not perfectly 
good." And unattributed (p. 41, fn. 30): a) A 
being which does not prevent unnecessary evil when it 
can is malevolent; b) A being which does not prevent 
avoidable evil when it can is malevolent.
Ibid., p. 38. Cf. here, Reichenbach, "The Deductive Argument'
He refers to pp. 22-32. For a further argument see below,
p. 55. For his statement of the necessary and suffici- 
ent conditions for solving the problem of evil, see his 
p. 31.
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55. Ibid., p. 38. I side here with Ahern, and against Lugenbehl 
"Can the Argument from Evil be Decisive After All?". 
Lugenbehl argues an Omnipotent God could have 
permitted us to have the required knowledge to see 
the connection of good and evil. But that would 
suppose omniscience for finite beings, and that is 
not possible.
56. See GRIFFIN. As a process theodicist Griffin is a keen 
critic of classical theism.
57. Ibid., p. 19.
58. Classical theism does not speak of "omnipotence" apart from 
the context of other attributes of God which are 
strictly personal - love, grace, forgiveness, mercy, 
etc. The question is, therefore, what does classical 
theism mean by omnipotence? On this, see below, pp. 
67 and 268-69.
59. See McCLOSKEY. For a further argument against McCloskey's 
point here, see below pp. 75-6.
60. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
61. Ibid., p. 9.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid. The "elsewhere" is footnoted by McCloskey as Meta- 
Ethics and Normative Ethics (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1969).
64. AHERN, pp. 78-9.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 50. This argument is central to Ahern's treatment 
of "actual evil". It also cuts against actual theodi- 
cies for they are all equally attempting an impossible 
task of seeking to establish what only God's eye can 
see (pp. 56-7) - the inter-relations between all events,
67. GRIFFIN, p. 20.
68. Ibid. The effect of this point of Griffin's is to make 
redundant the discussion in the literature (over 
Pike's article "Hume on Evil") as to whether in fact 
the theist can supply a morally justifiable reason 
for God creating this world. (See, e.g. Dore, "Do 
Theodicists Need to Solve the Problem of Evil?"; 
Richman, "The Argument from Evil"; Langston, "The 
Argument from Evil"; Oakes, R.A. "God, Suffering, 
and Conclusive Evidence".) See further below, pp. 
75-6.
69. McCLOSKEY, p. 21.
70. HICK (EGL:b), p. 3.
71. Ibid., p. 5.
72. HICK (EGL:a), pp. 33-9. Cf. DAVIS, p. 40. Hick leaves
process theodicy on one side on this basis ((EGL:a), 
p. 36); he sees it as an internal dualism in the 
Godhead, whereas traditional theism concerns God as 
"limitlessly" good and loving.
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74. Though the finite theist would reply that one man's evasion 
is another man's truth, and that he is not defending 
hellenized Christianity.
75. On some problems of'Vorship-worthiness" and the God of 
classical theism, see McCLOSKEY, ch. 5, "God as 
Finite and Imperfect: Worship-worthiness". See also 
Rachels, "God and Human Attitudes". GRIFFIN, ch. 17, 
"Worshipfulness and the Omnipotence Fallacy", defends 
process theodicy against the charge that it does not 
describe a reality which is perfect and hence worthy 
of worship. However, what he does is to redefine 
"perfect" to include necessary limitation.
76. However, in his recent contribution to DAVIS, Hick more
clearly states that theodicy concerns internal coherenc 
of the believer's problem (p. 39). But the discussion 
is still apart from its location in worship as argued 
below in section 4C.
77. DOSTOYEVSKY, Bk. 5, ch. 4. See Harries, "Ivan Karamazov's 
Argument", for comment, and an attack on Phillips 1 
and Soelle's responses in theodicy. On "rebellion", 
see p. 87 below, and on "protest", see pp. 282-84.
78. HICK (EGL:b), p. 370.
79. Many authors speculate whether, on balance, good in the 
world outweighs evil, or vice versa, thus implying 
a quantitative approach. Some, however, suggest any 
evil in the world raises the full problem of evil, 
thus implying a qualitative view of evil and good. 
Two problems attach to both positions. Firstly, 
no-one is sufficiently omniscient to make such 
judgements. Secondly, there are no criteria for 
assessing the relative weights of goods against 
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with an irreducible ambiguity.
80. Job 13:15. The RSV gives a different interpretation, but
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religious belief characterised by unconditional trust.
81. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1972). (Rawl's "bargaining game" aims at 
players arriving at unanimous agreement on a set of 
principles that will henceforth serve as the 
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82. On this see section three, and pp. 201-02,259-62.
83. For my understanding of "form of life", see below, p. 126. 
See on "form of life", Sutherland, "On the Idea of a 
Form of Life's Raschke, "Meaning and Saying in 
Religion".
84. See HICK (EGL:b), pp. 370-72, and most recently in DAVIS, 
p. 40 where he writes, "even if it should be sound, 
I suggest that their argument wins only a Pyrrhic 
victory". (Cf. pp. 43-4).
85. See PIKE, p. 102.
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religion, see Caton, "The Theological Import of 
Cartesian Doubt". He argues Descartes reverses the 
traditional theological solution by subordinating 
faith to reason, and thereby establishes the secular 
attitude characteristic of modern rationalism (p. 221) 
On the distinction between "philosophical" and 
"practical" doubt, see PHILLIPS (RWE), pp. 1-8, 
together with the attack throughout that book on 
the Humean legacy of philosophical doubt in religious 
understanding. On the question of "natural assumptior 
in epistemology, see FARRER, (FS) pp. 12-3, and on beli 
as "practical and passionate", see FARRER, (LA) pp. 11 
For a variation on this last in terms of "saving 
faith" see FARRER, (FS) pp. 14-5, which argues for a 
proper distinction between saving faith and philoso- 
phical reflection, with the consequence that the 
philosopher must know that he is examining or 
articulating the assumptions of the believing mind. 
For Farrer's philosophical side, see FARRER (FI), and 
for his ideas on religion see FARRER (SB).
87. E.g. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 106, "All I have tried to do is to 
make clearer a religious view of evil", and his talk 
of the philosopher's "descriptive task" in PHILLIPS 
(RWE), p. 189.
88. L. Wittgenstein, Zettel 144. (Oxford Blackwell, 1967), 
ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. 
G.E.M. Anscombe.
89. Ibid., 173.
90. See WINCH (ISS), pp. 23 and 83 ff. For the argument on this 
point and the references to Winch and Holmer in this 
paragraph, see SHERRY, pp. 118-19.
91. For discussion of Holmer, see SHERRY, pp. 118-21 (full 
Holmer bibliography given on p. 220). See also 
Sherry, "Learning How to be Religious".
92. Above, p. 56.
93. I take it biblical "definitions" such as "I am who I am" 
and "He who is" are making this point. "God is 
love" is hardly a definition; cf. "God is a 
consuming fire" (Hebrews 12:29, cf. Deut 4:24).
94. Especially his theory of the brokenness of language 
regarding God. See EARTH, HI/3, p. 293.
95. Cf. section one, fns. 10 and 15.
96. HICK (EGL:b), p. 4.
97. Ibid., p. 5.
98. Ibid. See above, p. 57.
99. See MILES, pp. 159-64.
100. Above, pp. 42-6. See also below, pp. 112-16. For discus- 
sions of the meaning of "existence" talk in theology, 
see KEIGHTLEY (WGG), pp. 80-84 and 139-57; SHERRY, 
pp. 191-93; HUDSON (PAR), pp. 89-105. Keightley
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commital; Sherry leans towards the need to recognise 
"ontology" as implicit in the grammar; Hudson rejects 
the "existence" question.
101. Above p. 9. Also see below, section 3.
102. HICK (EGL:b), p. 4.
103. As Aquinas argued, the impossibility lies in the nature of 
illogicality, and not in the task. See AQUINAS (ST) 
la, q25 art 3. Descartes argued that God can do 
absolutely anything. For discussion see GEACH, 
ch. 1, but cf. SWINBURNE (CT), p ft 160. See also 
section 4, fn. 106. Also, see GORMAN, p. 26, for 
details of the Norwegian Johan B. Hygen's Guds allmakt 
og det ondes problem (Oslo, 1973), which, German says, 
makes an examination of "omnipotence" in Christian 
tradition and concludes that though the concept is 
early and well-established, it has weak support in 
the Bible and the earliest Church. In these, 
"pantokrator" means "ruler of everything", and is 
largely a title of honour and reverence.
104. GEACH makes much of this in relation to God as
Truth, but see the discussion with Harrison noted abo\ 
section 1, fn. 11. Cf. also Khamara, "In Defence 
of Omnipotence" on God being able to, but not breaking 
his promises.
105. Below, pp. 268-69. On "love-omnipotent", see RELTON, ch. 6, 
"The Omnipotence of Love in Relation to Human Freedom" 
Cf. FERRE (RR) ch.4,"Nature and the Problem of Evil", 
pp. 259-69, which defends his theodicy of a "sovereign 
God of love".
106. HICK (GUF), p. 176.
107. MADDEN and HARE, p. 4.
108. Ibid. For critique of the "privative" definition, see 
HICK (EGL:b), pp. 53-8, and McCLOSKEY, pp. 25-41. 
See also fn. 63 in section 1.
109. See JOURNET. For a slightly more cautious approach, see 
CONNELLAN.
110. Plotinus, 1st Ennead, 8th Treatise, "The Essence and Origin 
of Evils". Quoted by Journet, ibid., p. 27.
111. MADDEN and HARE, p. 5.
112. Ibid.
113. Above, pp. 13-9.
114. SONTAG maintains the opposite - see fn. 42 above.
115. MADDEN and HARE, p. 5. For comment, see GRIFFIN, pp. 
252-53.
116. For discussion of this problem, see GILL. In the context 
of specifying "evil", see the subjective element in 
FARRER (LA), pp. 18-19.
117. See NOVAK, in bibliography.
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Knopf, 1962).
119. NOVAK, pp. 159-60.
120. Ibid., p. 160, (as quoted by Novak).
121. Ibid.
122. See below, pp. 131-32.
123. See DAVIES, pp. 22-4. Davies's point would undermine that 
of Wainwright, "Christian Theism and the Free Will 
Defense: A Problem", which argues that as God is a 
moral agent and yet cannot sin, so the Free Will 
Defense cannot argue that moral agency in man logicall 
involves ability to sin.
124. NOVAK, p. 160.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., pp. 160-61.
127. Ibid., pp. 161-62. Cf. here Phillips 1 use of Kierkegaard - 
see below, section 3. Similarly, see Lewis, "On 
Forgiveness", replying to Minas, "God and Forgiveness"
128. Ibid., p. 163. Cf. the approach of Job's friends!
129. Ibid.
130. See above, pp. 4-5.
131. By constitutive I mean "makes what it is". See below, pp. 
139, 225-31, and 241-48 for development.
132. NOVAK, p. 165. Cf. the argument in SONTAG (GE) passim.
For a strong recent reiteration, see his contribution 
to DAVIS, pp. 137-51.
" H
133. GORMAN, p. 65. German's book, esp. ch. 4-5, is heavily
influenced by HARE (LM) and (FR).
134. Ibid., cf. MOBERLY, p. 1, for the problem of evil as an 
ethical question.
135. Op. cit., p. 146. Cf. the similar argument in Hitterdale, 
"The Problem of Evil and the Subjectivity of Values".
136. On the motive for this, see COWBURN, p. 5. He takes A.-D. 
Sertillanges, Le probierne du mal, (Paris, 1948, II, 
p. 50) to task for implying that if one's view of 
reality could be all-embracing, one would, on the 
aesthetic argument, see no evil at all. Cf. also 
Pope's Essay on Man, "All nature is but art unknown 
to thee ... in erring reason's spite, One truth is 
clear, Whatever is, is right."
137. The influence derives through Thomist theology. See above, 
fn. 63 (section l), fn. 108 (this section).
138. See Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy, Science and Health with a Key 
to the Scriptures (1875). See also, McCullough/ 
"Theodicy and Mary Baker Eddy". Cf. "maya" in 
Advaita Vedanta Hinduism.
139. On this, see HICK (EGL:b), pp. 49-53 and 70-82.
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146. Ibid., p. 61.
147. Ibid., pp. 61-2.
148. Ibid., p. 62.
149. Cf. Mitchell's argument for the worth of the cumulative case 
in MITCHELL (JRB), ch. 3 passim. Also cf. the argument 
from "converging evidences" advanced by Cardinal 
Newman in his Grammar of Assent. HICK (FK), ch. 4, 
describes Newman 1 s thesis as the adding up of proba- 
bilities until they amount to a virtual certainty 
(p. 90). There are strong elements of additive 
methodology in Hick's theodicy. WISDOM pp. 157 f 
draws attention in his essay "Gods" to the use of 
cumulative argument in courts of law. Note also 
SWINBURNE (CT), pp. 45 f for a defence of inductive 
reasoning - "an argument from premisses to a conclusion 
in which the premisses count in favour of, provide 
evidence for, the conclusion, without entailing it."
150. See FLEW (GP), p. 63.
151. McCloskey, "God and Evil", in PIKE, p. 63.
152. Ibid., pp. 63-4.
153. MCCLOSKEY, ch. 8, p. 83.
154. PIKE, p. 65.
155. MCCLOSKEY, p. 113.
156. McCLOSKEY does not provide the reference.
157. PIKE, p. 65.
158. MCCLOSKEY, p. 113.
159. Ibid. Cf. PETIT, p. 88.
160. HICK (EGL:b), pp. 262-65.
161. See for this, McCLOSKEY, p. 97 (which refers in turn to 
MARITAIN (TPE), p. 6).
162. Ibid., p. 98, (quoting MARITAIN (TPE), pp. 16-7. McCLOSKEY 
p. 73, compares MARITAIN (GPE), pp. 37 ff.
163. Ibid., pp. 98-9.
164. Ibid., p. 99.
165. See (section 4), fn. 123. Cf. Burch, "The Defense from 
Plenitude".
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167. Cf. COWBURN, pp. 70 ff, and pace HICK (EGLtb), p. 8. See 
also PITTENGER (PG), p. 72.
168. For my use of "depth", see below, pp. 216-17.
169. See below, pp. 286-87. QUINN, argues the opposite - what 
is morally required is co-extensive with what God 
commands.
170. For example, 1 Cor. 11:17-34.
171. See HICK (EGL:b), pp. 337-41.
172. For a criticism of Hick's handling of biblical material, 
see Davis in DAVIS, pp. 59-60. For Hick's reply, 
see ibid., p. 67.
173. See PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 74.
174. See HICK (FK), p. 144.
175. For recent clarification by Hick of such "progress", see 
DAVIS, p. 66 - but this does not meet my point.
176. For a "Protest Theodicy", see ROTH, and his contributions 
to DAVIS, pp. 7-22 and 30-7.
177. Cf. GRIFFIN, pp. 27-8.
178. This term derives from Leibniz. For comment, see HICK 
(EGL:a), p. 164 and pp. 193-97, and GRIFFIN, pp. 
133-34. JOURNET, pp. 42-3 attacks it as a distortion 
of his favoured "privative" view.
179. See above, pp. 55-6.
180. See above, pp. 75-6.
181. Centrally argued by J. Wilson, N. Williams, B. Sugarman, 
An Introduction to Moral Education (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1967), pt. 1.
182. On some of the problems here, see B.C. Farr, "Is Moral 
Education an Impossible Dream?", Journal of Moral 
Education, 3 (1974):223-28.
183. Cf. Swinburne, in BROWN (RR), p. 83. He attempts some
terminological clarification making use of Wallace, 
"The Problems of Moral and Physical Evil". Cf. also 
COWBURN, p. vii, who divides (as a basic thesis) 
troubles which are no one's fault, from moral evil 
and its consequences.
184. See FARRER (LA), p. 30.
185. This is the aspect missing from radical dualism which makes 
evil a reality per se.
186. Ibid., p. 26.
187. So also Paterson, "Evil, Omniscience and Omnipotence",
p. 15- Cf. SONTAG (GE), p. 29, which says that where 
God is concerned this distinction between natural and 
moral evil breaks down.
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"stratonician" principle to his later "presumption 
of atheism" - e.g. FLEW (PA), ch. 1. Cf. discussion 
above, pp. 71-4.
189. See HICK (EGL:b), p. 238.
190. See Kane, "The Failure of Soul-making Theodicy".
191. See FARRER (LA), p. 34.
192. For an account and critique of this see Mackie, "Evil and 
Omnipotence", in PIKE, pp. 53-5. See MEYNELL (GW), 
pp. 71-5 for a reply to Mackie so that "third-order 
good" does not entail an infinite regress.
193. See Swinburne, "The Problem of Evil", in CAHN and SHATZ, 
pp. 3-19 (esp. pp. 14-5).
194. McCLOSKEY, p. 19.
195. In PIKE, pp. 61-2.
196. See below, pp. 205-07.
197. In PIKE, pp. 63-5.
198. Ibid., p. 64.
199. McCLOSKEY, p. 18.
200. AHERN, passim. Contrast McCLOSKEY, ch. 1 and 2.
201. See GRIFFIN, pp. 282-85,for further distinctions
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AHERN, ch. 4.
202. In PIKE, p. 47.
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by "good" they refer to social utility, whilst 
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that these, or similar alternatives, affect the 
basic issue in the theodicist's use of the phrase 
"moral evil", which is intended to refer to any 
situation of adversely judged moral behaviour. 
Conversely, "good" means all positively judged moral 
behaviour whatever its motivation. "Right" and 
"social utility" fall in this instance within this 
frame.
204. PHILLIPS (RWE), p. 181.
205. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 26.
206. Ibid., p. 33.
207. GORMAN, p. 15.
208. Ibid.
209. FARRER (LA), p. 7.
210. GRIFFIN, pp. 15-6. Griffin returns several times to "Evil, 
problem of, ... as theoretical", in a useful series 
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212. Section One, fn. 15.
213. See HEBBLETHWAITE, in bibliography.
214. Op. cit., pp. 8-10.
215. Ibid., respectively, ch. 2 and ch. 3.
216. Ibid., p. 10.






223. See HICK (EGL). In addition to fn. 43 in section 1, for 
discussion of Hick's theodicy see: Puccetti, "The 
Loving God", and the reply, Hick, "God, Evil and 
Mystery"; Trethowan, "Dr. Hick and the Problem of 
Evil", and the reply, Hick, "The Problem of Evil in 
the First and Last Things "; Ward, "Freedom and the 
Irenaean Theodicy", and the reply, Hick, "Freedom 
and the Irenaean Theodicy Again"; Rist, "Coherence 
and the God of Love", and the reply, Hick, "Coherence 
and the God of Love Again "; MADDEN & HARE, and 
the reply, HICK (EGLrb), pp. 375-76. See also Hick's 
"Remarks" in the debate between Phillips and Swinburne 
in BROWN (RR) pp. 122-28. Also the critique in 
GRIFFIN, ch. 13. For Hick's recent restatement of 
his position, together with his defences against, 
and critiques of S.T. Davis, J.K. Roth, D.R. Griffin, 
F. Sontag, see DAVIS, passim.
224. HICK (EGL:b), pp. 334-35.
225. Pace A. Boyce Gibson, "Differing Perspectives in Religion 
and Philosophy", International Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion, 1 (1970):16-21.
226. For the interaction in the present of experience and tradi- 
tion in theology, see SCHILLEBEECKX, section 1, ch.l.
227. Cf. WARD (CG) for an attempt to set philosophical handling 
of theology in such a broad context, and esp. ch. 3. 
"The Credal Context of Belief in God". WARD (RT), 
however, is an exercise in metaphysics, and seeks a 
God compatible with various major religions (p. 1), 
though still meeting the desires of worship (p. 234).
228. See section 4 for development.
229. See RAMSEY (BSR) in bibliography.




233. See GORMAN p. 61. Cf. WARD (CG), pp. 1-4, for a protest 
about the distance that much philosophy of religion 
has from the practised belief it claims to discuss.
234. See RAMSEY (RL), ch. 2, esp. p. 89. See also Ramsey, 
"The Paradox of Omnipotence".
235. Above, pp. 66-7.
236. PHILLIPS, (RWE), ch. 3.
237. Ibid., p. 27.
238. Ibid., passim.
239. Ibid. Besides Tylor, he discusses thus, for example, Fraze 
Marett, Freud, Durkheim.
240. This is the thrust of PHILLIPS (RWE), ch. 10, "Does God 
Exist?", but generally underlies (CP) and (FPE).
241. PHILLIPS (RWE), p. 152.
242. Ibid., p. 172.
243. For discussion, see SHERRY, pp. 117-34.
244. Cf. the central thesis of Winch, "Meaning and Religious 
Language", that to understand the way in which a 
system of ideas is related to reality one needs to 
examine the actual application in life of those 
ideas, and not fasten attention on the "peculiar 
entities" referred to by them. Cf. esp. PHILLIPS 
(FPE), pp. 101-09.
245. WITTGENSTEIN (LRB), p. 71. For comment see HUDSON (WRB), 
pp. 165-67 and PHILLIPS (DI), p. 65.
246. WILSON (LPT), in bibliography.
247. For this catena of points see ibid., pp. 13-7.
248. Ibid., pp. 18-19. I have added "evil" to Wilson's list. 
He has "negative".
249. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
250. Ibid., pp. 20-1. Cf, e.g., WITTGENSTEIN (PI), 19 and 23: 
"to imagine a language means to imagine a form of 
life" , "... the term "language-gjame" is meant to 
bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of 
language is part of an activity, or of a form of 
life". On "form of life", see below, p. 126.
251. I am using "speech-act" here to stand for the inter- 
penetration of speech and action by which meaning is 
communicated, and which lies within later "Wittgensteii 
ian" philosophy. For the technical use of "speech- 
act" as linguistic act, see AUSTIN; EVANSj J. Searle, 
Speech Acts; An Essay in the Philosophy of Language 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For a 
recent thorough application of this idea to theology, 
see McCLENDON and SMITH. See further below, pp. 122-2
252. Cf. above, pp. 42-6, and below, section 4C.
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253. Op. cit., p. 18.
254. Cf. Roth, in DAVIS, p. 8. "What does 'evil' mean? That 
question itself is a crucial element in the problem 
of evil. The word often, functions as a noun, 
suggesting that evil is an entity. In fact, evil 
is activity, sometimes inactivity ..." Cf. above, p. 45, 
D.W.D. Shaw, Who is God? (London: S.C.M. Press, 
1968), chs. 3-4, on taking God's attributes 
adverbially. Cf. Brunton, "A Model for ... D.Z. Philli
255. In FLEW (LL), pp. 11-36.
256. Ibid., p. 13.
257. Ibid., p. 14.
258. Ibid., pp. 18-9 (Ryle here discusses "Satan").
259. Ibid., p. 22.
260. For example, Proverbs, ch. 8.
261. However, in section 4 an account is given of how believers 
can be led into mistaken understanding: see pp. 217-24,
262. J. Jeremias , Rediscpvering the Parables (London: S.C.M. 
Press, Ltd., 1965), pp. 12-3.~
263. Cf. Farrer, "A Starting-Point", pp. 10-1. Cf. G.C. Stead, 
"How Theologians Reason", ibid., pp. 108-09.
264. Cf. Farrer, "Revelation", in MITCHELL (FL), pp. 95-9.
(The incarnation is "the self-enacted parable of God- 
head."). See also KING, pp. 111-12 for application of 
Farrer's point to Christology.
265. Cf. I.M. Crombie, "The Possibility of Theological
Statements" in MITCHELL (FL), esp. pp. 65-7. Cf.
C. Lewis, "On the Logic of Belief Claims in Religion",
p. 165 for the inter-connectedness of meaning in
theological doctrines and their setting in life.
He cites N. Smart, Reasons and Faiths (London, 1958),
p. 12 to similar effect.
266. See Foster, "'We' in Modern Philosophy", esp. pp. 199-203. 
He is commenting on G. Ryle, "Ordinary Language" 
(reprinted in C.E. Caton (ed.) Philosophy and 
Ordinary Language (Urbana, Chicago, London: University 
of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 108-127.
267. See HIGH (LPB). My points (i) and (ii) have reference to 
his pp. 1-69. Cf. also pp. 101 f. Cf. SMITH, p. 6; 
Raschke, "Meaning and Saying in Religion". For sharp 
criticism of High, see HELM, pp. 59-63.
268. Ibid., pp. 43-4. See also W. Alston, "Theories of Meaning" 
in A. & K. Lehrer (eds.), Theory of Meaning 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
269. This idea he bases on WITTGENSTEIN (PI), 151. Cf. the
comments on "understanding" in SHERRY, pp. 117-30 and 
189-90.
270. High here appeals to WINCH, pp. 24 f.
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271. AUSTIN sets out the criteria of "happiness", pp. 14-5.
McCLENDON and SMITH make a sustained application of 
Austin's thesis to theology as the science of 
convictions, and link happiness with justification 
of convictions (ch. 4) .
272. HIGH (LPB), p. 22. Cf. the use of "indwelling" (based
on M. Polanyi) by Gill, "Tacit Knowing and Religious 
Belief", pp. 87-8.
273. The bearing of this claim on descriptive theodicy is worked 
out in section 4.
Section Three
1. See above, pp. 21 ff.
2. See above, pp. 13-9.
3. See above, pp. 48-9.
4. See WILSON (LPT), p. 25. Cf. HARE (LM) (FR) passim.
5. Ibid., p. 26.
6. Ibid., p. 27.
7. Ibid., p. 28.
8. See above, pp. 71-4.
9. Op. cit., p. 65.
10. Op. cit., pp. 65 ff. See also MEYNELL (SNC), pp. 39-40 
on subjective/objective aspects of verification of 
value statements.
11. See above, pp. 75-6.
12. Ibid., pp. 66 ff. Cf. L. Kolakowski, Religion (Glasgow: 
Fontana Paperbacks, 1982), p. 97.
13. On the "third man", see Universals 1 and 2, Course A303,
Units 23-25 (Bletchley: Open University Press, 1973), 
and the literature there cited. Cf. the discussion 
on regression of criteria contained in Brown, 
"Religious Morality"; Campbell "Patterson Brown on 
God and Evil"; Flew, "The 'Religious Morality' of 
Mr. Patterson Brown"; Brown, "Religious Morality: A 
Reply to Flew and Campbell". See also HICK (FK), pp. 
95-119, for a limited regression. Cf. also HARE (LM), 
pp. 68 f. for the claim that a complete account of 
criteria is impossible. On this, see MITCHELL (MRS) - 
but his defence of his own position against the charge 
of circularity (p. 161) is weak.
14. WILSON (LPT), pp. 91-7. For discussion of Wilson's theory 
of meaning, see BRAKENHIELM, pp. 31-7.
15. Ibid., p. 94.
16. WILSON (LCB), p. 71.
17. Thus, the "Augustinian" theodicies which appeal to the 
remote past and future as perfect.
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18. Thus, "Best Possible World" theories. Cf. Mother Julian's 
"But all shall be well, and all shall be well, and 
all manner of thing shall be well."
19. Thus "Irenaean" theodicies. See MADDEN & HARE, and also 
GRIFFIN, for such summary characterisations of 
theodical theories.
20. For the background of ideas in this paragraph, see esp.
Whitaker, "Philosophy and the After Life", and BOROS, 
pp. 104-30.
21. GORMAN, ch. 5, "Analysing Evaluative Problems". German
builds on HARE (LM) and (FR). Cf. MOBERLY, p. 1, on 
the evaluative approach.
22. Ibid., p. 62.
23. On "fixedness", see above, p. 126. On commitment cf. fn. 
178 below. On "God" and "good" as bound together in 
language, see the debate between Brown, Flew and 
Campbell cited in fn. 13.
24. Above and below, pp. 107-8 and 276-78. See also Pittenger, 
"The Meaning of Words in Worship".
25. For discussion, see below pp. 225-31 and 241-48. On
"theistic" worship, see SWINBURNE (CT), pp. 282-92: 
("to show explicit respect towards a being acknow- 
ledged as the de facto and demure lord of all things", 
p. 283). But my specification is designed to leave 
as many questions open as possible. I owe the 
"Temple" quote to D. Watson, I Believe in Evangelism 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), p. 157; but 
his page reference is incorrect. It is from W. Tempi 
Readings in St. John's Gospel, 1st and 2nd Series, 
(London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 67. See for philosophic 
discussion of "Worship", Rachels, "God and Human 
Attitudes" (this thesis responds to most of the 
points). Cf. Oakes, "Reply to Professor Rachels".
26. See SHERRY, p. 200, fn. 12, and ch. 6, esp. pp. 140-43, 
"Excursus: Theology as Grammar".
27. See KEIGHTLEY, (WGG), p. 55, for grammar as standards of 
intelligibility; PHILLIPS (CP), p. 8 for depth 
grammar as what can and cannot be said of a concept.
28. See, e.g., on "anticipatory theory", K. Popper, Objective
Knowledge;_An Evolutionary Approach (London: 0.U.P., 
1972), ("there is no sense organ in which anticipatory 
theories are not genetically incorporated",) pp. 71-2. 
On "paradigms of thought", see T.S. Kuhn, The Structurj 
of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University Press, 
1970) 2nd ed., "until the scientist has learned to 
see nature in a different way - the new fact is not 
quite a scientific fact at all.", p. 53. For the use 
of Kuhn in philosophy of religion see MITCHELL (JRB), 
and G. Green, "On Seeing the Unseen: Imagination in 
Science and Religion", Zygon, vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar. 
1981), 15-28, esp. 23-5~.
29. On these points, see PHILLIPS (RWE), p. 3; (FPE), p. 7.
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30. This expression derives from P. Winch. For comment see 
SHERRY, pp. 35-6.
31. Cf. the rejection of old answers about ontology in QUINE.
On "pictures", KEIGHTLEY (WGG), pp. 73-80, shows, pact 
Nielsen, Durrant, Hudson, that Phillips uses "picture* 
= "logical space of a belief".
32. This is Phillips 1 phrase in PHILLIPS (CP), p. 106.
33. PHILLIPS (FPE), ch. 11. See also PHILLIPS and MOUNCE, 
App. 1, and pp. 82 ff. Cf. their contribution to 
HUDSON (IOQ), pp. 228-39.
34. In his Rights and Right Conduct (Oxford: Blackwell, 1959).
35. For 22 contributions about the "Humean guillotine", see 
HUDSON (IOQ).
36. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 225.
37. Ibid., pp. 228-29. Cf. PHILLIPS (RU), ch. 10.
38. Phillips refers to Fear and Trembling (O.U.P., 1939), pp. 
84-5.
39. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 97 "religious beliefs cannot be under- 
stood at all unless their relation to other forms of 
life is taken into account". Cf. (RU), pp. 196-97.
40. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 226.
41. PHILLIPS (RU), ch. 10. On the importance of "practice", 
see PHILLIPS and MOUNCE, passim.
42. On this, see SHERRY, pp. 58-9, where he expresses surprise 
at the lack of comment in Phillips on analogy, and 
refers to Phillips* rejection of natural theology of 
any sort. Phillips does use the word analogy, but 
in the context of contrast, e.g. (FPE), p. 50; (CP), 
p. 128 - a contrast he calls in the former "radical 
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57. And similarly on the "death" of the marriage, if divorce
ensues. For the religious application of this to the 
"death" of God as "turning their backs on God", see 
PHILLIPS (FPE), pp. 111-22, esp. pp . 119-20. Cf. 
PHILLIPS (DI), pp. 76-7.
58. E.g. PHILLIPS (RWE), p. 151; PHILLIPS (CP), ch. 1, also 
p. 149; PHILLIPS (FPE), pp. 11-2.
59. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 109.
60. PHILLIPS (RWE), pp. 189-90. See also HAIKOLA, pp. 129-47 
on the language-games of "Unbelief".
61. Cf. on this, KEIGHTLEY (WGG), pp. 67-8.
62. See below, pp. 245-47 and 282-84.
63. PHILLIPS (FPE), pp. 101 f f. , cf. p. 159. For "Idolatry", 
see PHILLIPS (CP), p. 159.
64. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 160.
65. See below, pp. 171-73, and 235-6.
66. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 160.
67. Above pp. 13-9.
68. This charge of "fideism" is much discussed. The essential 
elements are in Nielsen,"Wittgensteinian Fideism", and 
for a reply, see PHILLIPS (FPE), ch. 5.
69. PHILLIPS (FPE), pp. 11-2.
70. PHILLIPS (RWE), p. 181.
71. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 50.
72. Ibid., p. 51. Cf. the statement "to have the idea of God 
is to know God" - ibid., p. 18.
73. Ibid., p. 60. Cf. above, pp. 62-3 on Winch and Holmer.
74. Ibid., p. 150. See above, p. 4 and below, section 4. Note 
Phillips'1 rather different statement in PHILLIPS (FPE), 
p. 68 - but see section 1, fn. 7. Cf. SMART, p. 74.
75. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 130.
76. Passim, e.g. PHILLIPS (FPE), pp. 2-3; (CP), pp. 21-3.
77. PHILLIPS (CP), pp. 4-11.
78. Ibid., p. 8.
79. Ibid. Cf. fns. 26 and 27 above.
80. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 10.
81. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 89.
82. Ibid., p. 90. For a contrasting account of the non-testabili 
of basic theistic assertions as being parallel to the 
non-testability of statements in science cast at a high 
level of theoreticity, and for the implications of 
assuming this, see Botterill/'Falsification and the 
Existence of God: A discussion of Plantinga's Free 
Will Defense".
83. Ibid., pp. 84-7. See further below, pp. 175-76.
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84. PHILLIPS (RWE), p. 163.
85. Ibid., p.-164. For my account of "forgiveness" see below, 
pp. 275-78.
86. Ibid. The quote from Wittgenstein is from WITTGENSTEIN 
(LRB), p. 54.
87. Ibid., ch. 2, "Hume's Legacy".
88. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 213.
89. Ibid., p. 74.
90. Ibid., pp. 74-5. Cf. also ibid., p. 83, and above, fn. 49.
91. See, e.g. SHERRY; KEIGHTLEY (GG),(WGG); TILLEY; NIELSEN 
(CCR); HAIKOLA; BAELZ; BRAKENHIELM; HUDSON (PAR), 
(WRB); HELM; and essays in PHILLIPS (RU); DURRANT; L  
"Phillips, Earth and the Concept of God"; Olding, 
"D.Z. Phillips and Religious Language"; Nielson, 
"Wittgensteinian Fideism"; Olmstead, "Wittgenstein 
and Christian Truth Claims"; Richmond, '"Religion 
"without Explanation': Theology and D.Z. Phillips"; 
Shepherd, "Religion and the Contextualisation of 
Criteria"; Watt, "Religious Beliefs and Pictures". 
Robinson, "Review"; Brunton, "A Model".
92. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 62.
93. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 63.
94. For the historical emphasis, cf. SHERRY, pp. 45 and 51. For 
discussion see below, pp. 229-30 and 248-74.
95. See SHERRY, pp. 45-6.
96. In DELANEY, p. 64, fn. 7.
97. SHERRY, p. 57. Cf. Richmond, "'Religion without Explanation 
Theology and D.Z. Phillips" for support for Sherry's 
points.
98. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 41.
99. Cf. WITTGENSTEIN (PI), pp. 66-7. Cf. here the problem over 
the metaphysical nature of the "principle of 
verifiability".
100. Above, pp. 139-40.
101. For method of contrast see above, p. 144. See PHILLIPS (CP) 
pp. 43 ff. for discussion of God as a person.
102. Above, pp. 66-7.
103. Pace Phillips in BROWN (RR), p. 120, where he says religious 
talk is not all of a piece or capable of being fitted 
into a neat theological system.
104. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 228.
105. Ibid., p. 157.
106. Ibid., p. 231.
107. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 153. For full discussion see, pp. 149-57.
108. Ibid., p. 152.
109. Ibid., p. 153.
110. Ibid., pp. 150-52; PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 249.
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111. PHILLIPS (DI), pp. 57-8.
112. Ibid., p. 58.
113. Ibid., p. 69.
114. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 50.
115. PHILLIPS (FPE), pp. 248-49.
116. PHILLIPS (CP) - See above, p. 153.
117. Cf. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 69, "It makes no sense to ask which 
came first, the language or the theology". By 
language here, Phillips says he means "the language 
of worship, contemplation, and religious practices".
118. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 51.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 56.
122. For Phillips* qualifications to this, see his fn. 22 in 
(FPE), p. 61.
123. Ibid., p. 74.
124. Ibid. (Phillips footnotes to P. Winch in PHILLIPS (RU), 
pp. 34-8).
125. Ibid., p. 21. (Phillips acknowledges Kierkegaard's 
influence here).
126. Ibid., p. 29.
127. Ibid. The text reads "understanding", but the context is 
that of religious understanding.
128. Ibid., pp. 23-4.
129. Ibid., pp. 22 & 234-35.
130. He makes much use of Simone Weil on this. See WEIL (WG), 
pp. 94-166. For Weil,see section 4, fn. 40.
131. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 26.
132. PHILLIPS (RWE), p. 148.
133. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 194.
134. Ibid., p. 191.
135. Ibid., p. 192. Phillips says this in criticism of a point 
in Wisdom's "Religious Belief". In his paper "Wisdom 1 ; 
Gods" (FPE, ch. IX), Phillips praises Wisdom for 
delivering us from the mistakes of positivism in that 
Wisdom holds that the reality expressed by beliefs abo 
God is to be found in certain patterns of human 
reactions, but criticizes him for not going far 
enough and therefore remaining subject to his own 
critiques (p. 202) - because he seeks justification 
beyond the point where it makes sense to do so (p. 
199).
136. Ibid., p. 217.
137. Ibid., p. 216.
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138. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 68.
139. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 247 (Phillips is here quoting WEIL (WG), 
p. 101). Cf. PHILLIPS (DI), pp. 37-8, and PHILLIPS 
(CP), p. 128-
140. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 100.
141. Ibid., p. 70.
142. Ibid., p. 100 (Phillips italicizes is).
143. Ibid., p. 71. On contemplation and waiting, cf. ALLEN,













































. 129-30. That is,Phillij
things are possible" as meaning either that God can 
do the impossible, or that petitionary prayer proceeds 
like a scientific experiment. He says at (CP) p. 130 
that it means that only God is a necessity, and that 
everything else is merely possible for religious 
believers.
159. Ibid., p. 124.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid., pp. 36-7.
162. PHILLIPS (RWE), p. 172.
163. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 61.
164. Ibid., pp. 55-6.
165. PHILLIPS (DI), p. 49.
166. PHILLIPS (RWE), pp. 164-67.
167. PHILLIPS (DI), p. 45.
168. Ibid., pp. 54-5. (Phillips 1 underlining).
169. TILLEY, p. 63, cites this expression from Phillips' paper 
"Infinite Approximation", Journal of the American
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Acadamy of Religion, 43, 3 (September 1976): 486. 
Cf. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 108. Also cf. Wisdom, fn. 
135 above.
170. PHILLIPS (FPE), ch. VII. All quotes from pp. 127-29.
171. On Phillips having a notion of "true religion" see
KEIGHTLEY (WGG), pp. 67 f. & 84 f. Cf. above, pp. 
150-51 and below, pp. 234-36.
172. TILLEY, pp. 108-09.
173. For a test for "depth grammar" in relation to worship, see 
below pp. 216-17.
174. TILLEY, p. 109.
175. See PHILLIPS (RWE), ch. 10 for his handling of "Moore's 
truisms".
176. See his article in DELANEY, "Is Belief in God Rational?".
177. See SHERRY, p. 85.
178. See above, pp. 125-29. Cf. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 45, which is 
based on P. Winch, "Nature and Convention", Arist. 
Soc. Proc.. (1960), p. 246. Phillips remarks, "in 
the final analysis, the nature of the commitment 
follows from the nature of the language". For 
development see below, pp. 201-03.
179. See above, p. 42. Of interest here is the attack in
McKINNON on treating religious belief in terms of 
"God exists"rather than "I believe in God" - pp. 
56-61 and 81-2.
180. Cf. here RAMSEY (RL), p. 38, with its parallel between 
God and the elusive "I".
181. See Waismann, "Veriflability", Ft.III. For constructive
discussion of Waismann's article, see SHERRY, ch. 8, 
and HUDSON (WRB), pp. 62-7. Sherry discusses criti- 
cally (pp. 172-75) Waismann's suggestion that "true" 
is "systematically ambiguous", but unfortunately in 
developing his own position (pp. 175-78) he does not 
comment on the argument I guote. But this argument 
is important to the distinction Sherry makes (pp. 
175-76) between truth in relation to actual states of 
affairs (ontology) and truth in relation to true 
beliefs, judgements, propositions, etc. (language 
and epistemology). This importance can be seen in 
HUDSON, pp. 64-5. Hudson observes (p. 65), "We must 
proceed through linguistics to ontology", and cites 
WITTGENSTEIN (PI), 373, "Grammar tells what kind of 
object anything is". For comment on this quote (with 
emphasis on the word kind), see Bell, "Theology as 
Grammar: Is God an Object of Understanding?" which 
shifts the emphasis to the precedence of language 
over ontology. Cf. also KING, pp. 77-8.
182. Ibid., pp. 137-38.
183. Ibid., pp. 138-39.
184. Ibid., p. 139.
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185. Ibid., pp. 139-40.
186. Ibid., p. 140.
187. Ibid. Cf. above, pp. 122-27.
188. Ibid.
189. Ibid., pp. 140-41.
190. Ibid., p. 141.
191. Ibid. For accounts of the larger debate concerning languag 
and epistemology, see further BRAKENHIELM, ch. 4; 
McCLENDON and SMITH, pjassim; and HACKING. See 
further on epistemology, below pp. 218-24.
192. PHILLIPS (CP), pp. 84-106; BROWN (RR), pp. 103-21, 134-39.
193. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 106.
194. BROWN (RR), p. 139.
195. Ibid., p. 122.
196. Ibid., p. 124.
Section Four
1. See KEIGHTLEY (WGG), p. 79. "For it to be a religious 
belief, it would have to have - as a matter of 
'grammar' - an absolute character".
2. See above, pp. 179-80.
3. See above, p. 21. See on this, Glenn "Criteria for
Theological Models", especially the argument that 
models for the doctrine of God are culturally 
situated. Cf. HORDERN, who lays great emphasis on 
what he calls "The Personal Language Game" (ch. 8) 
and "Theological Language and Personal Language" 
(ch. 9), and is influenced by J. Macmurray's stress 
that personal knowledge is the paradigm case where 
man knows the meaning of "know".
4. See above, pp. 124-26.
5. See above, p. 127.
6. Below, pp. 184-94.
7. Below, pp. 194-97.
8. As indicated above (pp. 94 and 99), the word "negativity" 
will be introduced at that point rather than 
continuing to use "evil".
9. The debate from counter-factual instances is not always
sufficiently careful on this point. To imagine what 
might be the case within the limits of given structure; 
is permissible. To imagine what different structures 
there might have been serves no purpose in descriptive 
understanding of what is. Cf. HICK (EGL:a) p. 343. 
See also below, p. 268.
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10. To the objection that the notion of separation here is not 
univocal, this theodicist could reply that plurality 
of types of separation reinforces the point made on 
p. 193 below that negativity has various dimensions, 
and also that there is a family resemblance within 
the notion of negative experiences.
11. This general question was raised for me by Hardy, "What 
Does It Mean To Love?". On the answer given here 
see also PITTENGER (PG), pp. 71-2.
12. PHILLIPS (DI), passim.
13. Ibid., p. 17.
14. HICK (EGL:a), pp . 383 f. and (DEL).
15. FARRER (LA), pp. 23-31 and ch. IV. Farrer also argues for 
"accidentality" as inseparable from the character 
of our universe (p. 76), but the theodicist here 
doesn't need this for his basic case.
16. See on "pain", Kane, "Evil and Privation", pp. 48-51; Hare, 
"Pain and Evil"; Puccetti, "Is Pain Necessary?"; 
ELPHINSTONE, ch. 10-12; HICK (EGL:a), ch. XV. (The 
latter provides a bibliography including a physiolo- 
gical and medical literature). This theodicist is 
not using the idea in LEWIS, p. 81 of pain as "God's 
megaphone".
17. For this point see HICK (EGL:a), pp. 340-45, "Pain and the 
Structure of the World".
18. On this, see the discussion in SOELLE, pp. 43-5 of the 
thesis in KITAMORI that we should "earnestly seek 
and desire pain".
19. SONTAG (GE) emphasises this same point of necessary
negativity, but does so in terms of meontological 
existentialist categories.
20. For the themes of contemplation and attention see, e.g., 
WEIL (WG), "Forms of the Implicit Love of God", pp. 
94-167. Cf. above, p. 167.
21. See BROWN (RR), p. 139. On interests and intentions, see 
GORMAN, pp. 18-9.
22. PHILLIPS (CP), p. 43. Cf. Pittenger, "The Meaning of Words 
in Worship".
23. Putting it this way brings out that theological language 
of persons is not concerned with essences, but with 
relations. The grammatical use of the substantive 
"person" here is systematically misleading (Ryle). 
This is also the case with the substantive "love", 
e.g. in "God is love". Cf. above, pp. 111-16.
24. See above, pp. 117-22. Cf. also PHILLIPS (CP), pp. 45-50, 
and the interesting ideas in King, "Concepts, Anti- 
concepts and Religious Experience". She develops 
the notion that it is not what is said (the concept), 
but how it is said that is essential. For King, 
religious language "speaks out of the awareness [of 
God"] rather than about it'*.
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25. For the roots of this doctrine, see MACGREGOR, ch. 2. For 
a critique of impassibility, see same work, and 
SCHILLING. The standard critical historical surveys 
are BRASNETT and MOZLEY. For recent explorations, 
see MOLTMANN (CG); KITAMORI; LEE. See also 
McWilliams, "Divine Suffering in Contemporary Theology 
for accounts of Moltmann, Cone, Kitamori and MacGregor 
Surin, "The Impassibility of God and the Problem of 
Evil" for the Cross as a "suffering theophany"; 
Woolcombe, "The Pain of God". I am taking W. Temple's 
suggestion that it is truer to say there is suffering 
in God than that God suffers (see MOZLEY, p. 163) as 
obscuring rather than clarifying the issue.
26. See above, pp. 122-29.
27. See SCHILLING. Cf. MOZLEY, pp.177-83 for six necessary 
questions: the nature of God as Absolute; His 
relation to creation; the relationship of time and 
eternity; the nature of feeling in God; the 
religious value of passibility; the significance of 
the Cross.
28. Ibid., pp. 248-56.
29. In DELANEY, pp. 141-51. See SMITH (passim) for extended 
historical discussion of the use in the Bible and 
Christianity of "belief" as the verbal sign designatin 
allegiance, loyalty, integrity, love, commitment, 
trust and entrusting, and the capacity to perceive 
and respond to transcendent qualities in oneself and 
one's environment, rather than as a series of 
dubious or at best problematic propositions.
30. Ibid., p. 143.
31. See SCHILLEBEECKX, section 1, to whose account of the nature 
of theological "facts" I owe a debt.
32. For my use of the word "worship" see above, p. 139. For 
the argument in relation to worship see below, pp. 
225-29, 241-48.
33. The "grammatical" place of the "affliction" of Christ in
the believer's "picture" is discussed below, pp. 248-7
34. The Brothers Karamazov, ch. "Rebellion". See DOSTOYEVSKY.
35. McCLOSKEY, ch. 2.
36. CAMPBELL, pp. 287-306. On Campbell's theodical views, see
Coll ins, "C.A. Campbell and the Problem of Suffering". 
Also see D'ARCY (PW), pp. 117-20.
37. ROTH, passim. See also in DAVIS, pp. 7-22, 30-7.
38. HICK (EGL:b), p. 334.
39. See Translators note, WEIL (WG), p. 76. Surin, "The
Impassibility of God and the Problem of Evil", p. 103 
equates this with "dysteleological suffering", and 
also equates it with HICK (EGL:a), pp. 371-72 and 
SOELLE, p. 149. However, Weil's notion is theoreti- 
cally more creative - see discussion below.
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40. WEIL (WG), p. 76. For Well's influence on theodical
thinking see PHILLIPS (CP), pp. 98-106. (Cf. below 
pp. 227-28, 263 f f) . Also ALLEN; and Alien, "Natural 
Evil", and "A Christian Theology", passim. For a 
bibliographic article on Weil, see Springsted, 
"The Works of Simone Weil".
41. Ibid., p. 78.
42. Ibid., p. 79.
43. Ibid., p. 80. N.B. below pp. 217-24, for an account of how 
loss of belief is to be understood.
44. Ibid., pp. 77-9.
45. However, prolonged or frequent physical suffering is not
an "attack of pain", and is an affliction. Ibid.,
p. 77.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 78.
48. Psalm 88 is particularly vivid.
49. Op. cit., p. 130.
50. See above, section 3.
51. See ALLEN. Cf. also HICK (EGL:a), pp. 371-72, but he
emphasizes the mystery of meaningless suffering as th( 
ground of ethical response by man. Cf. Fletcher, 
"Literature and the Problem of Evil", together with 
the editorial comment in Mark, "The Sense of Evil and 
the Sense of Order" for the progression in literature, 
to the ultimate point in Satre's Les sequestres 
d*Altona of a world without meaning. See also 
Mijuskovie,"Camus and the Problem of Evil", and 
CONNELLAN, pp. 20-44 for discussion of Camus.
52. Ibid., pp. 15-6. For use of the notion "void", see also 
ROTH, p. 62.
53. Reprinted in FLEW and MACINTYRE. The literature is consider- 
able. See, FERRE (LLG) and HEIMBECK, for lengthy 
replies. See also the retrospective in Religious 
Studies, 5, No. 1 (1969) which includes further commei 
by Flew; Flew,"Theology and Falsification: Silver 
Jubilee Review".
54. See High, "Belief, Falsification and Wittgenstein", and
Churchill, "Flew, Wisdom, and Polanyi: The Falsifica- 
tion Challenge Revisited". Cf. Lewis, "On the Logic 
of Belief Claims in Religion" that the more basic 
claims in all systems of thought are unfalsifiable; 
and similarly McKINNON.
55. As examples, respectively: Hick ("eschatological verifica- 
tion"); Hare ("bliks")i Phillips ("language-games"
56. Cf. SMITH, p. 12 for an historian's similar comment. On 
"blunders" see WITTGENSTEIN (LRB), pp. 55 ff. Cf. 
the comments on this in HUDSON (WRB) p. 183.
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57. Some argue that evil and suffering are a pre-condition for 
the existence of Christianity which is a response to 
them, e.g. Gruner, "The Elimination of the Argument 
from Evil", p. 416. Even if this is the case, it 
still remains for that response to be philosophically 
described. Bowker, "Suffering as a Problem of 
Religions", agrees suffering creates the opportunities 
for religions.
58. There is an extensive debate on this, and my position is 
here stated. See, e.g., the debate in BROWN (RR) 
between N. Malcolm, C. Lyas, and B. Mitchell, on 
the rationality of religious belief, and between 
P. Winch, M. Durrant, & S. Brown, on meaning and 
religious language (pp. 143-255). See also DELANEYj 
TRIGG; McCLENDON and SMITH; and WILSON (ed.). For 
a bibliography of sixty books and articles on 
rationality and religious commitment see CAHN and 
SHATZ, pp. 308-10. For my understanding of "form of 
life" see above, p. 126.
59. See above, pp. 105-11.
60. See below, pp. 217-24.
61. Cf. PHILLIPS (FPE), p. 86. Cf. fn. 56 above.
62. Ibid., p. 59. Phillips seems not to make a strong distinc- 
tion between blunder and mistake. I am using them 
differently to indicate a radical incoherence in a 
form of life, as against a misapprehension as to the 
shape of one's form of life. The former is 
destructive of belief, the latter is not necessarily 
so.
63. RAMSEY (RL), passim. E.g., logical "mistakes" in incarna- 
tional doctrine are not felt as mistakes, let alone 
"blunders" in the context of living worship.
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